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ABSTRACT

A Defense and Expansion of the Theory of Capitalist Ground Rent:
Speculation, Securitization, and Struggles Over Land and Housing
by
Francesca T. C. Manning

Advisor: Dr. David Harvey

Why are the rents so high? Who is responsible for homelessness, for urban and rural
displacement? How can these problems be combatted?
Recent literature addressing these questions has pointed to gentrification and the
financialization of land and housing, faulted financialized landlords, hedge funds, and the
irredeemable logic of finance, and pointed to the importance of land and housing regulation to
prevent displacement.
However, theories of displacement—in both land and housing, on both urban and rural
terrain—suffer from a lack of an underlying theory of the logic, tendencies, and limits of ground
rent extraction in capitalism.
This dissertation develops a theory of capitalist ground rent that is applicable across the
rural/urban divide. I outline the necessary social forms which arise from capitalist private
property in land, and point to essential tendencies and limits to ground rent extraction. In so
doing I offer the beginning of a general structure which underlies struggles over land and
housing.
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My arguments involve an explication and advancement of Marxian ground rent theory,
and draw extensively on Marx’s own writings as well as classical economists on ground rent. I
analyze mainstream economic research on real estate markets and critical literature on the
financialization of land and housing. I mobilize data from the Bureau of Economic Research, the
Federal Reserve, and the United States Department of Agriculture, as well as some private
companies aggregating data on land, rent, and housing. I draw from personal and published
accounts of struggles by working and poor people for land control.
I situate my arguments in a position on capitalism developed, but not exhausted, by
Value-Form Theorists and Marxian critiques of political economy–which view capitalism as a
system governed in part by specific abstract logics such as that of value production—and by
theorists of racial capitalism, primarily within the Black Radical Tradition, who suggest an
endogenous account of race within the capitalist mode of production and emphasize the
importance of refusal.
Chapter 1, The Landowning Class, presents a defense of the concept of the landowning
class as third class of the capitalist mode of production—a theory which has been widely
abandoned over the last century.
Chapter 2, Ground Rent, revisits Marx’s theory of ground rent by contrasting it with
interest (in opposition to contemporary scholarship which often collapses rent and interest) and
argues that the categories of absolute rent and differential rent each reveal an essential aspect of
the capitalist mode of production: absolute rent highlights the power of the landowner to
withdraw land from the market, and differential rent reveals the fact that land (or space) is the
singular value-less, monopolizable resource.
Chapter 3, Land and “Finance,” defines and categorizes the different forms of speculative
and securitized ground rent, including mortgages, sale price of land, and land-based securities
such as REIT stock and Mortgage-backed securities. I analyze mainstream economic approaches
v

to land-based revenue streams and investment vehicles, and suggest that land-based markets
and land-based securities diverge from other financial investments because they remain
tethered to actual ground rent extraction.
Chapter 4, Landed Class Struggle, analyzes the strategies available to the landowning
class which they may use to increase their power to extract ground rent. These include
withholding land from the market, soliciting favorable government policy, and inducing a rise in
the price of what I call “high-rent commodities.” I advance a novel theory of urban residential
ground rent, locating capitalist production in the reproduction of “home” for monthly sale. I also
suggest a different answer to the question “Why are the rents so damn high?” in urban
residential rentals by applying the same methods Marx used in analyzing agricultural rents.
Chapter 5, Financialization, criticizes what I call the epochal theory of the
“financialization of land and housing,” on the basis that the rise in “finance” and its imbrication
with ground rent is not new, and that the quantitative shifts over the last half century do not
indicate a qualitative, epochal break. Also, while this literature argues that finance is taking over
land and housing, I argue the opposite: a larger and larger portion of global “financial” revenue
is being extracted in the form of ground rent, indicating a process of the “housingification of
finance.”
Through this dissertation I attempt to systematize a theory of ground rent and private
landownership that builds from Marx’s preliminary drafts on the topic. I intervene in several
long-standing debates in Marxian political economy, critical geography, and social theory
around urban ground rent, the status of the landowning class in capitalism, and the stakes of
land-based struggles. I suggest that the structural analysis of land relations in capitalism can
improve the concept of class struggle by including within it a broader range of struggles, and
also refine our notions of what it means to struggle against capitalism. Further inquiry into
capitalist landed property along these lines should also advance our understanding of the nature
vi

of the capitalist state form. I also suggest that the “housingification of finance” (or, more
accurate but even less pronounceable, the “ground-rentification of finance”) and the behavior of
landowners in “High-Rent” sectors are important avenues for future research.
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Introduction

This project began with a specific concern, arising from my own involvement with urban
struggles over land and housing: why is gentrification so impossible to combat? Marxist
literature provided ample resources to make sense of wage and workplace disputes (class
struggle between proletarians and capitalists at the point of production); feminist scholarship
offered structures for understanding gender hierarchies and gendered violence inside and
outside of the workplace. However, struggles over land and space remained tertiary in most
Marxist and leftist literature—constantly “outside.” Marxist and critical geography offered many
tools for the study, but I sought a structural account which could treat struggles over land on the
same level of abstraction as struggles over the wage.
This dissertation does not offer a deep dive into a particular case study. As much as I
wanted to analyze the dynamics of ground rent and land struggles in San Francisco and
California, where I was born and raised, every time I started collecting information about these
struggles, about land markets and rent struggles, I felt like I did not have a conceptual structure
with which to parse and analyze these dynamics. This dissertation is my attempt to create that
structure. I consider it a first step towards outlining the structural dynamics and forces which
govern landed class struggle in the capitalist mode of production. While it is partial and
fragmented, I hope my readers will find I have made some modest headway.
In what follows, I frequently work with macroeconomic data about the United States.
This involves using statistics from the fraught institutions of the USDA, US Census, and the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In some cases, long-run data they have collected are not digitized, or
not publicly available, and I use old published papers and reports which contain tables and
charts that are impossible to find elsewhere; hence my readers will find here reproduced several
1

aged charts from these papers. I have occasionally used data from private sources on real estate
such as CoreLogic and HousingWire, but I try to avoid these when possible because they are
usually partial. In some cases where data is not available, I substantiate my claims through
anecdote.
In this dissertation, I attempt to systematize a theory of ground rent that builds from
Marx’s preliminary drafts on the topic. Large parts involve the critique of extant literature on the
question of land in capital. I found this necessary in order to move toward a structural analysis
of land relations, and I believe the critiques yield important positive claims about the inherent
dynamics of landed class struggle. I draw upon data of land markets as well as accounts of landbased struggles in order to clarify the structure and operative categories of ground rent theory.
I lean on Marx heavily in this dissertation because I believe he was very good at what he
did. His word is not gospel; he was often wrong. That he frequently recanted on his most
egregious errors is evidence of his capacity for critique. However when it comes to land, his
writings are inchoate enough to serve primarily as sign posts rather than as clear structure. I
strive to use his work as inspiration, and not to take anything for granted.
Chapters 1 and 2 treat the categories of a landowning class and of ground rent. The
dominant trend over the last 50 years has been to dismiss or dilute these categories; I defend
them and argue that in order to accurately develop our understanding of the capitalist mode of
production in its totality, we must analyze the landowning class and ground rent both as “pure
forms” of the CMP and as historically dynamic social relations. Through a critique of the
literature, I highlight the assumptions that undergird the marginalization of land relations in
capitalism. I also suggest which elements of ground rent theory are important for the broad
analysis of land in capital.

2

In Chapter 3 I analyze mainstream economics approaches to land-based revenue streams
and investment vehicles, using the framework of landownership and ground rent established in
Chapters 1 and 2. I define and categorize the different forms of speculative and securitized
ground rent. I show that land-based markets and land-based securities are, as a rule,
distinguished from financial markets by mainstream economists (if not by leftist theoreticians).
The divergence of land-based markets from financial markets reflects fundamental differences
between the imperatives of landowners and those of capitalists.
In Chapter 4 I offer a provisional schema with which to analyze landed class struggle by
outlining the strategies and limits of the landowning class. I apply these insights to the question
of urban residential rents in the United States. Urban Residential Rents have been historically
misunderstood in terms of ground rent theory, and I clarify by arguing that the structure of
urban rents is analogous to agricultural land rents. The only true “renter” is a capitalist, and that
proletarian “renters” in fact purchase the commodity “home” from capitalist producers
(generally, property management companies) who then pay landowners a rent (when they are
not the same company).
Chapter 5 criticizes scholarship on the “Financialization of land and housing,” on the
basis that it misapprehends and mystifies landed class struggle. I argue for a longue-durée
account of financialization, and for considering that finance is being gobbled up by the land
market, rather than the reverse.

Much of this dissertation will analyze the economic dynamics of landed class interests,
how they conflict or collaborate with capitalist class interests, and how the this plays out in
space. However, I will begin by reflecting on the conflict between landowners and proletarians,
as the ultimate goal is to contribute to a “Marxist theory of displacement” (Chatterjee, 2014, p.
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55). The landowning class, through pursuing their imperative to extract ground rent from the
land, attempts to gain control over increasing amounts of the globe. In this pursuit, they
constantly divorce more and more people from the land, creating more free laborers. In doing
this, the landowning class plays the essential role of preventing the people from getting too
much land, too much freedom, too much power.
Marx called it original accumulation; others have called the enclosure movement,
ongoing accumulation by dispossession, colonization. Here I call it gentrification. It attacks and
severs the relation between land and people. It destroys community ties and social fabric.
Gentrification is a tool of social control, a counterinsurgency measure against the strength of
landed communities to resist and to attack. Displacement is not just a travesty, it is a
suppression of resistance.

Displacement as Counterrevolution
Every resistance movement, every insurrection, every revolutionary struggle, starts and
subsists in shared space—flourishes and grows through control over mobility. So, displacement
is one of the most effective counterinsurgency tactics—intentional or no.
Gentrification is what we call the current wave of urban displacement, in which primarily
Black and Brown people are pushed out of their homes and neighborhoods. Generally the push
comes from big money looking for profitable rent gaps, but the white bourgeoisie also plays an
essential role in this displacement. Anti-gentrification activists have had very few success stories
at the neighborhood or city level, because we are standing up against a powerful flood of global
real estate capital into warm, moist rent gaps, where moneys grow out of all proportion. The
power that accompanies this flood of capital is so massive that community groups can do little to
even touch it.
4

This mismatched fight between global real estate capital and urban communities of color
is preceded by decades of attack on the social fabric of those communities, generally by the state;
through incarceration, policing, the “war on drugs,” government redevelopment, infrastructure
projects, redlining, reverse-redlining, disinvestment, affordable housing scams; through the
irresistible logic of private property in land. The state smooths the way for capital and landed
property.
Gentrification as we know it encounters a social fabric already torn and singed by
generations of direct and indirect attack. The people who still live and work there are still
fighting, and often angrier than ever, but with fewer material resources and collective power due
to very real and material violence and dispossessions over the years.
In rural and agricultural settings, we see much the same thing. Generations of attack on
rural communities—of forced privatization on previously collective land, of coercive credit
schemes and manipulative patents, and of direct violence under many guises—leave rural and
agricultural communities weakened. Moneyed interests enter the stage, pushing out residents to
make space for agribusiness, mining, windfarms, whatever turns a profit.
Even the tactics can be radically similar across urban and rural areas: policing and
militarization (from urban policing to rural paramilitaries, displacement for infrastructure
projects (from city subway tracks to rural railroads), privatization of land so that moneyed
interests can buy up property rights (from privatization of public housing units in the UK to the
privatization of Mexican ejido system), and so on.
Clyde Woods (1998) described this process as “spatial fragmentation” in the context of
the counterrevolution of the plantation block against the powerful force of Black
Reconstruction: Even after Black farmers were coerced into returning to the fields, the planters
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dismantled centralized housing “for the primary purpose of crushing the Union Leagues
movement in the south.”
Sometimes spatial fragmentation is an open tool of social repression; other times it
comes under the guise of self-professed do-gooders. Saidiya Hartman (2018) describes how, in
Golden Era New York City, “sociologists and reformers” enacted spatial fragmentation for the
purposes of destroying “the modes of intimacy and affiliation being fashioned in the ghetto, the
refusal to labor, the forms of gathering and assembly, the practices of subsistence and getting
over” (p. 469). Hartman continues: “Harlem was swarming with vice-investigators and
undercover detectives and do-gooders who were all intent on keeping young black women off
the streets, even if it meant arresting every last one of them” (p. 473). Here, free mobility and
taking-up space was named a disorder, a danger, a threat, and so the resources of the state and
shadow states were directed towards spatial fragmentation of that “threat.”
Today, in Central America, spatial stratification of landed Indigenous communities is
part and parcel – and potentially the ultimate goal – of the so-called “drug war.” Dawn Paley
writes: “States and transnational capital [take recourse] in repression through terror in attempt
to dispossess people from their communal lands and territories throughout the Americas and
the world.” (Paley, 2014, p. 18). The “drug war”; the “war on terrorism”; “ethnic conflict” –all
these are masks for landed class struggle.
These types of overt violence and repression raze the ground for subsequent stages of
impersonal, profit-motivated displacement. When so-called “financialized landlords” buy up
San Francisco properties and squeeze low income residents until they move, those tenants have
already lost two thirds of their community—why not move to Vallejo?
It is even difficult for working class people to refuse turning their own properties into
profit. Just five years after the powerful protests following the murders of Michael Brown and
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Eric Garner in Oakland, CA, dozens of the young Black organizers of those protests have been
pushed to the outskirts of the Bay Area, others have been arrested and are still in jail or prison,
and at least one has been killed. Many homeowners – Black, white, and otherwise – that may
have harbored political organizing in the 70s, 80s, or 90s have chosen to sell their properties in
Oakland, cashing out on rising home values. This weakens communities, prevents the passing
down of political knowledge, and reduces the square footage available for meetings and crash
pads. It is not an individual failure, but evidence of a structural compulsion.
Though displacement is never the end. Displacement leads to new spatial
concentrations. One of the most earth-shaking uprising in the US in the last decade was in
Ferguson, Mo.. The people who organized and executed the uprising were poor Black people
recently pushed into Ferguson after being displaced from elsewhere. In such places, resistance,
rebellion, and revolution can spread quickly.

Land as Invitation Masterlessness
“Colonial authorities were ever mindful of the many invitations to masterlessness which
the cities held out.” – Julius Scott (2018)
“Down where we are, food is used as a political weapon. But if you have a pig in your
backyard, if you have some vegetables in your garden, you can feed yourself and your
family, and nobody can push you around.” – Fannie Lou Hamer (White & Redmond,
2019)

Julius Scott (2018) describes cities in the Caribbean as places of potential power and
refusal for ex-slaves and free Black people in the 19th Century. Authorities could not so easily
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stratify and dismantle social networks and infrastructure in the space of the city (since then,
capital and state have found increasingly effective ways to control cities, though never entirely).
Fannie Lou Hamer describes how autonomy over food, which is concomitant to control over
land and space, leads to strength vis a vis would-be oppressors. Cedric Robinson (2000)
describes the Black Radical Tradition as aimed not toward the goal of gaining strength within
the capitalist mode of production, but toward wrenching autonomy and freedom from it. In this
tradition land, space, and mobility are highly valued; they can enable people to refuse, rather
than struggle forever within.
This is important when considering the role of land struggle in capitalism. Struggles over
the wage relation are always, to some extent, struggles for status and quality of life within the
system. Struggles over land, space, mobility have the potential to encourage refusal, rejection,
an impulse towards the “total abolition” of the capitalist mode of production.
Conversely, it is exceedingly difficult to develop any autonomy when there is not
defensible access to land. In gentrifying capitalist metropoles, it is neither easy, efficient, nor
particularly effective to pursue the “necessities” of life – food, living space, water – through
collective struggle, in large part because we have no secure access to land or space. Squatted
houses get busted, squatted community gardens get bulldozed, and as gentrification progresses,
the busting and bulldozing happens faster and faster. It is less arduous and more reliable to go
to a food pantry, to borrow money for McDonalds, to sign your children up for free lunches at
school and throughout the summer, than to maintain a collective urban farm and communal
neighborhood kitchen, especially when you know it could get squashed at any moment. It is less
dangerous and onerous to rent an apartment from a private landlord, even if it is a moldy one, a
broken down or overcrowded one, than to occupy and defend a collective squat in a
neighborhood that’s on the radar of the real estate industry.
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Struggles over the wage can also have the potential to pass over into collective social
reproduction, but they have been cauterized by centuries of counterattacks. Where once, a strike
might have implied the collectivization of “reproductive” activities like cooking and child
tending, this is rarely any longer the case in hyper developed cities. Now, fighting for a better
wage or working conditions in capitalist metropoles rarely bleeds out beyond the workplace.
(Such was the strange draw of the occupy movement – a sense of collective reproduction so alien
to most urbanites, and so immediately transformative.)
Ruth Wilson Gilmore stresses that abolition geographies, which go “back in time-space”
to find alternatives above and beyond the “displacement and redistribution of human sacrifice,”
these abolition geographies “start from the homely premise that freedom is a place” (Gilmore,
2017, pp. 227, 228, emphasis added). Cedric Robinson emphasizes removal of self from the
system, of “flight,” “marronage,” “total rejection,” and “preservation of the collective being,” as
elements of the Black Radical Tradition (Robinson, 2000, pp. 130, 190, 169, 171). Unlike
demands for a higher wage or for reduction in violence from forces on high, revolutionary
movements towards masterlessness necessitate – without possible compromise – land, space,
territory, mobility.

Endogenous Racialization and Landed Class Struggle

Contrary to the popular Marxist and communist belief that capitalism produces an
increasingly homogenized working class, capitalism in fact produces a radically stratified and
hierarchized proletariat. The labor relation ranges from the most unfree, violently enforced
slavery, to the six-figure salaries of CEOs, university chancellors, or leaders of non-profit
corporations. The amount you are paid, brutalities of the job, and freedom of your person vary
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wildly, to make the different experiences of work basically incomparable. These labor
hierarchies have been called out repeatedly as an anomaly by labor organizers and theorists, but
it is, on the contrary, the norm.
Cedric Robinson suggests in his history of pre-colonial European societies that the very
existence of clan differentiation combined with hierarchized access to resources became the
process of racialization. This seed grew into the capitalist mode of production. If we consider
Gilmore’s “group-differentiation” as the form taken in capitalism of Robinson’s clan
distinctions, then we might consider group-differentiated access to resources to be capitalist
race-formation. This could be a vulgar economistic version of Gilmore’s definition of race as
“group-based vulnerability to premature death;” insofar as vulnerability to premature death can
be determined by access to resources.
If we accept that capitalism inherently hierarchizes the proletariat, and that hierarchized
groups in capitalism are always racial groups, then not only can we say that capitalism
inherently reproduces race, but we can also say that the differentiation of access to land and
housing is an inherently racializing process.
While all struggles over the wage somehow demand inclusion (on better terms) within
the capitalist system, many land-based struggles are pointed consciously away from the system
altogether. The people who wage land struggles for autonomy are usually those people who are
marginalized and pushed out of the wage relation. They are those groups who are more
vulnerable to premature death, have fewer rights and securities vis a vis the wage, and less
power in general as defined by the capitalist mode of production – they are closer to the “edge”
of capitalism, are more intensely suppressed while having the least amount of rights. Hence,
there is a connection between racialization (which produces some groups as closer to or farther
from that “edge”) and land-based struggles.
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Robinson suggests that the goal of many enslaved Africans in the south was to live
outside and reject capitalist social relations in their totality. In his focus on this intent to escape
and refuse, Robinson offers something diametrically opposed to what most Marxists emphasize
in discussion of “surplus populations.” In the Marxist theory of surplus population, the working
class tends towards becoming “excluded from work” (Endnotes, 2010, p. 33). Marx himself only
defines proletarian once in capital, in a footnote in Chapter 25 which reads
“Proletarian” must be understood to mean, economically speaking, nothing other than
“wage-laborer,” the man who produces and valorizes “capital,” and is thrown into the
street as soon as he becomes superfluous to the need for valorization. (Marx, 1992)
However, to take Robinson’s point seriously is to believe that not everyone is “thrown into the
street” or “excluded from work”; some people run away from the factory or the field, hurling
themselves from work. And if a person runs away from work, they need land to run into.
Similar to the Marxist position, Wacquant writes that detainees in jails and prisons are
“essentially drawn from the most marginalized…. Incarceration serves above all to regulate, if
not to perpetuate, poverty and to warehouse the human rejects of the market”(Wacquant, 2009,
p. 70). But did the market reject them, or did they reject the market?
In any case, to reject the market, or be rejected by it, means to have a particularly urgent
relationship to land control. The movement toward freedom, toward “open rebellion,”
necessarily involves the capture of land and the wrenching open of paths of mobility. In this, we
will come into conflict with the landowning class.

11

12

: The Landowning Class

Introduction
Here, then, we have all three classes—wage-laborers, industrial capitalists, and
landowners constituting together, and in their mutual opposition, the framework of
modern society. (Marx, 1967, p. 618)

We are accustomed to thinking about capitalism as being composed of two classes: the
working class and the capitalist class. However, Marx, as a progenitor of anti-capitalist critique,
explicitly argues that there are not two classes, but three—the third being the class of landlords.
Appearing late in Capital Vol 1, and elaborated in Capital Vol 3 and in Theories of Surplus Value
Vol 2, Marx’s landowning class is grounded in the social relation of private property in land,
and draws its wealth in the form of ground rent, a revenue stream categorically distinct from
profits, wages, and even interest. The landowning class as such is irreducible to and distinct
from the other classes, while remaining necessary to the capitalist mode of production (CMP)
due to the necessity of the material social relations which give rise to it (private property in
land). Marx often uses the term “class” to casually refer to groups like merchant capital, but he
elevates landowners to one of the three great classes of modern society alongside capitalists and
the proletariat.
While enjoying some significance in Kautsky’s 1899 text The Agrarian Question (1988),
the landowning class is absent in Lenin. This is surprising considering Lenin’s sensitivity to land
issues which are epitomized in his 1917 Decree on Land which declared landed proprietorship to
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be abolished and all land “and everything pertaining thereto” placed at the disposal of peasants’
(volost) land committees and uyezd Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies (Lenin, 2017). The idea of the
landowning class—a fundamental analytical category for many classical economists—evaporated
almost completely in Marxist and anti-capitalist scholarship over the next century, especially
among those explicitly discussing issues of land, space, and place. Marxian critics of space from
Henri Lefebvre to Doreen Massey, all abandoned the theory of landowners-as-class, often
without fanfare. The prominent Marxist theorists who have paved the road for critical
scholarship on land and space since the seventies, such as David Harvey, Ben Fine, Michael Ball,
Anne Haila, and Michael Neocosmos, have carried forward the assumption that landowners are
not capitalism’s “third class,” in some cases arguing that they are not even necessary to the
capitalist mode of production. The growing consensus is that landowners are, at most, a subset
or class fraction of the capitalist class, usually a branch of finance capital. This position has
influenced contemporary studies of the current housing crisis, in which predatory and
“financialized” landownership is analyzed in terms of the logic of finance, speculation, and
predatory debt relationships, but not in terms of the extraction of ground rent. However, not
only do the market dynamics of ground rent extraction diverge from those of “financial” capital
accumulation (see Chapter 3), the ontological structure of the landowning class is unique and
incommensurable with any type of capitalist—financial or otherwise.
In this Chapter we will track the abandonment of the theory of the landowning class as
third class and then offer a preliminary sketch of the logics of landownership elaborated
throughout this dissertation. These logics include, but are not limited to: (1) the willingness of
the landowning class to withdraw land from the market and hold it; (2) the emergence of direct
conflict between landowning interests and productive capital over shares of surplus value; and
(3) the unique and unparalleled use-value represented by land which, if left to the masses,
encourages the rejection of the wage system, capitalist exploitation, and all its accoutrements.
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Because of this, the perpetuation of capitalism requires the preservation of landed property as a
social form.
The emphasis on the “financialized” nature of landownership in recent years leads
scholars to posit a rupture rather than a continuity between contemporary land relations and
land relations of the past. However, as Marx warns us, a quantitative shift (in this case, the
increase of financial profits over profits of production) does not necessarily mean a qualitative
break has taken place. For example, quantitative increases in the size of landowning companies
over the last half century does not make them qualitatively distinct from capitalist land
consolidation in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Over the last 50 years many scholars of land and capital have argued for the importance
of ground rent while rejecting the class-status of landowners. Recent authors such as Deepankar
Basu and Jorgen Sandemose join Fine, Harvey, Massey, and Lefebvre, in this camp (Basu, 2018;
Sandemose, 2006). Anne Haila and Pradeep Bandyopadhyay derive ground rent from the
coordinating function it plays for capital rather than seeing it as a distinct revenue stream
based on private landownership and captured by the class of landowners.(Bandyopadhyay,
1982; Haila, 1990) However, to disconnect ground rent from a theory of the landowning class is
to abandon its historical-material basis (the social relation of private landownership). Many
studies of rent today avoid a direct treatment of land qua land as a result of this abandonment of
a theory of the landowning class. Marx himself found it necessary to “deal with landed property
ex professo” before giving a “detailed exposition of rent” (Marx, 1968, p. 26; see also pp. 30,37, 103-4).
Theorizing ground rent without a theory of the landowning class warps the theory of ground
rent almost beyond recognition.
A few theorists have taken up the category of the landowning class positively in the postwar period—notably Martha Campbell, a contemporary Marxist affiliated with Value Form
Theory, and Roman Rosdolsky, a Ukranian socialist expelled from the CP in the late 20s who is
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warmly cited by contemporary Value Form Theorists (Campbell & Reuten, 2001; Rosdolsky,
1989). Both offer careful exegesis of Marx’s theory of the landowning class but are generally
uncited by critical theorists of space. 1
The dismissal of the landowning class as third class complements the prioritization of
the wage labor relation as ground zero of class struggle. Such a theory of revolution treats
struggles which occur elsewhere than the “point of production” as having less historical and
strategic significance. On this account, workers organizing their workplace represent a more
fundamental moment of class struggle than tenants organizing their buildings; wildcat strikes in
automobile factories are more immediate forms of class struggle than actions of landless
peasant movements to occupy land; mistreated restaurant workers are more immediate
evidence of the inner logic of capital than homeless encampments.
There has been robust critique of this privileging of struggles at the “point of
production,” not least by thinkers like Harvey, Lefebvre, and Massey. However, it remains taboo
to suggest there is a class struggle between proletarians and landowners, or between
landowners and capitalists, of the same level of abstraction as the class struggle between
proletarians and capitalists. The theory of the landowning class as third class requires us to
consider struggles around land, space, and housing as forms of immediate and direct class
struggle. What’s more, struggles around land, space, and housing are frequently waged (and
most militantly) by indigenous people, Black people, and other racialized people around the
world—and often by women and LGBTQ people within communities. The tendency to elevate
the movements and revolutions of industrialized European men, and those global movements
and revolutions which match them in form, is critiqued immanently by the theory of the
landowning class. Racialization (the production of violent racial hierarchy) and patriarchy (the

1

Campbell and Rosdolsky are not, however, representative of the opinions of Value Form Theorists in general about
landowners as third class; CJ Arthur and Marco Guidi, for example, both assert the inessentiality of landowners
(Arthur, 2006; Guidi, 1998).
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production of violent gender hierarchy) as social relations both involve land in essential ways,
and so developing a structural theory of landownership also offers insight into a structural
analysis of these social relations.

Marx’s Theory of the Landowning Class
What is a “class”?
Marx uses the term “class” in two ways. First, he refers casually to groups like merchant
capitalists or the intelligentsia as “classes.” This coincides with Bertell Ollman’s observation, in
his seminal study on Marx’s concept of class (1968), that Marx’s loose use of “class” functions as
“a synonym for ‘group,’ ‘faction,’ or ‘layer.’” Secondly, Marx describes three classes which
together constitute the “framework of modern society”: capitalists, proletarians, and
landowners. Ollman suggests that this use of the term class is “most in keeping with his other
theories,” and the tripartite division should be considered the “Marxist system of classes” (1968,
p. 576).
Each class arises from material conditions that differ absolutely from those of the other
two classes. Proletarians own naught but their labor power; capitalists own the means of
production; landowners own land. These classes are all functionally necessary for the
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production in its most basic, unadorned form. Capitalist
production requires labor from the worker, the dominance of the capitalist in the production
process, and it requires that land be owned. Classes divided along these lines will have, as
Ollman argues, “distinct economic interests… based on these relations which place them in
conflict with… the other two groups”(1968, p. 576).
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Ollman states, however, that landowners-as-a-class are soon to vanish.2 Ollman makes
no argument for this position, even though it represents—on his own reading—a significant
departure from Marx’s thought. However, because Ollman designates the first criterion for class
as having “a direct operating relationship to the mode of production” (Ollman, 1968, p. 576), we
might reasonably infer that he believes the landowning class to lack this “direct operating
relationship”—at least in the long term.
The superfluous and necessary landowner.
And Ollman would be correct to argue that landowners do not have a direct operating
relationship to the immediate process of production. Marx also argues this, regularly describing
the landowning class as ‘superfluous’ and ‘useless’ vis a vis production:
Assuming the capitalist mode of production, then the capitalist is not only a necessary
functionary, but the dominating functionary in production. The landowner, on the other
hand, is quite superfluous in this mode of production. Its only requirement is that land
should not be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition
of production, not belonging to it... The landowner, such an important functionary in
production in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages, is a useless superfetation in the
industrial world. (Marx 1968 p. 44, italic emphasis mine)
Many scholars have interpreted this ‘superfluity’ to mean that landowners are
unnecessary to the capitalist mode of production. Marx encourages this interpretation by calling
landowners a “useless excrescence” that “have not grown out of the capitalist mode of
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“[Marx] believes that developments in capitalist society are speedily reducing all such [middle and intermediate]
strata into the capitalist or proletarian class. The landowners, too, are shortly to go the same way.” Ollman 1968, p.
577.
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production but have been passed on to it,” who are “not a necessary agent for capitalist
production” (Marx, 1968, pp. 44, 152, 153).
While it may be the case that from “the standpoint of capitalist production,” only the
capitalist and the wage laborer are necessary (Marx, 1968, p. 152), from the standpoint of the
totality of capitalist social relations, landowners are also necessary. Marx’s comments
sometimes lean toward ejecting the landowner from the logical core of the capitalist mode of
production, but the fact remains that land “should belong to someone, so long as it is not the
worker.” Insofar as this is true, the landowner is a necessary agent for the capitalist mode of
production, if not for capitalist production.
In sum: landowners are superfluous vis a vis the concrete process of value production,
while being necessary to the reproduction of the totality of capitalist social relations. Their role
is not to instigate or direct the production process, but to prevent land from being used as
common property.
Moreover, this superfluity of landowners vis a vis the production process marks the
“characteristic peculiarity” of the landowner of the CMP:
The capitalist still performs an active function... but the landowner need only
appropriate the growing share in the surplus product and the surplus-value, without
having contributed anything to this growth. This is the characteristic peculiarity of his
position. (Marx, 1967, p. 638, emphasis mine).
Compared to feudal landowners who directed production—for example, dictating what is to be
planted and when to till— capitalist landowners are distinguished by their detachment from
production. The capitalist landowning class exerts no influence on the concrete aspects of
producing value—what is produced, in what quantity, and at what quality. Capitalist landowners
may not even know what is being produced on their land—they are only concerned with
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collecting rent (Marx, 1968, p. 152). This is the strange form of landed property that emerges as
a necessary element of capitalism.
This analysis of the landowning class also reveals the differentia specifica of the
capitalist mode of production; that differentia specifica is that while there are three classes, the
capitalist class dominates the others in production (Marx, 1968, p. 153). This dominance is also
a dependency: the capitalist class still needs the working class and landowning class to
reproduce the system. It is the capitalist who “performs an active function”; the capitalist is “the
dominating functionary in production” (Marx, 1967, p. 638, 1993, p. 276), but workers and
landowners are still necessary subordinate functionaries. Capital is the “active middle” in the
process which can be written either ground rent - capital - wage labor or wage labor - capital ground rent, and which is “the inner construction of modern society, or, capital in the totality of
its relations” (Marx, 1993, p. 276).
Hence, private landownership—and the function it plays in divorcing workers from the
land— is “the basis of the capitalist mode of production,” according to Marx (1967, p. 812). It is
the basis of the capitalist mode of production historically—because the transition from
feudalism to capitalism required enclosures of land to create free laborers—and it is also the
basis logically—because the ongoing self-reproduction of the CMP production requires the
constant cleavage of people from land. Land must be owned, unavailable to free use. By owning
land, landowners reproduce wage laborers qua form (Marx, 1993).
Landowners appear in heterogeneous forms across the capitalist world—and in some
places and times appear to be absent altogether.3 In both respects, they are like the capitalists
and working classes. But for capitalism to reproduce itself, there must always some force which
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Marx suggests as much in his Letter to Engels of August 2, 1862, when he declares that absolute rent “is not paid
when landed property does not exist, either factually or legally.” In Marx (1967) he erroneously suggests that one such
place was the United States.
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ensures that land only confronts the working class “as a condition of production, not belonging
to it.” Even the state can play this role (Capps, 2012, pp. 317–318).The absence of an obvious
class of landowners in a given time and place no more threatens the class-status of landowners
than would a city of worker-owned co-operatives threaten the class-status of capitalists.
Sometimes, a person or company is both “landlord” and “capitalist” at once. This can
also be the case of capitalist and wage worker—for example, a capitalist who owns a majority
share in a series of shoe factories, may also be employed as CEO of the shoe company, thereby
receiving a wage as a highly paid laborer, in addition to receiving profits as a capitalist. That he
receives the wage does not mean that the capitalist class has no representative in him. Similarly,
as Marx argues, a capitalist farmer may own the land he works, but this does not mean the
landowning class does not have a representative in him; that farmer obtains both the profits of
the farm as a capitalist, and the ground rent of the land as a landowner.
Some special dynamics come into play when landlord and capitalist are one. They might
collect both an imputed rent and the capitalist profits, or they may charge themselves no rent,
and only collect average profits. In the latter case, they can afford either to produce at a higher
production price than average while still selling their commodity for the average price, or they
can lower the price of their commodity, squeezing competitors out of the market and increasing
the number of commodities they sell..
Marx himself anticipated that class lines would be blurred—in particular that the line
between investment capital and landownership could easily be confused by the investorlandowner:
the money expended in purchasing land, like that in purchasing government bonds, …
figures in [the investor’s] accounts as interest-bearing capital, because he considers the
income, received as rent from the land or as interest on state indebtedness, as interest on
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the money which the purchase of the claim to this revenue has cost him. (Marx, 1967, p.
809)
But the fact that an investor might see the ground rent he gains from investment in land as an
interest on capital
does not in the least alter the economic nature of the land factor, any more than the
circumstance that someone has paid L1,000 for 3% consols [government bonds] has
anything to do with the capital out of whose revenue the interest on the national debt is
paid. (Marx, 1967, p. 809)
Rent “appears” to a landowner as interest; the landowner “reckons” the rent obtained on
land is interest on capital, that the money used to purchase land “functions in [the buyer of
land's] accounts as interest-bearing capital” but, integrally, this “does not change the economic
nature of the land factor in the slightest” (Marx, 1967, pp. 945–946).
In fact, how the landowner acquired a plot of land and how it appears on his books is
irrelevant to his deeper role as a member of the landowning class; all this “alters nothing in the
capital invested by the farmer in his establishment, and changes nothing in the rent, but merely
alters the question whether it appears to him as interest or not, or as higher or lower interest
respectively” (Marx, 1967, p. 808). The appearances change; the fundamental relation of private
landownership stays the same.
What is going on in the mind of a person does not tell us the truth of their material
practices. As Martha Campbell puts it in her excellent explication of Marx’s theories on land:
“…this view of land by its owners [that it is no different from other investments] does not
obliterate the difference between the determination of interest by the supply and demand for
money capital and the determination of rent by the monopoly over land” (Campbell & Reuten,
2001, p. 230 fn.3).
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Campbell also argues that even in the most extreme case where a landowner regards
themselves exclusively as a capitalist, therefore abandoning the possibility of acting as a
landowning class for-itself, that nonetheless “their perception does not abolish the difference
between land and the other means of production or between land and interest-bearing capital
(any more than the idea of human capital makes workers into capitalists)” (2001, p. 230).
Landowership as “barrier” to capitalist production.
While it is common for people and companies to embody two and even three class roles,
the classes are defined by distinct and antagonistic social relations. The central antagonism
between landowners and capitalists is the level of rent. Landowner’s power in imposing rents
and withholding land from market can erect a barrier to capitalist production and technological
development.
As landownership becomes increasingly abstract and generalized, it expropriates and
absorbs more and more land, faster and faster. As the “economic realization of private
property,” ground-rent marches over the globe in lockstep with the growing privatization of land
(Marx, 1967, pp. 618, 634). Rent cannot always be drawn from the land, but land always gives
the landowner “the power to withdraw his land from exploitation until economic conditions
permit him to utilize it in such a manner as to yield him a surplus” (Marx, 1967, p. 757). While
differential rents depend on the relative advantages one plot of land may have compared to
another, and so arise from the qualities—inherent or produced—of that land, absolute rent is
created by landed property itself. Absolute rent emerges from the landlord’s perpetual threat to
withdraw their land from the market. (I will discuss absolute and differential rent at length
below in Chapter 2.)
The landlord’s threat of withdrawal poses a barrier to capitalist production. Land which
could be profitably farmed if no rent were charged goes uncultivated, thereby dampening
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capitalist “progress” in agriculture. And if we look at global landownership, we can observe a
strong tendency for landowners to hold unused land even when there is demand for it; vacant
apartments plague the high-rent cities of the world; up to 40% of farmland taken through recent
waves of global land grabs sits fallow, sometimes with prior tillers and residents looking on in
sorrow (Peel, 2016).
Land will only yield rent if the production occurring there turns profits in excess of the
price of production (price of production = cost of production + average profit), or if the
capitalist producer accepts less than an average profit. While this would seem to encourage the
development of technological advances in agriculture, the extra profits gained through
technological advance can be captured by the landowner by increasing the rent (this is
differential rent 2). Many extant “technological advances” in agriculture, especially in
agrochemicals, only increase productivity for a few years, after which they decrease, and this
rhythm could arguably be the result (at least in part) of landlord-tenant class conflict.
Marx suggests that the capturing of excess profits by landowners can lead to the slowing
down of technological development in agriculture, functioning again as a barrier to capitalist
development. Importantly, we have to extend this analysis to include all rent-paying industries—
for example, a bakery in a popular urban neighborhood may not want to install expensive new
ovens that are not easily moved if they fear their rent will be raised or they may be evicted.

Marxists' Disavowal of 3rd Class
While Marx affords primacy of place to the landowning class in the totality of the
capitalist mode of production, alongside capitalists and proletarians, most Marxian thinkers of
land and space since the post-war period have dismissed the landowning class. These dismissals
follow four lines of argumentation: (1) Landowners are a leftover from pre-capitalist social
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forms; (2) Landowners are a subset or fraction of the capitalist class; (3) landowners-as-class
wither away with the development of capitalism; and (4) the landowning class is replaced, in
‘late’ or ‘financialized’ capitalism, by a rentier class fraction.

1: Landowners as feudal residuals
Most Marxian theorists of land consider contemporary appearances of a landowning
class to be leftovers from a “pre-capitalist landlord class;” a residual from the feudal era (Edel,
1975, p. 114). Landowners were fundamental to pre-capitalist class formations such as European
feudalism (the canonical foil for many theories of capitalism) but today they are an
anachronism—the echo of a dying age—their power subverted and dismantled by capitalism.
Ward and Aalbers describe the consensus of Marxian geography in the 1970s that “landlords
were a feudalistic hangover acting as a drain on capitalist productivity” (Ward & Aalbers, 2016,
p. 1770). What power landed property retains today is a result of the sheer strength of the precapitalist landlord class, or occasionally of the unique savviness of specific landowners.
But the capitalist landowning class reproduces free labor through separating workers
from the land, absolutely. It is no more a residual than money is a residual medium of exchange
because we can point to a proliferation of coinage in pre-capitalist societies. Far from being
leftovers, capitalist landed property is an entirely new form of landownership with a distinct
logic. Feudal landed property becomes capitalist landed property by shedding all its “former
political and social embellishments and associations” to gain its “purely economic form”
divorced “from the relations of domination and servitude” (Marx, 1967, pp. 618, 617).
Marx himself criticizes the “pre-capitalist leftovers” or “feudal residuals” strain of
thought, already in vogue during his time:
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An erroneous conception of the nature of rent is based upon the fact that rent in
kind, partly as tithes to the church and partly as a curiosity perpetuated by longestablished contracts, has been dragged over into modern times from the natural
economy of the Middle Ages, completely in contradiction to the conditions of the
capitalist mode of production. (Marx, 1967, p. 787)
The feudal residuals position falls into the trap of “articulationism” criticized by Michael
Neocosmos (1986), in which scholars tend to treat major differences of form within social
formations—such as the existence of a landowning class in capitalism—as things that “can only
be accounted for with reference to the articulation of different (usually pre-capitalist) modes of
production with an ideal capitalist mode.” Neocosmos contends that this “articulationism”
has had the effect of indefensibly restricting investigations a priori, making it
impossible to discover what may be different and important capitalist forms, by
relegating these a priori to the status of ‘pre-capitalist leftovers,’ which are then
said to be ‘reproduced’ for various reasons and in various ways by capital.
(Neocosmos, 1986, p. 11)
Even scholars who place grave importance on the theory of ground rent, such as Utsa
Pantaik, whose important work on ground rent we will reference in Chapter 2, implicitly adopt
this positions that landowners are “feudal residuals.” However, when we erroneously attribute
the landowning class to a bygone mode of production, we impoverish our capacity to understand
capital’s relationship to land and space in the here and now.

2: Landowners as class fraction
In the 70s and 80s, Marxists popularized the term “class fraction” to describe groups within the
capitalist class such as merchant capital and finance capital (groups which Marx describes as having
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“separate forms of existence” of the same capital) (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 239). In the late 70s, many
Marxists began to refer to landowners as a class fraction (Ward & Aalbers, 2016, p. 1770). Today, the
class fraction argument frequently coincides with the idea that landowners are subsumed by finance
capital. For example, Clarke and Ginsburg write: “During the century the landowner as a separate
interest has declined and finance capital has increasingly penetrated landownership” (1975, p. 6). As
such, landowners become a subset of the class fraction finance capital—a subset of a subset of the
capitalist class, far from a class on their own
While it is possible to consider specific class fractions as necessary to capitalism, it is
more common to consider class fractions as temporary, because the existence and the strength
of class fractions depend on the balance of political and economic forces at any given moment.
The authors who designate landowners as a fraction tend to emphasize the contingency of
landownership. For example, Ball (1980) mobilizes Massey and Catalano’s classification of
landowners as a class fraction to argue explicitly that “capitalism does not need private landed
property for its existence” (p. 304).
The “Class Fraction” position, like the “Feudal Residuals” position, ignores the essential
role of the landowning class in reproducing free labor, but it also disregards the fact that the
landowning class and the capitalist class arise from two distinct and incommensurable social
relations: on the one side, private landownership, on the other, ownership of the means of
production. To be a class fraction, a group must share the basic presuppositions of the larger
class of which it is part. Landowners, therefore, cannot be a subset of the capitalist class, for they
do not own the means of production; they own only land. Landowners cannot be accurately
described as a “separate form of existence” of the capitalist class (as per the common definition
of class fraction) for their existence is based not on ownership of the means of production or
mobilization of capital in the process of production, but on ownership of land and the collection
of ground rent. To believe the class fraction argument, therefore, one must collapse ground rent
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with interest and profits, conflating the reproduction of landownership with the reproduction of
capital.
Massey and Catalano’s seminal book Capital and Land (1978), which remains one the
most focused studies on capitalism and land relations, explicitly designates landowners as a
“class fraction.” Ignoring Marx's own work on the question of landowners, Massey and Catalano
turn instead to Marx's discussion of merchants in their efforts to explain the “fractional”
relationship of landowners to capital (1978, p. 37). While Marx would agree with Massey and
Catalano that categories like “commercial capital” and “loan capital” cannot give rise to a
distinct class (and so can only be thought of as constituting some subset of the capitalist class),
Marx argues that ground rent differs from these forms (not least because it acts as a barrier to
capital—something which commercial capital does not categorically do). When Massey and
Catalano designate landowners as a fraction, they skirt the deeper ontological features of
landownership—its role in reproducing free labor, its antagonism with capitalist production—
and produces an analysis of “Land in Capital” that necessarily stays on the surface.
Poulantzas also dismisses the possibility that landowners represent “a class of the pure
CMP” and argues instead that they are a class fraction (Poulantzas, 1978). Unlike Massey and
Catalano who simply ignore Marx’s theory of the landowning class, Poulantzas explicitly
distinguishes his position from Marx. He argues that landowners occupy an integral role in the
transition to capitalism, and after this period remain a formidable economic force in the form of
a politically significant fraction allied under the hegemonic fraction.4 He opposes Marx's idea of
landlords as a “distinct” and “separate class belonging to the pure CMP,” calling this position

4

Poulantzas can conceive of this diminished version of class distinction, which could be called a sub-class distinction,
as a result of his theory of the power bloc and the way it works within the structures of the capitalist state. The power
blocs “allow a characteristic ‘participation’ in power, either by the dominant classes of the dominated modes of
production or by those fraction of the bourgeoisie whose autonomy depends on their relation to these modes”
(Poulantzas, 1978, p. 232). The power block, for Poulantzas, is unique to capitalist social formations. See also
Bonefeld, 1992; Hirsch, 1978.
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“inexact” and “incorrect.” Instead Poulantzas sides with what he sees as Lenin's contribution,
that “landed property, private ownership of land, does not belong to the relations of
combination of the 'pure' CMP” (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 231–232).
Poulantzas believes that Marx's incorrect assessment of landowners was a result of “(i)
the fact that the necessary transition from feudalism to capitalism was effected under the
politico-ideological leadership of the nobility or the bourgeoisie, and (ii) the fact that they
[landowners] maintained their autonomy even after absorption into the bourgeoisie” (p. 232).
Poulantzas attributes Marx’s mistake to the residual strength of the pre-capitalist landowning
class that persisted in Marx’s time.
Poulantzas also fuses the “feudal residuals” argument with the “class fraction” argument;
he argues that the politico-ideological strength of the landowning class pre-capitalism led to the
landowning class forming an “autonomous fraction” throughout the transition period (p. 231232).5 He also notes that the landowning class was able to maintain some of its power due to the
particularity of ground-rent as a “mode of transfer of the social product and distribution of
surplus value” (p. 232). He shares this position with more recent writers Haila and
Bandyopadhyay, who also argue for the particularity and independence of ground rent, at the
expense of a demoted landowning class.
For Marx, ground rent is the basis for a distinct class of landowners, while other forms
of surplus value distribution like mercantile exchange could only give rise to a special breed of
capitalist. Poulantzas, like Massey and Catalano, does not investigate this important distinction

5

Milios also argues that the landowning class only exists under certain historical contexts, as the result of a specific
balance of forces. His argument is similar to the class fraction argument: landowners are only a “historical variation”
of capitalist social relations that can or cannot exist at any given moment. He writes that “the class of landowners...
does not constitute a component element of the capitalist mode of production, that is, an inevitable result of its
dominance, but constitutes a manifestation of a specific historical variation of this domination” (Milios, 2000, p.
296).
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between ground rent and other types of “economic rent” or interest. Ground rent arises from the
private ownership of land, a unique and unparalleled resource, and it presents a barrier to
capitalist investment that interest and merchant capital do not.6

3: The withering away of the landlord class
To dismiss the class status of landowners is to believe that within the “permanent,
'unaltered' nucleus of the capitalist system of class domination, independent… from the
particular evolution of each specifically studied (capitalist) society” (Milios, 2000, p. 291),
landowners are nowhere to be found. Landowners play a role in the transition to capitalism, but
then they “wither away,” often dissolving into the capitalist class. Above, we reviewed
Poulantzas’ argument that landowners are not a class of the “pure” capitalist mode of
production. Edel (1977) also writes that “In the long run, and as capitalists (who decrease in
numbers and increase in size) buy up land, landlords may even disappear as a class and rent
cease to exist as a distinct part of surplus value” (p. 103). Bryan (1990) likewise states: “In this
era, capitalists invest actively in both land and industry, and capital moves freely between the
two. In other words, in the epoch of capitalism, the very concept of a distinct landlord class must
be questioned” (p. 80; see also Neocosmos, 1986, pp. 30–32).
Poulantzas, Edel, Bryan, Massey and Catalano, all reject the existence of a third class of
landowners. Some theorists argue, alternatively, that the landowning class is essential for the
beginning period of capitalism, but that the landowning class then essentially “withers away” as
capitalism progresses.

6

See also Neocosmos (1986, p. 6). Neocosmos also makes note of the fact that Poulantzas succeeds where Massey and
Catalano fail at presenting a concerted argument against Marx’s position of landowners as third class.
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For example, Neocosmos aims to “take seriously Marx's references to landowners under
capitalism as forming a class” (1986, p. 8). Neocosmos acknowledges that the creation of wage
laborers depended on “the creation of a new capitalist form of landed property” (p. 12). For him,
landowners are not mere leftovers, because “developing capitalism... necessarily transforms the
old form of landed property into a specially capitalist form of landed property” (p. 13).7
Neocosmos argues that a specifically capitalist landowning class is necessary for the first
stages of the capitalist mode of production, and to create wage laborers, but he believes that
eventually the landowning class is abolished. While capital needed to establish private landed
property in order to effectively initiate capitalist production historically, capital does not need
landed property and/or a separate class of landed proprietors, in order to continue to exist. In
other words, land rent and landlords are forms that are not necessary to capitalist mode of
production in general, only to its genesis: “the continued existence of landed property is not a
necessary condition of capitalist production. Capital can exist without landed property” (p. 27).
Murray (1978) similarly writes that landed property and rent will remain significant only “Until
land has been ‘really’ subordinated” (p. 29).
This epitomizes what I call “the withering away of the landlord class” thesis, an analog to
Lenin’s idea of the withering away of the state. In both cases, a specific social form (a
landowning class on one hand, and a state on the other) is fundamental and necessary for the
transformation of one mode of production to the next. However, in both cases, that fundamental
social form renders itself obsolete through that transition, and then fades away.
Neocosmos justifies his position on the grounds that landed property, because of the
obstacle it constitutes, is positively harmful to capitalism. In this it “differs from other kinds of

7

Poulantzas also believes that landownership was integral to the transition to capitalism, arguing that “This
establishment of the dominance of the CMP is in fact executed (for mainly political and ideological reasons) by the
private ownership of land” (1978, p. 231).
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property” (p. 27). Because of the barrier it poses to production, Capitalism will not tolerate it in
the long term.
This position fails in both historical and theoretical terms. Historically, landowners
appear increasingly powerful within the global economy (see Chapter 5), and regularly come
into conflict with capitalist class interests (see Chapter 4). Theoretically, the fact that landed
property presents an obstacle to capitalist development does not mean that landed property
stands outside the CMP. Marx unequivocally argued that landownership impeded capitalist
development and believed this was one of the features of the class-status of landowners. Labor
also presents obstacles to capitalist development and occupies a permanently antagonistic role
vis a vis capitalists. But labor is also the life blood of capital.
In fact, all classes potentially destabilize the capitalist mode of production—competition
among capitalists can lead, after all, to a falling rate of profit, which tends towards throwing the
entire system into crisis. Neocosmos denies that landowners could possibly be a third class of
the CMP due to the supposed barrier landowners pose, but he fails to contend with Marx's
claims that the very same relations which erect landownership as a barrier to capitalist
development also establish the landowning class as the third class of the capitalist mode of
production
Guidi (1998) also takes up a “withering away of the landlord class” position, arguing that
the initial necessity of the landowning class is reversed as capitalism progresses. Guidi agrees
with Marx that labor must be divorced from the land as a precondition of wage labor, and so of
capital. He emphasizes accurately that:
On the one hand rent, as a necessary condition of the “double freedom” of labor power,
appears as a presupposition of capital. On the other hand, the nature of rent in modern
landed property can be understood only after discussing the concept of capital and
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analyzing the processes of production, circulation and distribution that arise from it.
This is the logical circularity that concerns the concept of rent, and this circularity is
grounded on capital and its determinations. (Guidi, 1998, p. 76)
Guidi notes that the term “presupposition” is more complicated than it appears at face
value. He argues that for Marx, as for Hegel, presupposition is more than something that
precedes and relates to another thing—rather, a “presupposition” articulates an intimate
interrelation of the totality to itself-as-other. Ground rent, according to Guidi, is capital's other
which capital requires to ground itself.
But, for Guidi, rent ceases to serve as the presupposition of capital. In late capitalism, the
“reproduction of labor power” takes its place. But although Hegel's concept of precondition has
no specific content, Marx argues that ground rent specifically is a precondition of capitalism.
Guidi over-Hegelianizes Marx, focusing on the form self-as-other at the expense of the specific
content of private property in land. Ground rent is a presupposition of the CMP because it bars
the subsistence activity of proletarians, forcing them into waged labor. The “reproduction of
labor power” cannot serve this function.

4: The rise of the rentier
David Harvey (2007) writes that “Both rent and private property in land are socially
necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism” (p. 371). Rather than disappear, Harvey suggests
that rent and landed property are transformed. He argues that financialized landownership is
the properly capitalist form of landownership, and that all economic agents increasingly tend to
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treat land as a “pure financial asset” (p. 347). In many of his texts, these arguments fall broadly
in line with the “class fraction” argument.8
However, in his more recent work, Harvey advances a theory of the rentier class. The
rentier has become a favored analytic framework, especially since the turn of the 20 th century
(Andreucci et al., 2017; Gunnoe, 2014; Hudson, 2014; Jayadev & Epstein, 2007; for a summary
of post-Keynesian theories of the "rentier," see Lapavitsas, 2013). The rentier class fraction
makes money from collecting rents on monopolized resources. Sometimes Harvey characterizes
the rentier class as another addition to the list of class factions which includes financiers,
landowners, merchants, and others. In these texts, he distinguishes the landlords from rentiers
as follows: “Landlords collect rent because the land and properties they own are scarce
resources. Rentiers make money from royalties and intellectual property rights” (Harvey, 2010,
p. 40). However, more recently, Harvey’s uses “rentier” to refer to rent-seekers in “property and
asset markets of all sorts,” and he uses the terms rentier and landlord interchangeably (Harvey,
2017).
Harvey’s rentier is not a financier. While a financier collects any type of economic rent
(interest, dividends, bond yields) the rentier collects a rent for the use of a monopolized
resource. The rentier’s power derives from monopoly power. Marx does not discuss “monopoly
rents” as a distinct form of rent alongside Differential Rent 1 and 2 and Absolute Rent, but
Harvey takes the comments Marx makes about monopoly prices and rents and argues for
monopoly rents as a category in their own right (2007). He has also argued that monopoly rent
is the fundamental rent relation in urban areas. In his later work he draws the concept of rent
even closer to the concept of monopoly writing, for example, in Rebel Cities: “All rent, recall, is a
return to the monopoly power of private ownership of some crucial asset, such as land or a

8

“But there is no question that the balance of forces between these two class factions [of finance capital v. Industrial
capital] (as well as between them and the other major class factions, such as landlords and merchants) has never been
stable, and that shifting hegemonies have certainly occurred” (Harvey, 2013). However, Harvey also criticises the
notion of the “power bloc,” which is, at least for Poulantzas, the foundation of class fractions.
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patent” (Harvey, 2013, pp. 92–93). Harvey reminds us that the fundamental social relation of
private property in land is essentially a monopolistic relation.9
However, Harvey’s theory of the rentier class erroneously conflates ground rent with
certain forms of interest, profits, and fictitious capital. He argues that rent paid for the use of
privately owned land has the same character as “rent” paid for intellectual property. Fees
charged for the use of, for example, Monsanto’s patented “Fontanelle Hybrid” GMO seeds, or
Ray Charles’ “Georgia on my mind” are put in the same category as quarterly ground rent paid
by a capitalist farmer to a landowner.
This conflation obliterates all that is specific about the form of ground rent—especially
the finitude of land (key to its monopolizability). Generally speaking, one can only rent space to
one rent-paying entity at a time. On the other hand, intellectual property and patents can
theoretically be “rented” to infinitely many people simultaneously. There is no inherent physical
or temporal limit to the exploitation of intellectual property (although renting intellectual
property to many people simultaneously may reduce its market value, and some forms of
patented commodities require physical production), whereas the extraction of ground rent is
based upon the finitude of its specific use-value, on the fundamental monopolistic character of
landownership.
Land is a commodity like no other, as Harvey has argued. Land is a “prerequisite of
competitive production in all lines of business activity, even those which are not agricultural”
(Marx, 1967, p. 637). Land ownership erects a barrier between labor and land that is “socially
necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism” (Harvey, 2007, p. 359). As Harvey writes, “Capital
in effect makes a side payment to landlords for excluding labor from the land and smoothing the
path to perfect competition across the uneven spaces of a national and even the world market”
(Harvey, 2017).

9

(Patnaik, 2007, Chapter Introduction)n.
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The ownership of intellectual property, on the other hand, does not serve an integral
function for capital. Capitalist landownership controls poor and working people’s relationship to
subsistence activities, extinguishing it to create free labor forced to go work, or allowing it when
it supports existing patterns of accumulation (Goffe, 2017). In lumping together these two
categories in the figure of the rentier, Harvey disavows the specificity of capitalist land relations
that he elsewhere emphasizes.

Persisting Divisions Between Landowner and Capitalist
Several thinkers above assume that landowners as distinct entities are a dying breed. However,
there is evidence of the contrary. A substantial 40% of farmland is owned by landowners who merely
charge rent and are not involved in production (Figure 1). There has also been a slight increase in
tenancy over the last 50 years. Landlords of farmland tend to be non-farmers themselves (Bigelow et al.,
2016).
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Figure 1-1
Ownership of U. S. Farmland: Owner-Operated or Rented/Leased, 1964-2012
During last 40 years of supposed dissolution of landowners’ power, there has actually been a
minor increase in the amount of farmland that landowners control. Rent as the percentage of operating
expenses for farming companies has also increased (Figure 1-2). This means that landowners have both
managed to increase the acreage they control and capture a higher percentage of profits over the last
several decades.
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Rent as Percent of Farm Operating Expenses
US Totals
Source: USDA NASS
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Figure 1-2
Rent as Percentage of Farm Operating Expenses
There is also some evidence that where rent increases, tenancy increases (Figure 1-3). In other
words, there is evidence of a relationship between higher rates of ground rent extraction and an
increased presence of a distinct landowning interest.
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Figure 1-3:
Rent Per Acre vs. Percent of Farmland Rented
Source: USDA TOTAL Survey

We can see in Figure 1-3 that in high-rent corn and soy belt states such as Iowa, Illinois,
Nebraska, Indiana, Minnesota, along with leading high-rent “breadbasket” state California,
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tenancy exceeds 50%, peaking around 60%. States with lower rents per acre tend to have rates
of tenancy at or below the US average—for example, Kentucky, Missouri, Missisipi, and Florida.
There are some outliers in Figure 1-3—for example, Kansas, North Dakota, Texas, and
Oklahoma all have a lower rent/tenancy ratio than might be expected. This variation leads us to further
questions: Is there something about the particular histories of class struggle in these places which
affects the rents and/or tenancy? Alternatively, seeing Texas and Kansas have high amounts of
farmland dedicated to livestock, which generally draws lower rents than agricultural land, how do we
understand the effects of differential land use in terms of predicted rents and tenancy rates?

Figure 1-4
Percent of U. S. Farmland Rented by County and Cash Crop
Source: Bigelow et al. 2016
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The majority of land specializing in cash-grain crops is rented (Figure 1-4) (Bigelow et al., 2016,
p. iii). Cotton and rice in particular are usually farmed on rented land; 70% of cotton acreage and 80%
of rice acreage are rented, compared to an average of 55% for other cash crops.
In figure 5, I have calculated the organic composition of the 5 major cash crops and compared
them to the average rent per acre in 2010. According to ground rent theory, low organic composition in
agriculture should correlate with high rents. As we can see, he only crop which follows this formula is
rice.
Rents for rice-producing land follows the predictions of ground rent theory because rice requires
very specific types of land and weather available in only a few states, with little land available for
expansion beyond what is already being farmed. In other words, landowners of rice-growing land have
a clear monopoly. Cotton, in contrast, can be grown in a wide array of regions. Also, the USDA has
invested heavily in pushing the green revolution in cotton production, raising its growability and
productivity substantially (in part as an attack on African American farmers at the behest of the
Southern Plantation Bloc – see Woods 1998), and also subsidizing cotton farmers to destroy their crops.
Consequently, there is no shortage of farmable cotton land. This can explain the discrepancy between
cotton and rice in Figure 5. It also offers some cursory evidence for the persistence of ground rent
dynamics in US Agriculture.
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Organic Composition vs.
Average Rent Per Acre
Source: USDA 2010 Data sets in Bigelow et al. 2016
Organic composition = operating costs/labor costs
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Figure 1-5
Organic Composition vs. Average Rent Per Acre, U. S. Cash Crops

Constant lease renewal ensures that landowners can raise rents as farm income rises.
57% of farmland acres rented in the US renew their lease annually, even though 75% of acres
have been rented to the same tenant for over 3 years, and 34% for over 10 years (Bigelow et al.,
2016, p. iv).
Evidence from US farmland tenancy shows that while there is a substantial amount of
small owner-operated farms, the majority of high-yield farmland—especially cash crops—are
owned by non-farmers and rented to capitalist farmers. Rents have been increasing as a
percentage of costs for farmers, as well. Regional differences in rent and tenancy persist, but the
overall trend suggests that landowners matching the Marxian definition I have defended above
are broadly active, wield substantial power, and collect substantial ground rents within the US
market for farmland. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the significance of agricultural subsidies also for
the agricultural landowning class.
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We can find similar trends in commercial rentals, even though we do not have the luxury
of comprehensive data as in agriculture. Urban businesses large and small tend to rent
storefronts and office space instead of buying, especially in hot real estate markets. For example,
in San Francisco—one of the most expensive commercial property markets—even big businesses
rarely own their own buildings. The Salesforce tower is the newest iconic skyscraper in the city
and has reshaped the San Francisco skyline. The building is named for the tech services
company Salesforce. However, Salesforce does not own the building, but rather holds a 15-year
lease, valued at over $560 million, on much of the building. Boston Properties, a commercial
real estate company, owns over 95% of the building and collects rent from Salesforce and others.
Similarly, LinkedIn has a 10-year lease on a skyscraper at 222 Second Street from the real estate
company Tishman Speyer, and Twitter rents several floors of an impressive edifice owned by
Shorenstein Properties.
Boston Properties, Tishman Speyer, and Shorenstein are all long-standing real estate
companies, and provide long-term leases to companies. Boston Properties is a Real Estate Investment
Trust (REIT) founded in 1970 (a very early REIT). Tishman Speyer began as Tishman Realty &
Construction over a century ago in 1898, transforming into a privately held limited partnership in 1978.
Shorenstein is a real estate investment company, previously called Milton Meyer & Co, dating back to at
least before 1941 when Walter Shorenstein joined the company (Shorenstein was also the villain behind
the I-Hotel struggle and controversy in San Francisco in 1968). Although aggregate data on urban office
and retail property is hard to come by, a cursory survey of major properties shows that much of the
urban ground rent goes to long-established landowning firms. In these we can again glimpse the
formidable strength and dizzying profits of landowners.
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: Ground Rent

Many essays have rehashed Marx’s theories of ground rent, defining again absolute and
differential rents, arguing for additional rental categories, and trying to ascertain the types of
rents involved in specific concrete circumstances. In this chapter I will outline Marx’s theory of
ground rent, but I do so by contrasting it to Marx’s theory of interest. Juxtaposing ground rent
theory to interest—which Marx did in his Manuscripts that became Capital vol 3—emphasizes
different aspects of ground rent than are usually highlighted in existing literature on ground
rent. I also use the recently published unedited manuscripts that became Capital Volume 3,
which emphasize a more holistic perspective on ground rent that is less concerned with the
types of rent and more concerned with the meaning and implications of ground rent extraction
and private landownership.
One important exception to much theory on ground rent is Utsa Patnaik’s (2007)
Introduction to her selection of Marxian texts on ground rent, in which she specifically
emphasizes the political and “subversive” significance of Marx’s category of absolute rent. She
argues that Ricardo’s move to emphasize differential rent was a way to cauterize the theory of
ground rent.
Indeed, Marx intends to show in his writings on rent that Ricardo’s differential rent—the
most popular theory of rent in his time—was not the most fundamental type of rent in
capitalism, and was not unique to capitalism. Given center stage, the theory of differential rent
obscures essential dynamics arising from capitalist private property in land. Genuine absolute
rent, on the other hand, according to Marx, gives us insight into the specific and peculiar form of
capitalist landownership.
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Ground rent is the form in which private property in land can be realized economically.
The section on ground rent in Marx’s Manuscripts/Capital Volume 3 outlines the role taken by
the landed property in the capitalist mode of production. Marx describes how landed property
can yield revenue for its owner. The social relation of capitalist landed property—embodied by
the landowner—is immanent to a rigorous theory of ground rent. Marx describes at length the
development of private property in land, landownership, and ground rent in capitalism, and
how these forms differ absolutely from pre-capitalist forms of land tenure and ground rent.
Marx highlights the inevitable antagonism between landowners and capitalists, as well as
that between landowners and proletarians. These class struggles—over land rather than wages—
arise from the particular class interests of landowners and how those conflict with the interests
and needs of the working and capitalist classes. Part of Marx’s task in analyzing ground rent is to
clarify the distinction between the three classes and their competing claims upon the surplus.
The section on ground rent immediately follows the section on Interest Bearing Capital
(IBC), which details the division of capitalist class revenue into profits from production, on the
one hand, and interest, on the other. The positioning of these two sections beside one another
emphasizes the radical differences between ground rent and interest. It even appears as if they
were placed at this point in Capital in order to emphasize and clarify their categorical
distinction. Read in sequence, interest and ground rent are shown to originate in two completely
distinct and irreducible social relations; interest arises from the bifurcation and confrontation
between productive capitalists and money-lending capitalists, while ground rent emerges from
the private ownership of land.
Marx often mentions that many landowners view the ground rent they collect as interest
on their original investment (purchase of land), but he is clear to note that this is a
mystification; any conflation of ground rent with interest is a powerful appearance which
obfuscates concrete material relations around land.
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Contemporary Scholarship on Ground Rent

The view of property as a pure financial asset would seem to deny a specific role for rent
in theorizing property (which seems essential), for it is difficult simultaneously to
reconcile the conflicting dictates of rent and finance theory. (Coakley, 1994, p. 701)
Many critical scholars of land and space have called in recent years for a reconsideration
of rent, to “bring rent back in” (Andreucci et al., 2017, p. 7); that “rent has to be brought forward
into the forefront of analysis” (Harvey, 2010, p. 183), that “land has unique features as a factor
of production that set it apart from capital in general and requires a theory of rent,” (Ward &
Aalbers, 2016, p. 1778) and so on (see also Gunnoe 2015; Harvey 2007, 2015, Knuth 2015).
However, these scholars simultaneously insist that “rent” should pertain to an array of
situations beyond those concerning land relations. They advocate a theory of rent which attends
to the special qualities of land, while often in the same breath collapsing “ground rent” with
theories of “economic rent” or interest in general. This collapse of ground rent with interest
bolsters the dismissal of the landowning class discussed in Chapter 1, for in place of a theory of
the landowner who draws ground rent, we are left with a theory of the rentier or financier who
collects economic rent in general, also known as interest.
Ward and Aalbers, for example, criticize those who have ignored the concept of
differential rents, developed by Ricardo and Marx, and particularly the factor of location in rent
determination, thereby
rendering their account of landlords as a class functionalist and disconnected from an
understanding of the wider land market… so instead of connecting their research to
macro-level analyses and theories of the land market, researchers in this tradition have
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tended to adopt… the rent categories as a political heuristic to expose extractive power
relations within an institutional analysis… or obfuscated the issue of rent altogether.
(2016, p. 1779)
Here, Ward and Aalbers criticize those who disconnect a theory of rent from the
vicissitudes of land. However, later in the same text they advocate doing exactly that: they
suggest that we “extend the theory [of rent] beyond land to other situations where the existence
of a class of rentiers itself creates rents—for instance, in the case of immaterial commodities
where profit is reliant on the imposition of intellectual property rights, and the process of
financialization across the economy generally” (2016, p. 1779, emphasis mine). Ward and
Aalbers demand that we attend to the unique status of land in the capitalist economy through
the special category of rent, while simultaneously insisting that we take rent and extend its
reach beyond that of land.
Ward and Aalbers conclude this text with the statement that the challenge of this century
is “to take the categories of rent beyond land in the analysis of a capitalism increasingly reliant
on flows of rentier income through financial instruments… immaterial commodities enforced by
property… and so- called ‘sharing economies’” (2016, p. 1780, emphasis mine). They assert that
the contemporary economy is “rife with rentiers” and firmly shift their critique from the
landlord as extractor of ground rent to the rentier as extractor of economic rent in general. In
doing so, they combine accurate insights about the centrality of land to capitalist accumulation
with a conceptual confusion induced by the popular theory of financialization.
Marx warned that interest created such a powerful appearance of value begetting value
(M-M’), that it tended to seep outwards, cloaking all types of accumulation in its illusory form.
All wealth then seems to be born of interest—even wages appear as interest paid on value (labor)
invested. Most financialization theory involves a contemporary version of this mystification, in
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which finance devours and digests all sorts of social relations—especially, for our purposes,
ground rent.
Marx, for his part, argues that conflating ground rent with interest is erroneous and
mystifying. Marx refers to many early economic thinkers when he writes:
Some writers, partly as spokesmen for landed property against the attacks of the
bourgeois economists and partly in an effort to transform the capitalist system of
production into a system of 'harmonies' instead of antitheses, as for example Carey, have
sought to present ground-rent, the specific economic expression of landed property, as
identical with interest. In this way, the opposition between landowners and capitalists
would be abolished. (Marx, 1967, p. 79)
In conflating ground rent with interest, any understanding of the opposition between the
landowning class and the capitalist class is lost. Below I argue for a strong and undiluted theory
of ground rent—specifically, one which is distinct from interest.
While it may be easy for the buyers of land to “confuse[e] ground rent itself with the
interest form,” leading “necessarily… to the most absurd conclusions” (Marx, 1967, p. 624), it is
less likely for working class renters, squatters, small home owners, landless peasants, landed
peasants, homeless people, and so on, to forget how important and powerful is the control over
land, space, and mobility. For someone struggling to find or keep a place to rest, to cook, to
soothe children, to grow food, to get high, and so on, the question of land and space is special.
When working and poor people gain, maintain, and defend access to land and mobility,
they have removed some portion of land from potential ground rent extraction. However, they
have also achieved some autonomy from subordination of waged labor and begun to create a
material basis for association between people that can strengthen resistance movements. Such is
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not the case for struggles over credit, intellectual property rights, and the like. Nor are these
land-based struggles analogous to struggles over the wage.
Marx criticises the vulgar economists’ “Trinity Formula” for giving the false impression
that the three sources of revenue—capital, land, and labor—are somehow parallel and analogous
to one another, each yielding their own natural rate of return. Marx argues to the contrary that
capital, land, and labor have “about the same relation to each other as lawyer's fees, red beets,
and music” (Marx, 1967, p. 814).
However, as Rosdolsky points out, the trinity formula “does contain a certain germ of
truth.” Marx recognized that value does in fact become divided into “three different kinds of
revenue, and form the annual income of the three social classes—the capitalists, landowners,
and the workers” (Rosdolsky, 1989, p. 29). Part of the trick is to analyze the three classes while
remembering their respective bases (land, labor, capital) are each radically unique.
Before proceeding to Marx’s analysis of interest and ground rent, it is useful to note
briefly how this debate played among his predecessors and interlocutors. This shaped Marx’s
own approach and understanding of ground rent as well as interest.

Classical Economists and Ground Rent vs. Interest
While the category of ground rent has fallen decisively out of fashion over the last
century, it was a very important mode of analysis for the early classical economists, particularly
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Their approaches to ground rent, if inchoate, highlight
important aspects of Marx’s own theory and draw attention to important features of land that
we should attend to, today.
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Before Adam Smith, it was common, as it is today, for economic rent and land rent to be
conflated. As Sir Dudley North proclaimed,
But as the Landed Man letts his Land, so these still lett their Stock; this latter is
call'd Interest, but is only Rent for Stock, as the other is for Land. And in several
Languages, hiring of Money, and Lands, are Terms of common use; and it is so
also in some Countries in England.
Thus to be a Landlord, or a Stock-lord is the same thing; the Landlord
hath the advantage only in this: That his Tenant cannot carry away the Land, as
the Tenant of the other may the Stock; and therefore Land ought to yield less
profit than Stock, which is let out at the greater hazard. (North, 1907)
Locke also treats “land as a capital asset” rather than considering it as a unique
investment, and Turgot argues at length for the economic identity between land and “the general
class of capital assets” (Keiper, 1961, p. 8). Turgot writes:
Since landed property yielding a given revenue is simply the equivalent of a sum
of value equal to a certain multiple of this revenue, it follows that any sum of
value is the equivalent of a property yielding a revenue equal to a definite fraction
of the sum: it makes absolutely no difference whether this sum of capital consists
of a mass of metal or of anything else, since money represents every kind of value,
just as every kind of value represents money. (Keiper, 1961, p. 12)
However, Turgot did develop one of the first analyses of diminishing returns in
agriculture, arguing that there is a limit to how much a farmer can increase the fertility of the
land, that there is a point after which investment in the land will yield less and less produce
because the fertility of the earth will be “exhausted,” husbandry “unable to add anything
further,” and additional investment will “add nothing whatever to the produce” (Keiper, 1961,
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pp. 12–13). So, even while arguing for the economic identity between land rent and economic
rent, Turgot notes certain factors which pertain to land rent alone. Specifically, the fact that land
is both finite and inescapably corporeal—there are limits to its extent and its inherent capacities.
Adam Smith differed from his mercantilist predecessors by arguing that land rent was
distinct from returns on other invested capital, arguing that it is “naturally a monopoly price. It
is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the
land, or to what he can afford to take, but to what the farmer can afford to give” (Keiper, 1961, p.
14). In this, Smith developed a watershed theory of rent in the Wealth of Nations to which
subsequent thinkers had to respond. Importantly, Smith emphasized even more thoroughly
than Turgot the finite limits of land through the theory of “monopoly” price, and anticipated
Marx’s theory of absolute rent in his emphasis on the level of rent being limited by what the
tenant (in this case the farmer) “can afford to give.”
Ricardo, expanded and systematised Smith's initial formulation of ground rent,
continuing to focus primarily on the relative fertility of land as the key factor in differential
rents. For Ricardo, because of the prominence of land and agriculture to social life, agricultural
profits and rent were a central (if not the central) determining force in average profit rates and
wages, and the overall wealth of society. The centrality of land and agriculture for social life was
justified, for Ricardo, through the Malthusian argument which emphasises the direct
relationship between food production and population levels. Land rent and agricultural profits
thus had their own peculiar nature and logic based upon their centrality to the most
fundamental product: food.
In his chapter “On Rent,” Ricardo insists that “...the laws which regulate the progress of
rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of profits, and seldom operate
in the same direction” (Ricardo, 1996, p. 46). For Ricardo, the particularity of ground rent rests
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on the particularity of the agricultural sector of capitalism. The agricultural sector, because it
produced food, the most basic necessity, determines profits in all other sectors.
From these early thinkers, we find three insights into why land rent might be
categorically distinct from economic rent: (1) Investment in land results in diminishing returns
in terms of increases in productivity on the land (Turgot); (2) Land has a monopoly price
unrelated to what the landowner has spent on that land (Smith); (3) Land is qualitatively
special, in that it produces the most essential and basic human commodity, food (Ricardo) (we
would extend the latter to include other necessities immanent to land and space such as
accommodation and transportation). Marx’s theory of rent is built on an appraisal of these
thinkers, so it is not surprising that these arguments approximate many of Marx’s own, albeit
with important inversions and improvements.
The birth of the marginalist school put to rest such notions of the special quality of land
rents. The fact that contemporary dominant marginalist theories of prices and profits were in
large part based on Ricardo’s theory of land rent does not seem to elevate the popularity of landrent theory within the discipline. Modern marginalist economics does not consider land rent to
be a specific or unique form of profits. However, some contemporary economists have analysed
the relationship between land sectors and other investments, and there does appear to be
relevant distinctions in their behaviours over time (see Chapter 3).
Fine (1982) faults the marginalist revolution in economic theory for the lack of attention
to issues of ground rent and landed social struggles today. For the marginalists, the distinction
between wages, profits, and rents “is purely semantic… since all are simultaneously determined
by the same principles according to the more or less free flow of resources through the market to
equate supply and demand” (Fine, 1982, pp. 347–348). Patnaik (2007) goes even further,
writing that modern economic theory has suppressed any real theory of rent in order to avoid an
analysis of land ownership that might result in demands for true land reform (p. 18).
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Interest
For Marx, interest as a social relation arises (in the capitalist mode of production)
directly from the production process as a “part of the profit which the functioning capitalist hast
to pay to the owner of capital instead of pocketing it himself” (Marx, 2015, p. 445). The demand
for credit expands along with the expansion of the system of production, and with it grows
reserves of cash held by productive capitalists as well as moneyed capitalists and landowners.
This surplus liquidity is aggregated in banks or in institutions like hedge funds and loaned out at
a cost to productive capitalists as well as other investors. The part of the profit paid in interest
by the productive capitalist then becomes distinguished from the part they keep—the latter Marx
denotes as “profit of enterprise.”
Marx asks and re-asks the question, why does this purely “quantitative” distinction
between interest and profit of enterprise take on a “qualitative” distinction, such that even when
a capitalist uses his own money for investment, he still calculates it in terms of a rate of interest
which he, in this case, pockets himself?10 Because the starting point of interest formation is the
face-to-face confrontation between the moneyed capitalist and productive capitalist, “Not just as
legally separate persons but as persons who play quite different roles in the reproduction
process, or in whose hands the same capital really does go through a double and completely
different movement. The one simply lends the capital, the other applies it productively”11 (Marx,
2015, p. 475). Importantly, this highlights “the significance of the legal status of ownership of

10

And Marx makes sure to tell us, not all quantitative distinctions become qualitative!

11

It is not entirely clear why this face-to-face confrontation between money-lending capitalist and productive
capitalist is so salient as to yield a qualitative break. Merchant capital and productive capital, for example, meet faceto-face all the time without giving rise to new forms. However, it seems that the appearance of self-valorizing value
which is represented in its most pure form for the financial capitalist may be the lynchpin of Marx’s emphasis on this
qualitative break.
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property” (Harvey, 2013, p. 193). This division, and the competition which arises between them,
also determine the rate of interest (Marx 2015, p. 473).
For the lender, money appears to directly valorise itself. Everything that happens
between doling out the loan and the receiving the original sum back, plus interest, “is
obliterated” in the process (Marx, 2015, p. 454). This is the other side of commodity fetishism:
for the money-dealing capitalist, the production process is obliterated and forgotten. As Harvey
(2013) notes, “Here, in Volume III, the circulation of interest-bearing capital reappears as the
consummate fetish form of capital’s circulation” (p.173).
This illusory structure of self-valorising value then infects its neighbours. The productive
capitalist, too, believes his capital to be self-valorising, and views his investment as interestbearing. The movement of interest has no governing structure or tendency other than the supply
and demand of money capital, and the fallacy of supply and demand is also generalized across
sectors.
The money lending capitalist deals specifically in interest-bearing capital (IBC). In
modern terms, this would be direct money lending from, e.g., banks. However, when we think of
“finance” today, we usually also think of stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Marx called such
vehicles “fictitious capital.” Fictitious capital is created by securitizing any flow of money; to
purchase fictitious capital is to purchase the legal right to collect a future flow of money (profits
of a company, taxes collected by a state). Marx calls this “fictitious capital” because while they
are often treated as capital, they are merely legal rights to claims on future income. As legal
rights, they depend on private property relations being secured by the state (Best, 2017, p. 85).
The circulation of interest-bearing capital and fictitious capital is essential for capitalist
production and the reproduction of the system as a whole; financial capitalists (in the form of
banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and so on) agglomerate liquid capital from around the
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system and make it available as loans or in the purchase of stocks to productive capitalists who
are enabled, on the basis of this access to liquid capital, to initiate production on scales
otherwise impossible. It is as disingenuous to decry finance in favor of production as it is to
decry the cherry blossom in favor of the cherry, although many continue to do so.

Ground Rent
Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of
particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion
of all others. Once this is given, it is a question of developing the economic value of this
monopoly, in other words valorizing it on the basis of the capitalist mode of production.
(Marx, 2015, p. 715)
Marx’s lengthy section on ground rent begins with bracketing off pre-capitalist forms of
landownership and rent, emphasizing instead ground rent as “the autonomous, specific
economic form of landed property on the basis of the Capitalist mode of production” (2015, pp.
722–723). Here, Marx triumphantly introduces capitalist landowners as the third element
constituting the “economic framework” of modern society (2015, p. 717).
Marx precedes his discussion of absolute and differential rent by introducing a different
and apparently more fundamental distinction: he tells us that there is “genuine” ground rent on
the one hand, and ground rent “in practice”/ “economically speaking” on the other. The former,
we will find, is embodied in the theory of absolute rent, and is characterised by that rent for
which the landowner is the “creative basis” (the true genesis).
Non-genuine rent (not a term used by Marx), on the other hand, includes any other
economic valorisation of the landowner’s monopoly over land, from whatever source it comes,
which can include “a hidden deduction from average profit, normal wages, or both together” (p.
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723; see also pp. 725, 727). When a landowner draws non-genuine rents from a hidden
deduction from wages of (in this case agricultural) workers, this means that the capitalist
operating on the land pays workers below the value of their labor power. This creates a surplus
that may be paid to the landowner, which can, over time, depress the value of the workers’ labor
power. Non-genuine ground rent can also come out of the capitalist’s average profits, resulting
in the capitalist taking home less than the average profit at the end of the day.
Rent as deduction from average wages and/or average profits is of prime importance for
our present day considerations, but Marx brackets off these forms of rent at the beginning of his
discussion because he wishes to show the core structural features of capitalist ground rent which
in turn enable other derivative (non-genuine) types of ground rent extraction.
Marx brings up the division of the surplus between landowners (via ground rent),
capitalists (via profit and interest), and workers (via wages) at the forefront of his discussion of
ground rent, describing it as in important tension within which the ground rent relation is
located. He also calls attention to some large-scale trends that are imbricated with ground rent
dynamics—the ever-increasing demand for land (2015, p. 734); a relative decline in agricultural
population relative to the industrial population (2015, p. 734); the growing portion of surplus
value captured by landed property in the course of capitalist development, as a result of their
“monopoly of the earth,” which enables landowners to raise the rent and the price of land (2015
p735-6). (I will return to some of these dynamics in the conclusion to Chapter 5, below.)
The monopoly character of landed property features prominently from the beginning of
Marx’s analysis on ground rent. Erroneous conceptions of rent suggest it still arises, as in feudal
modes, “not from the price of the agricultural product, but from its quantity, i.e., not from social
relations but form the earth itself” (2015, p. 775). On the contrary, when the legally sanctioned
and protected monopoly over land triumphs as the fundamental social relation regarding land,
land monopolists (landowners) are rewarded with ground rents.
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This, more than almost any other aspect of the capitalist mode of production, invites a
theory of law and state into the logical core of what capital is and needs. The legal defense of
monopoly over land—and its corollary, state-military defense—is implied in the concept of
private property itself.
This monopoly over pieces of the earth gives landowners the power to extract ground
rent, and from here Marx offers us two central forms of ground rent—absolute and differential.
In his original draft, he discusses absolute rent first, followed by differential rent (a much longer
section) but includes a note that differential rent should be moved before absolute, which Engels
follows in his edit. It is likely that Marx wanted to start with differential rent because this was
the prevailing theory held by economists of his time. One of Marx’s strategies throughout the
volumes of Capital is to begin with the most ready-to-hand or commonplace understanding of a
given issue and unfold from there (paying homage to Hegel’s method in the Phenomenology).
However, it is absolute rent that truly embodies Marx’s intervention into the theory of
rent. Absolute rent tethers the specific form of contemporary landownership to the capitalist
mode of production, and no other mode. Differential rent is merely a transfer of a portion of the
commodity price from the capitalist to the landowner and involves no effort or creation on the
part of landed property. Absolute rent, on the other hand, has capitalist landed property as its
“creative basis.” “Landed property has created this rent in itself” (Marx, 2015, p. 743, fn. 26).
Our goal here is to look at the conceptual stakes of Marx’s conversation of ground rent,
rather than the typology for typology’s sake. All ground rent (that is not a siphon from average
wages or profits) depends on selling commodities at a price which enables the capitalist to make
a profit greater than the average profit, so they can pay the landowner and still keep an average
profit. In other words, the market price must be greater than the production price of the product
(where the production price = the cost of production + average profits) thereby yielding a
“surplus profit” over and above the average profit which can then be gathered as ground rent by
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the landowner (Marx, 2015, p. 737). In other terms, the rate of profit must be higher than the
average.
Differential rent explains the many reasons why market price can exceed the production
price by radically different magnitudes for different commodities, thereby yielding very
different rents on different plots of land. Absolute rent, on the other hand, considers the case
where market price in excess of production price is the result of the landlord withdrawing or
threatening to withdraw land from the market—or in other words, absolute rent results from the
fact that landowners generally refuse to rent land for free (or at exceedingly cheap prices).
Absolute rent is the rent which results from the landowning class wielding their special power of
land monopoly over capitalists.

Absolute Rent: The power of the landowner to withdraw land from the
market.
The willingness to hold land out of the market is a characteristic feature of capitalist
landed property, and its main means of wielding power. This reaffirms landowners’ reliance on
law or state formation, as it takes legal or militaristic defense to prevent people from using
unused but “privately owned” land. This also comprises one of the ways in which landed
property is “a barrier to the investment of capital and its unrestricted valorization on the land”
(Marx, 2015, p. 739). Capitalist rent necessarily must “restrict the land as a field of employment
for capital to be invested.” As such, absolute rent arises from a pitched battle between
landowner and capitalist about land use and the cost thereof.
Marx begins his discussion of absolute rent by noting that the theory of differential rent
is independent of it. In other words, the theory of differential rent functions whether or not one
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has a theory of absolute rent. This explains the possibility of Ricardo maintain a strong theory of
differential rent while dismissing the existence of absolute rent.
Marx’s theory of Absolute Rent emerges from the fact that landlords will not lease their
land for free or too cheaply. The notion that the land of the least fertility currently under
cultivation—“Type I” land, for ease—will yield a rent of zero, is the fundamental limit case upon
which Ricardo bases his theory of differential rent. However, Marx reminds us that, as
landowners are not philanthropists, there is no reason for them to allow use of their land with
no remuneration (Marx, 2015, p. 739). Even though “the condition for the valorization of capital
as capital” is present on this Type I land—if a capitalist were to farm it without paying rent, they
could reap average profits on their invested capital—this gives no reason to the private
landowner to let their land for this use for free.
Anywhere that we find land cultivated without rental payments, we find a “factual—if
not also legal—abolition of landed property” (Marx, 2015, p. 739). This can happen, for
instance, when the landowner and capitalist are one and the same (and so they can farm land
which yields only average profits).
For new plots of so-called “Type I” land to be rented and come under cultivation
(bracketing off the potential extraction of rent from average wages or average profits, which in
fact “constantly happens in practice” Marx, 2015, p. 743), the market price of the commodities
there produced—say, corn—must rise enough to yield price of production plus an extra amount
that can be transformed into rent. If the price of corn does indeed rise, bringing Type 1 land into
cultivation, insofar as the price rise is a result of needing more corn, landed property is the
genesis of this rise in price—and so, of the absolute rent then drawn. The rise in the market price
of corn is not the cause of rent—the rent is the cause of the price rise (Marx, 2015, p. 43).
The corn laws of Marx’s time provided an excellent example of the activity of the
landowning class—abetted by law and state—leading to higher market prices; the corn laws
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enabled the price of grains to stay high, maintain a surplus profit above average profit and
thereby maintaining the grounds for high levels of rent extraction. The contemporary pro-tariffs,
anti-free-trade approach of not only the Trump administration but various democrats and
“leftists” must also be analyzed within the context of the growing strength of landowning class
interests (see Chapters 4 and 5).
This absolute rent of which landed property is the creative origin depends on two
important dynamics: (1) the fact that agricultural products have a higher value composition
than the average, and (2) that landed property functions as a barrier preventing the equalization
of this higher value and profits across spheres (Marx, 2015, p. 746-748).
Marx goes to some length to emphasize that absolute rent is not simply the result of
agricultural products having a higher value above their price of production, as this can be the
case in for “a whole number of manufacturing products” that do not necessarily yield absolute
rent (2015, p. 748). Agricultural products must have a higher value composition and the
equalization of this value imbalance must be barred; the general tendency toward equalization
of surplus-value across spheres of production is blocked by landowners collecting this extra
profit before it can be equalized. Agricultural products thus “have a monopoly because their
value is not levelled down to their price of production as it is with other industrial products
whose values stand above the general price of production” (Marx, 2015, p. 750).
In the capitalist economy at large, the equalization of surplus-value only faces relatively
few and always accidental and temporary barriers (Marx, 2015, p. 749), but landownership
confronts this equalization process with a structural barrier:
capital comes up against an alien power which it can overcome only partly or not at all, a
power which restricts its investment in particular spheres of production, allowing this
only under conditions that completely or partially exclude the above-mentioned general
equalization of surplus-value to give an average profit, it is clear that in these spheres of
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production a surplus profit will arise, from the excess of commodity value above its price
of production, which is transformed into rent and as such can become autonomous vis-àvis profit. And it is as an alien power and a barrier of this kind that landed property
confronts capital over its investment in the land, or that the landowner confronts the
capitalist. (Marx, 2015, p. 749)

The effects of landed property come to bear on the economy as a whole insofar as the
collection of rent interferes with the equalization of surplus value across spheres (Marx, 2015, p.
750). However, the active role of landed property is this field is restricted to pushing of the price
of “products of the soil” above their price of production to yield some rent, which in some cases
is very small (Marx, 2015, p. 751). There is no guarantee, for example, that landowners will be
able to capture all the excess profits, or even the majority of them. The general state of the
market, and not landed property, determines “how far the market price rises above the price of
production and towards the value, and to what extent, therefore, the surplus-value produced
over and above the given average profit in agriculture is either transformed into rent or goes into
the general equalization of surplus-value that settles the average profit” (Marx, 2015, p. 751).12

12

“The essence of absolute rent consists in this: equally large capitals produce different amounts of surplus-value in
different spheres of production according to their differing average composition, given an equal rate of surplus-value
or equal exploitation of labor. In industry these different amounts of surplus-value are equalized to give the average
profit or are divided uniformly between the individual capitals as aliquot parts of the total social capital. Whenever
industry needs land, whether for agriculture or for the extraction of raw materials, landed property blocks this
equalization process for the capitals invested on the land and captures a portion of the surplus-value which would
otherwise go into the equalization process, giving a general rate of profit. Rent then forms a part of the value of
commodities, in particular of their surplus-value, which simply accrues to the landowners, who
extract it from the capitalists, instead of to the capitalist class, who have extracted it from the
workers. It is assumed in this connection that agricultural capital sets more labor in motion than an equally large
portion of non-agricultural capital. The extent of this gap, or whether it exists at all, depends on the relative
development of agriculture and industry. By the nature of the case, this difference must decline with the progress of
agriculture, unless the ratio in which the variable part of the capital declines vis-à-vis the constant part is still greater
in industrial capital than in agricultural. This absolute rent plays a still more important role in extractive industry
proper, where one element of constant capital, raw material, completely disappears, and where, with the exception of
branches for which the portion consisting of machinery and other fixed capital is very significant, the lowest
composition of capital invariably prevails. Precisely here, where rent seems to derive from a monopoly price alone,
extraordinarily favorable market conditions are required for the commodities to be sold at their value or for rent to
equal the entire excess of surplus-value in a commodity over and above its price of production. This is the case for
example with rent for fishing grounds, quarries, natural forests, etc.”(Marx, 2015, p. 759).
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There is no reason to confine this phenomenon to the production of agricultural goods
and rent on agricultural land. The recent spike in home rents, for example, should be considered
in relation to the ability of a landowner to raise sale price over costs of production (see Chapter
4). However, while every industry must pay some kind of rent, not every industry is rentburdened. Absolute rent can only apply in situations where there is a functional monopoly on
land; where there is some restriction as to where that industry can be located, and a limit on the
amount of land available to it. I discuss such sectors as those which produce “High-Rent
Commodities” in Chapter 4.
In the end, Marx asserts that absolute rent can easily disappear, and even in “normal
conditions” it can only be relatively small (Marx, 2015, p. 758). However, even as it is
overstepped by other forms of non-genuine rent, absolute rent represents the fundamental
power of the landowner to withdraw land from the market, and the potential of its existence is
fundamental to other forms of rent extraction.
Sandemose (2006) has clarified an important point about absolute rent:
The point of the “monopoly of landownership” is not that it prevents “excess surplus
value… from going into a general equalization of the rate of profit.” This reasoning is
tautological. The amount in question is an “excess” amount precisely because it is not
taking part in the equalization. It shares this characteristic with all other parts of the
product value from agriculture. It is the whole agricultural sphere that is exempt from
inter-sectoral competition. That goes for any part of its product value, be it c (constant
capital), v (variable capital), or s (surplus value).
… For absolute rent to exist the value composition has to be lower in agriculture than in
industry. In the latter, property relations create an average rate of profits, p’, in the
former, other property relations create conditions that—to a significant degree—secure
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exemption from the regime of p’… Agricultural tenants do not compete with other
sectors, but they compete with each other. (Sandemose, 2006, p. 361)
If we consider other sectors as subject to the barrier of landed property, it is important to
consider the effects of a lack of competition with external sectors.

Differential Rent: Land as monopolizable and un-produced (value-less).
Most commentators on Marx’s theory of differential rent (DR) have rightly focused on
his improvement on Ricardo’s theory. Marx expands Ricardo’s theory of differential rent beyond
difference based on fertility or location/situation, to differential taxes, level of development, and
differential concentration of capital between farmers (Marx, 2015, p. 807; see Harvey, 2007, pp.
353-358).
The beginning of Marx’s section on Differential rent centers on why rent payments are
not a part of production price, not a part of the constant capital—why they are not the c in c+v+s
(Marx, 2015, pp. 799-800). Fundamentally, this is because land is not a commodity, it is not
produced. “But!”—we might argue—“other natural resources are considered to be a part of
constant capital, for example, wood used to make paper pulp, or natural fertilizer to fertilize
crops.” The difference here between land and things like wood or manure are that wood and
manure have been gathered and brought to production through labor, so they have, in fact, been
“mixed” with labor, thereby bearing a value in addition to a price.
Slightly more complicated is the distinction Marx makes is between land and other noncommodity, value-less natural resources for which capitalists pay nothing. His example is a
fascinating one: he compares a waterfall—which, as an element fixed in space, can be subjected
to the ground rent relation, is a “monopolizable and monopolized natural force” (Marx, 2015, p.
803-804)—to steam power, in which “the manufacturer pays for the coal, but not for the ability
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of water to change its aggregate state and transfer itself into steam” (Marx, 2015, p. 801). The
latter process of water changing its aggregate state is just as un-produced and hence value-less
as land and the waterfall that sits on it, but the water changing its state is not monopolizable.
Are there monopolizable, value-less resources other than land and its accoutrements? As far as
the ground rent argument stands, no. We must understand that land (and to some degree, it is
more accurate to say “space”) is the basic context by which any non-produced resource enters
the production process (e.g. mining).
The surplus profit arising from the use of a waterfall does not arise from the investment
of capital but from the monopolization of the natural force of the waterfall (Marx, 2015, pp.
803–804). This increased profit and ground rent from the waterfall does not affect the general
production price of the commodity, because it derives from relative returns, not an absolute rise
in productivity (Marx, 2015, pp. 804). The natural force of the waterfall is not the “source” of
surplus profit here, but simply a “natural basis” for it, because it is “the natural basis of the
exceptionally increased productivity of social labor” (Marx, 2015, p. 804).
Marx puts much stake in this distinction between basis and source, which, while being
somewhat semantically weak, we should understand in its strength as the difference between,
essentially, the preconditions of a given social relation such as rent, and the generative actor in
said relation. It mirrors the difference between private property in land (basis of capitalist
production) and capitalist who initiates production/ worker who produces value (the sources of
capitalist production).
Marx continues to elucidate why landed property is not the creator of differential rent: if
no one owned property with a waterfall, a manufacturer could use it as “unclaimed land”—hence
landed property “does not create the portion of value that is transformed into surplus profit;
rather it simply enables the landowner… to entice this surplus profit out of the manufacturer’s
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pocket and into his own” (Marx 2015 p805). This distinguishes differential rent from absolute
rent, because differential rent does not require landed property (Patnaik, 2007).
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: Land and “Finance”

A Note on Data
The study of landownership on a large scale is impeded by the fact that most major
landowning companies are private, do not disclose their dealings, and are often not known by
name to the international community of analysts and scholars (either critical or mainstream).
Much contemporary critical scholarship on landownership focuses on Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs). These landowning entities happen to be one of the easiest to analyze, as they are
usually publicly traded and so their accounts are available to the public. REITs are effectively
investment vehicles for the masses—they allow “anyone” to invest in real estate. The study of
REITs, then, is the study of a sort of mass market version of landownership and cannot be
mistaken for representing landownership in general. REITs are public in order to seek a wide
basis for raising liquid capital. Studies that focus exclusively on landowning companies that are
publicly traded, as well as a few privately traded but highly leveraged landowning companies,
are therefore restricted to less powerful landowning companies: those that are in need of
investment.
And public investment companies do not own the bulk of the nation’s land. Ninety-seven
of the USA’s top 100 largest landowners are individuals, families, or heirs (Land Report 100,
2019). Although we cannot know for sure, it is entirely possible that these legacy landowners
have a worse effect on the world’s arable land, urban poor, and so on, than publicly traded
REITS, even though they are less “financialized” in their ownership structure.
I emphasize this at the outset of this chapter, which focuses on fictitious, leveraged,
securitized, and speculative forms of ground rent extraction, to remind us that while these forms
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have been increasingly significant to global economic life, they comprise only a portion of the
revenue of the landowning class in general—likely, a small portion.

Introduction
So far, we have considered ground rent primarily in terms of direct, periodic ground rent
payments to a landowner by a tenant. We must also address mortgage, land-based security, and
the purchase and sale of land. These are the forms that bring land into the world of “finance.”
Financial profits derive from money lending, stocks, bonds, and securities that yield a
combination of interest payments, dividends, and profits from their purchase and sale. In this
chapter, I explore the ways that speculation in land and land-based securities differ from these
purely financial—and often fictitious—investments.
The 2007 subprime crisis heightened the visibility of land-based investment vehicles
such as the mortgage-backed security. Many critical and leftist analysts have assumed that the
increase in speculative investment markets in land are evidence of a process of financialization
that detaches land-based investments further and further from ground rent and the
particularities of land.
Although critical scholars of land and housing argue that speculation in land is identical
to speculation in financial assets (see Chapter 5), several critical scholars of finance disaggregate
rent and real estate from their study of financial assets, putting aside rent and real estate so as
not to muddy their data. Krippner, for example, questions whether real estate markets should be
lumped together with financial markets (Krippner, 2005, pp. 179, fn7); Norfield excises real
estate from his analysis of profit rates in the investment sector (Norfield, 2012); Phillipon (2011)
excludes real estate from all calculations, noting that the inclusion of real estate is the main
cause of misleading and inconsistent classifications of financial activities (p. 3). Land and real
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estate are pushed out of broader analyses of finance, but they have no other place to go. The lack
of a field of study based in ground rent theory means that the only way to study rent is to
collapse it into finance (see Chapter 5).
For mainstream economists, the relationship between real estate markets and financial
markets is an open question. Preoccupied with diversifying investment portfolios, economists
seek investment opportunities that will hedge against plunges in the stock market; real estate is
(potentially) a good candidate if it can be proven to behave differently than other markets. Thus,
there is a wealth of mainstream scholarship comparing land-based markets to stocks and bonds.
Building on a review of this scholarship, I argue that speculative markets for land are still
tethered to ground rent and the logic of landownership. The sale and purchase of land, the
mortgaging of land, and the production of land-based securities all involve predictions about
future ground rents, and so are all speculative. As such they mirror other speculative practices:
Land is bought and sold much the same as financial assets are bought and sold; mortgages are
structured like loans; land-based securities are traded in the same manner as other financial
securities. However, their returns are based on ground rents rather than company profits or
other purely fictitious revenue streams, which means that land-based investments follow
different trends than other financial markets.
The sale price of land is calculated by capitalizing future rental payments. Mortgages are
based on this capitalized price, with additional speculation on the ability of the landowner to
pay. Land-based securities are either directly securitized ground rents (in the case of most
Equity REIT stock as well as the recently developed rent-backed security), securitized mortgages
(in the case of Mortgage REIT stock or mortgage-backed securities), securitized cash flow from
the purchase and sale of properties (some Equity REIT stock), or derivatives based upon these
securities. Each of these investments is tethered to ground rents.
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In their search for diversification options, economists generally analyze two different
categories of real estate investment: direct and securitized. Studies analyzing securitized real
estate often use data from REITs, which are relatively easy to obtain as they are often publicly
traded and their data is aggregated by entities such as Nareit (National Association of Real
Estate Investment Trusts). Direct real estate investment is more difficult to calculate accurately,
for economists as well as for theorists of ground rent.
Economists calculate direct returns on real estate in three ways: cash rents (ground
rent), actual land sales, and assessed land value. Rents are difficult to assess because most
metrics of rent include “imputed rent” of owner-occupied housing and owner-operated
farmland. House and land price assessment varies widely—for example, the USDA’s valuation of
agricultural land is calculated by assessed value combined with cash rents, while private listing
companies like Zillow calculate home value and predict the housing market based on a
combination of assessed, list, and sale price.
Generally speaking, assessed price (or “capital gains”) is an inferior metric to actual sale
price, as the former is a guess and the latter based on actual transactions. The Case-Shiller
housing index is based exclusively on actual sales, and I use this for housing when possible.
However, the Case-Shiller index is less useful for granular analysis, and so economists
frequently use a proxy for direct real estate returns, such as dividends from the ownership of
stock in a direct real estate company.

Sale Price of Land—Cap Rates v. Interest Rates
While some buildings can be costly, in any competitive land market, variations in sale
price depend far more upon the land—the ground rent—than on the building or structures built
upon it. Buildings and structures fall further in contribution to price during booming rental
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markets in growing cities.13 The volatility and geographic differentials in home and building
prices are broadly due to land (Davis & Heathcote, 2007). Buildings are capital investments in
land, similar to building a well or windmill on agricultural land. They (can) increase the
potential ground rent for the landowner, realized as differential rent 2. Knoll et al. (2017) find
that “Land prices, not construction costs, hold the key to understanding the trajectory of house
prices in the long-run.” (2017, p. 1).
What determines the sale price of land? Land itself has no value because it is not
produced, so its sale price does not reflect even its adjusted value. The sale price of land is
generally tethered the ground rent it will realize in the future. Marx described this as capitalized
ground rent. To capitalize ground rent, one takes the presumed rental income over a period of
time—generally a year—and calculates the price of the land as if the ground rent were interest
payments on a capital outlay. For instance, if a plot of land is expected to draw $10,000 in rent
over the relevant time period, and interest rates are at 4%, that means the land will be thought
of as worth $250,000 (because $10,000 is 4% of $250,000).
Sale price = (yearly rental income / interest rate)
We can see from this equation that the price of land falls as interest rates rise, and the
price of land rises when interest rates fall. For example, if interest rates were to rise to 5%, the
same plot of land would be valued at $200,000 because rental revenue of $10,000 would
represent 5% (rather than 4%) of the “value” of the land. If interest rates fall to 2%, the price of
the plot of land in question rises to $500,000. Because the price of land is based upon future

13

“In cities that are experiencing rapid growth, particularly where building is carried on with industrial methods, as
in London, it is the ground-rent and not the house that forms the real object of speculation” (Marx, 2015, p. 761). :
“It’s not the structure that has a volatile price; it’s the land. Where there is plenty of buildable land, the response to an
increase in demand for homes is mostly to build more, not to increase prices. Where there is little buildable land, the
response to an increase in demand for homes is mostly a price increase, sufficient to discourage buyers enough to
reequilibrate the supply and demand.” (Leamer, 2007, p. 28)
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potential ground rent collection (as well as gambling on interest rates), the “price of land” is
always an irrational form, inherently speculative.
The contemporary valuation of homes for sale to and by homeowners is often based
upon looking at what other properties of similar quality and geography are selling for—hence,
this is how assessment tends to be described to laypeople. However, the sale of rental properties
always involves calculation of the capitalization rate or “cap rate” on that property.
The cap rate fulfills the function the interest rate in Marx’s original equation. The sale
price of land for multifamily rental properties (residential or commercial) is calculated as net
operating income (gross profits minus all expenses except property tax) divided by the cap rate:

Sale price of land = net operating income / “cap rate”

Cap rate can be calculated as:

Cap rate = Net Operating Income / sale price (market value)

The sale price of financial assets, on the other hand, is measured by interest rates.

Price of asset = yearly yield / interest rate

The key difference is between the cap rate and the interest rates. Cap rates tend to be
higher than interest rates, meaning investment in real estate yields higher returns than other
financial investment. The mainstream explanation for this is that real estate is more “risky” than
investing in other financial assets. Whether or not this is actually true, real estate lobbyists have
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long convinced the US government to guarantee real estate investments and to subsidize
housing since the wartime period (see Chapter 4) on the basis that it is “too risky.”
Chervachidze et al. (2009) show that cap rates are affected by risk-free Treasury rates,
general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the net amount of liquid debt
issued in the economy. Furthermore, in determining cap rates, past growth in rental income is
extrapolated forward, resulting in overvalued properties whenever an increase in rents is
followed by a downturn (Sivitanides et al., 2001, p. 3).
Cap rates are the analytic tool used to assess the reasonable price of a property; however,
the profitability of real estate investment also depends on how highly leveraged the purchase. A
common cap rate expectation on rental multifamily property in recent years is 6% (North
America Cap Rate Survey H2 2019, 2019). This means a property producing 60,000 in rentals
per year will be valued at 1,000,000. After making back the principal (which in this case would
take about 16 years), all rental income is pure profit. If the rental market tanks in year 5 and
rental income drops from 60,000 to 30,000, you still get $30,000 profit (3% of your original
investment).
However, if you borrowed $900,000 at 4% interest and only put down $100,000 of your
own money, that $60,000 minus $36,000 interest payments gives you a 20% profit rate. But if
you’re unlucky and that rental income drops to $30,000, your profit rate is -6%. You owe an
interest payment of $36,000 but only have income to pay $30,000 (Kliman, 2011, pp. 32–33).
Highly leveraged properties produce unusually high profits during good times but end up
costing money during a downturn.
Because there is no underlying value to land, speculative calculations are the only way to
assess land’s value. Some scholars have defined financialization in part as the growing
pervasiveness of calculative financial practices (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014). However, calculative
financial practices are the only method for assessing the price of land. Nor have the methods of
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calculation changed dramatically since the recent increase in financial activity in the 1970s;
Crosby and Henneberry (2015) have shown, in the case of UK commercial property, that the
techniques of evaluative calculations on property have not transformed substantially throughout
the last century.
Rent-Price Ratio
Cap rates have a gestural quality—they
involve a sort of mystic sensing (as in witching for
water – see Figure 3-1). As such, the “price” of real
estate is variable. While land values should, in
theory, be dependent on rent, the relationship
between rent and price is inconsistent. Sale price
can rise and fall regardless of the rise and fall of
ground rent (Marx, 2015, p. 768). This
inconsistency is expressed in the variability of the
rent-price ratio.
Analysts use this ratio to determine
Figure 3-1
Using Dowsing Rod to Find Water
Source: Baird, 2015

whether house prices are overvalued (if they
exceed a given ratio with prevailing rents, they are
considered overvalued). Many economists have

shown that the ratio is unstable and unpredictable (André et al., 2014; Gregoriou et al., 2014;
Mikhed & Zemčík, 2009). However, others have argued that, while the ratio between them is
not stable, house prices and rents are cointegrated or mean-reverting. (Black et al., 2006; Gallin,
2008; Osterrieder & Schotman, 2011)
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Gallin and Gysels finds that rent-price ratio predicts changes in prices, but not rents.
(Gallin, 2008; Ghysels et al., 2013). Clarke, on the other hand, finds that where the rent-price
ratio is high (where prices are low and/or rents are high), there will be low rent growth. This
makes intuitive sense—in cities where rents are high relative to the price of housing, it will be
difficult to raise rents, as it may induce people to purchase homes.
In the long term in the US, the rent-price ratio of both residential property and
agricultural property has declined (Figures 3-2 and 3-3). Rents have declined relative to land
prices and land price has increased relative to the rents that it yields. This could be the result of
an increase in speculative land assessment—assessors, buyers, and sellers assuming that rents
will be going up (which has only been happening since the 1980s). The decline of the rent-price
ratio could also mean that land buyers are willing to accept lower returns (lower rents) on their
investments.

Rent-Price Ratio
Data Source for housing: Case-Shiller Index
Data source for Rent: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 3-2
Rent-Price Ratio, U.S. 1914-2019
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Figure 3-3
Cropland Rent-to-Value
Source: Nickerson et al., 2012
However, there are other structural factors that can lead to a divergence between sale
price and rents. In the case of home ownership versus home rentals, the price and the rent apply
to two different populations - renters and homebuyers. Even though some renters become
homebuyers, and vice-versa, there is evidence that a large part of the renting population are
lifelong renters. A stable rent/price ratio assumes that investment can flow unburdened between
renting and purchasing homes. However, if different populations rent and buy, and if these two
populations are in significantly different income brackets, then the ratio would not be stable.
Given increasing income inequality within the working class, the numerator and denominator in
the rent/price ratio would be governed by different forces.
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This bears itself out in the housing market’s dramatic revival post-COVID-19. Many are
asking, how can the housing market fare so well during double-digit unemployment? As Logan
Mohtashomi, a mainstream housing market analyst, argued recently:
a lot of these [job losses] are tied to what I call renter households and people that are
future renters… it doesn’t impact homeowners as much… there’s 138 million people
working and the key is the housing market just needs 4 million mortgage buyers per year
to keep things stable. (Mohtashomi, 2020)
The hierarchy between homeowner and renter is a racialized and racializing one; low
income Black and Latinx people are produced as a “semi-permanent rental class” (Desmond,
2020), while white people are produced as probable homeowners. Homeownership is one of
many metrics that make visible the inherent racialization which motivates US state policy and
its enforcement. The effects of racist GI bill loan disbursement was one step in a long history of
producing white people as homeowners and people of color—Black people especially—as renters
(Taylor, 2019). Homeownership has long been recognized as a way to quell dissent—with a
home and a mortgage people are less willing to rise up. So, a 75% white homeownership rate
ensures that the majority of whites in the USA will act as collaborators and apologists for capital
and the state—including and especially by supporting the racial hierarchy in which they are the
winners.
Economists and politicians constantly imply that renters are people who just haven’t
bought a home yet; they do not like to refer to the semi-permanent renter class. They act as if
the actual goal in the USA was 100% homeownership, but clearly it is not—there is too much
money to be made from renting.
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There is more public visibility and
analysis of homeownership markets than
rental markets. The “housing market” is
generally calculated as the value of all owneroccupied property plus mortgage debt—a
striking 33.1 Trillion. This dwarfs the 2.9
trillion of multifamily rental property, or even
the 16 Trillion of all commercial non-farm
rental properties (Figure 3-4). There are is also
a vast cottage industry of people offering

Figure 3-4
Estimates of Commercial Property Value 2018

advice and training for entering the real estate

Source: Nareit, 2018

business, which erupted since the turn of the 21sts century.
Public-facing data and market advice, however, is not meant for large scale investors.
This data is for small entrepreneurs and small companies—real estate agents, assessors, and
other people who facilitate sale and purchase of properties. These individuals and companies are
most interested in purchase and sale—flipping. Larger companies will serve as intermediaries in
sale (real estate firms that handle sales for others; providers of supplies for building
construction), or they will invest in the enormous and varied mortgage market (see Chapter 4).
The data that guides large investors on property purchases is private; the techniques they
employ are clandestine. Popular media discusses the “housing market” in terms of the purchase
and sale of owner-occupied homes, but residential rentals provide vast revenues for major
institutional investors, especially since the 1980s (Figure 3-5).
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Figure 3-5
Personal Expenditure on Tenant-Occupied Nonfarm Housing

Residential rental properties in the U.S. yielded 620 billion dollars in 2019. Rentals
require relatively little capital outlay (once the property is acquired) compared to manufacture
or services. This results in a lot of money going directly to passive landowners.
Despite the visibility of flipping houses, long term gains are in rentals, not flipping—so
long as one acquires property at a good cap-rate. Equity REITs, for example, (amongst the few
institutional real estate investors with public data) clearly state that the majority of their profits
derive from rental payments—not sale. Large institutional investors shunned the single-family
home market altogether because the cap-rate on purchase price and rent price for single family
had been too low. However, after the 2007/8 crash, single family homes flooded the market at
slashed rates, with dramatically increased cap-rates, and institutional investors finally entered
the market with the intention to buy and rent rather than buy and sell. Several companies that
started out purchasing these properties in order to flip them quickly found that renting out the
homes they bought would be more profitable than selling them. They transitioned their
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properties into rentals, and in many cases were later acquired by large rental companies (e.g.
Colony, Invitation Homes).
Institutional investors generally make up a small percentage of home purchases every
year, and they usually buy to rent, not to sell (D’Lima & Schultz, 2019). In 2018, institutional
purchase of homes reached a 20 year high of 11% of all home purchases. 5.96 million homes
were sold that year, representing less than 5% of all owner-occupied property, equal to roughly
$1.5 Trillion dollars. That means that housing worth 165 billion was purchased by institutional
investors.
Large institutional investors (those that purchase more than 101 properties at a time)
only invest in markets with extremely high cap-rates; for example, less than 0.05% of total large
investment purchases of multifamily property have been in high cost Metropolitan areas such as
San Francisco, New York, or Boston for the last twenty years (Mclaughlin, 2019). Even their
activity in these low-cost cities only makes up about 15% of all investor home purchases (Figure
3-6).
Most “institutional investors” in homebuying markets are small investors (buying 10
properties or less). Small investors especially dominate home purchases in high cost, low caprate MSAs (e.g. Boston, San Francisco). CoreLogic (a major housing data analytics firm) calls
these small investors “Mom-and-Pop” investors because they are so small, and tend to be small
entrepreneurs rather than major companies. Often the term “institutional investor” is
juxtaposed to “Mom-and-Pop” landlords (see Chapter 5) but here, to be an institutional investor
you need only have a business name—an LLC, etc.
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Figure 3-6
Investor Homebuying Rates by Investor Size: 1999 – 2018
Source: CoreLogic

Large moneyed institutional investors generally enter the market of house purchase and
sale not as buyers and sellers, but as mortgage lenders. Mortgages become a proxy for
landownership, and the owners of mortgages collect monthly “interest payments” from the
“homeowners.”
Mortgages
In the purchase and sale of property, the seller can realize future ground rents by selling
land for more than they invested in it, but the mortgage-lender will generally make an even
greater return on investment than the seller.
Take for example the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, adopted by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) in the mid-50s and becoming the standard in the 60s and 70s. This
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lowered monthly payments from a 10- or 20-year fixed rate mortgage that were more common
in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, but it increased total interest payments substantially. Even at a low
5% interest rate (found in the 1950s and then not again till post-crisis 2009), with down
payment of 20% a home buyer ends up paying additional 75% of the sale price in interest
payments, compared to about 55% for a 20 year FRM. At rates of 7.5%--common in the 90s and
early 70s— buyers pay more than the actual price of the property in interest with a 30-year
mortgage, compared to 90% of the full price with a 20 year mortgage. The first handful of years
pay back the principal to the mortgage lender, and from then on they collect ground rents. Once
mortgages were paid off, ground rent extraction can begin again with second mortgages, reverse
mortgages, and home equity loans.

Figure 3-7:
30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage Average in the U. S. 1970-2020
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Throughout most of the last century, purchasers of 1 to 4 family residences have been
primarily owner-occupiers; people who live in their own unit, some of whom own a few more
units for rental income. These small working class landowners account for the vast majority of
mortgages. The mortgage market is therefore a transfer of ground rent from proletarian “home
owners” to mortgage lenders/holders—who, in the last instance, hold the title to land if the
ground rent transfer is not completed.
Mortgage lenders are the de-facto landowners for much of the life of the mortgage. The
idea that a “buyer” owns their home before the mortgage repaid is a slight of hand—nowhere so
obvious as when a person having paid off 90% of their mortgage goes into foreclosure and loses
their home.
Mortgage-lenders make up an evasive but powerful bloc within the landowning class.
They have historically had a very powerful lobby (see Chapter 4) and won significant guarantees
from the US government. During the COVID-19 epidemic, we see mortgage-lenders protected
from potential default of their working-class borrowers in much the same fashion as residential
landlords are being protected from the potential default of their working class tenants. Tenants
who couldn’t pay rent were protected from eviction for the first 5 months of the pandemic,
mortgage borrowers were generally allowed deferrals for a similar duration.
However, here the renter/homebuyer hierarchy reinstates itself in COVID-19 policy, for
at the end of that 5 months, the renter is expected to pay the 5 months of ground rent in full to
avoid eviction, while the homeowner can defers that 5 months of ground rent into the future.
The distinction here between the mortgage lender and the residential landowner is innocuous;
both demand their monthly payment of ground rent. The difference is not one of kind, but one
of degree; the “homeowner” (often) enjoys more flexibility in relation to their ground rent
payments than the renter. It is easier to refinance a mortgage than negotiate your rent lower.
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But both are ground rent payments, and both the rent’s percentage of household income and
mortgage as percentage of household income have risen dramatically since 1975.
Stock Markets v. Real Estate Markets
Of the numerous studies analyzing the relationship between real estate markets and
stock markets, many find no relationship, or a relationship so weak as to be useless for
predictive purposes. However, there are also many that find a close correlation, integration, or
causal relationship. I have summarized 15 of the most cited of these studies in the Table I and
Table II below.
Nine of the ten studies that find segmentation or negligible cointegration have a time
frame that ends before 2000, and eight begin before 1980. These studies compare stocks (and
sometimes bonds) to both securitized real estate (usually equity REITs) and “unsecuritized” real
estate, for which they use appraisals or the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) which measures both
“capital appreciation” and income.
All of the 6 studies that find real estate and stock markets to be significantly integrated,
on the other hand, use data that begins after 1984 and ends after 2002, with the exception of
Quan et al., which ends in 1996.
The relationship between real estate markets and stock markets shifts substantially
between the years 1985 and 2005. Studies beginning before this period (running roughly
between 1970 and 2000) find the markets to be segmented, while studies beginning during this
period (running between 1985 and 2010) are integrated. this suggests that at some point
between 1985 and 2000 something changes in the relationship between the two m between
roughly 1970 and 2000, real estate was not integrated with stocks, but at some point between
1985 and 2010, they appear to integrate.
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Several studies suggest a shift in the relationship between real estate and finance—
Glascock et al. (2000) argue that securitized real estate becomes integrated with stocks after
1992; Luchtenberg and Seiler (2014) find that they become even more integrated after the 2007
Financial crisis (although in this study, “Pure property” remains unintegrated).
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Table I
Studies Finding No or Low Cointegration Between Real Estate and Financial Markets
Authors
and

Real estate

Publication

Geographic

Time

type and data

Stocks or Bonds, and

Date

Area Covered

Period

source

data source

Commercial
nonfarm real
estate returns
(Liu et al.,
1990)

& Equity
USA

1978-1986

REITS

Stocks

Equity REITs,
unsecuritized
RE
(Myer &
Webb, 1993)

USA

1978-1990

(NCREIF/FRC

Stocks (S&P 500; CRSP VW

data)

and EW)

Equity REITs,
unsecuritized
(Mei & Lee,
1994)

USA

1978-1989

Real Estate

Stocks (NYSE & AMEX) &

(Russel-

bonds (Government bond

NCREIF)

fund)

Securitized

Stocks (S&P 500 and Small

(Wilson &
Okunev,
1999)

USA

1971-1993

(NAREIT)

Cap Index)

USA

1972-1998

Equity REITs

Stocks (S&P 500)

(Okunev et
al., 2000)

Stocks (S&P 500), Bonds
(Glascock et
al., 2000)

USA

1972-1997

NAREIT,

(Salomon Treasury

NCREIF

Benchmark)
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USA, Canada,
Australia, Japan,
Netherlands,
(Westerheide,

Belgium, France,

2006)

Germany

Real Estate
1990-2004

Securities

Other Asset Classes

Real Estate
Returns
(Ibbotson &
Siegel, 1984)

USA

1947-1982

(Unsecuritized;

Stocks, Bonds (S&P 500;

appraisal-

Treasury Bonds, municipal

based)

bonds)
S&P 500 index for stocks,
the Lehman
Government/Corporate

(Chaudhry et
al., 1999)

Unsecuritized,

index for bonds, and 3-

Russel-

month Treasury bills for T-

USA

1978-1996

NCREIF Index.

bills.

21 countries

1985-1993

Securitized.

Stocks.

Goetzman
and Walker
(1995)
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Table II
Studies Finding Significant Integration Between Real Estate and Financial Markets
Authors and
Geographic
Publication

Area

Time

Real estate

Date

Covered

Period

type

Stocks or Bonds

1993-2007

Real Estate

Stocks

UK & Hong
(Hui et al., 2011)

Kong

(Olaleye &
Ekemode, 2014)

Securitized
Nigeria

2006-2010

RE

Stocks

Securitized
and
Unsecuritized
pure property
(FTSE
NAREIT and
(Luchtenberg &
Seiler, 2014)

FTSA
USA

2006-2010

(Cauchie &
Hoesli, 2006)

NAREIT)

Stocks: CRSP VW

Real Estate
Switzerland

1986-2002

Funds

Stocks & Bonds

(Apergis &

Unsecuritized

Lambrinidis,

Real Estate,

Stocks: Dow Jones; S&P 500;

REUS, REUK

NYSE, FTSE 100

2007)

US and UK

1985-2006

Assessed Real
Estate =

(Quan & Titman,
1999)

17 Countries

1984-1996

capital values

Stocks = Morgan Stanley's

and rental

Capital International's

indexes of

Composite stock returns;

prime office

Kuala Lumpur Composite

buildings in

Index; New Zealand Stock

major cities

Exchange
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I have not included in these tables the sole macro study of this relationship between
stocks and real estate markets, because it exceeds the scope of all the other studies. Li et al.
(2015) study data from 1890 to 2012, and find that while the relationship between the direct real
estate and common stock markets fluctuates over time, they tend to coincide in the periods
leading up to and following a crisis. This reflects the shift from no integration to cointegration
observed in the studies above: 1990s begin a period of cointegration between finance and real
estate, marking the beginning of a long run up to the 2007 crisis. After controlling for economic
growth, however, Li et al. find the co-movement decreases substantially, suggesting the comovement is likely the result of both markets responding to “economic growth fundamentals.”
In other words, when economic fundamentals are favorable and the economy is
booming, real estate and stocks boom together; when the economy busts, real estate and stocks
bust together. When economists attempt to remove the effects of economic fundamentals on the
two markets, they have little correlation.
Securitized Real Estate v. Direct Real Estate
While it would seem that securitized real estate should behave more like other financial
markets than direct real estate, several scholars note securitized real estate actually behaves
more like direct real estate than like stocks. Mei and Lei (1994) suggest a “real estate factor
premium” by which all assets related to real estate are affected.
Anderson et al. (2016) study private equity investment in real estate (PERE)—an
industry they describe as being particularly speculative and highly leveraged. They write that
PERE is “at the other end of the risk-return spectrum” from direct, hold-oriented real estate
funds—meaning that, if there were to be a divergence between direct and securitized real estate
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markets, it should be observable in the comparison between Real Estate Private Equity and
hold-oriented real estate investment.
On the contrary, Anderson et al. find that REPE is integrated with direct real estate, and
segmented from other private equity investments(see Figures 3-8 and 3-9): “REPE funds have
in almost all regards closer ties with real estate than with non-real estate private equity” (2016,
p. 264).

Figures 3-8 and 3-9
Index of Development of Real Estate Private Equity v. Real Estate v. Private
Equity

Why Are Real Estate and Stock Markets Segmented?
Economists explain the segmentation of real estate and stocks by various means: several
point to the legal constraints imposed on real estate investment that are not imposed on stock
purchases, others to the fact that information on real estate prices and cash flow are usually
proprietary, leading to insufficiently educated investors, and others still to divergent
expectations (rational or irrational) about future profits and future rents (Quan & Titman, 1999,
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p. 205). All of these are true to some degree; real estate and stock markets correspond to
different underlying social relations, with different legal structures and forecasting mechanisms.
But the most fundamental underlying difference between real estate and stocks is that
real estate is based on ground rents, which are concrete and have specific limits and tendencies,
while stocks and bond yields are whimsical—purely fictitious, brought closer down to earth
periodically through crises. This difference gives rise to the different legalities, forecasting
strategies, and market opacity between the two markets. Based on the data provided in this
chapter, I argue that even when loosed onto the trade floors of the NYSE, or traded in the glass
penthouse offices of international Private Equity, land-based securities remain tethered to
actual ground rent extraction.
If land securities are based on rental cash flows, what causes rent to go up and down? We
will discuss this in the conclusion to the next Chapter.
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: Landed Class Struggle

The tremendous power this gives landed property when it is combined together with
industrial capital in the same hands enables capital practically to exclude workers
engaged in a struggle over wages from the very earth itself as their dwelling-place. (Here
one section of society demands a tribute from the other for the right to inhabit the earth,
just as in landed property in general the proprietors demand the right to exploit the
earth’s surface, its bowels, and air above, and thereby the maintenance and development
of life.) The rise in population, and the consequent increase in the need for housing, is
not the only factor that must necessarily increase the rent on buildings. So too does the
development of fixed capital, which is either incorporated into the earth or strikes root in
it, like all industrial buildings, railways, factories, storehouses, docks, etc., which rest on
it. It is impossible, even with Carey’s determination, to confuse house-rent, in as much as
this is interest on the capital invested in the house, with rent of land pure and simple,
particularly when, as in England, the landowner and the speculative builder are
completely different people. Two elements come into consideration here: on the one
hand the exploitation of the earth for the purpose of reproduction or extraction, on the
other the space that is required as an element for any production and any human
activity. On both counts landed property demands its tribute. (Marx, 2015, p. 760)

Landowners and capitalists clash over their share of surplus value. In their interminable
conflict, landowners have an array of strategies at their disposal: they may (1) raise rents, (2)
withhold land, (3) vie for favored tax status and subsidies from the government, and (4) force a
rise in market price of commodities which are produced on high-ground-rent land, thereby
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directing a larger percentage of wage bill toward ground rent. Below I will address these
different strategies.

Strategies of Landowning Class
Raising rents.
If a capitalist farmer adopts labor-saving technology in the production of, say, soybeans,
resulting in higher than average profits for their crops, the landowner can raise rents the
following year. The raised rents capture the profits that exceed the average rate of profit for
agriculture, bringing the profits of that capitalist farmer back down to average. This can be a
disincentive to investing in labor-saving technology, leading to a lower than average organic
composition in agriculture.
This dynamic is visible in agricultural production and rents in the US over the last
century. The data is patchy, but we can see from USDA data that there was a gradual increase in
cash rents per acre of farmland from 1960 to 1980, a decline sometime after that followed by
stagnation, and a dramatic increase in rents per acre after the 2007 market crash. This is
apparent in national data from 1960-1980, and from 1998-2019 (Figure 4.1), and it is also
evidenced by state-level data: Iowa in particular has kept rigorous agricultural statistics which
reflect both of these trends (Figure 4.2).
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Cash Rent Per Acre of Farmland, USA
Adjusted for Inflation CPI=1984
Source 1998-2019: USDA NASS
Source 1960-1980 (All states except the West, adjusted for inflation):
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Figure 4-1
Cash Rent Per Acre of Farmland, U.S. 1960-2019

Figure 4-2
Cash Rent and Farmland Value, Iowa Average 1954-2015

93

How do these increases and declines in rents correspond to the income for capitalist
farmers over the same period? Generally speaking, the increased rents capture gains in gross
receipts and government payments (see Figure 4-4). During the period of moderately increasing
rents between 1950 to 1970 we see slow growth of farm gross income, paired with the stagnation
of farm net income; based on the simultaneous increase in agricultural rents, we can wager that
these gross gains are being captured by landowners in rent. When gross farm income decreases
between 1980 and 1990, we also see declining rents. Gross and net farm income mostly
stagnates between 1990 and 2005, and rents also stay flat. After the 2007 financial crisis, rents
and gross income skyrockets, while farm income has a momentary uptick and drops down again.
Farmers gained a share of the dramatic spike in gross farm income in the 1970s, with net
income rising along with it, but soon the net income returned to previous levels, while rents and
gross income stay high until the mid-1980s. This substantiates the thesis that productivity gains
will initially yield increased profits to farmers, but the gains will rapidly become incorporated in
rent hikes and go toward landowners.
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Figure 4-3
Inflation-adjusted U. S. Gross and Net Farm Income, 1910-2016
Source: Zhang & Beek, 2016

This is evidence that landownership affects the net profits of agricultural capital. We can
observe a similar pattern when it comes to Mining, Transportation, and Utilities—all sectors
with a high ground rent bill.
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Figure 4-4:
Broad Profit Rate: Highly capital intensive industries, Business, and Restricted
business
Source: Dumenil and Levy, 2002
Top Dotted Line: Restricted business (Business minus Highly Capital Intensive
Industries)
Middle Solid Line: Business
Bottom Dashed Line: Highly Capital Intensive Industries

Dumenil and Levy find that while the majority of US industries follow a similar trend of
plunging profit rates until the 1980s followed by moderately rising rates,14 the sector they call
“Highly capital intensive industries” (Figure 4-4, the bottom dashed line) follows a different
trajectory, hovering at a low and constant profit rate of about .08-.09%. This is not unlike the
net profits on farms (Figure 4-3). The industries they define as Highly capital intensive are

14

Kliman 2011 has argued that in fact profit rates do not rise after the 1980s.
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Mining—which has the same relationship to the landowner as agriculture—and Transportation
& Public Utilities. But Dumenil and Levy’s characterization of these industries as “Highly capital
intensive” is misleading—in truth, they are land intensive; they require vast amounts of space
compared to manufacture, trade, or services (which are the sectors within “Restricted
Business”). In other words, they pay a lot of rent. In effect, this graph compares profit rates in
sectors where landowners do not intervene to capture excess profits, with sectors in which they
do.
Landowners do not intervene in industrial production to the degree they do in
agriculture, because the portion of profits extracted as ground rent is minimal. This is because
there is not as strict a monopoly on industrial land as there is for agriculture. Manufacture of
durables, for example, requires very little land per unit of value produced relative to agriculture.
Also, manufacturers are generally not too picky about the quality of their land—a factory can
more or less be built anywhere there is flat solid land. Landed property will demand its tribute
from the factory owner, but the sum for major industry is a very small fraction of profits.
This is where Harvey’s concept of monopoly rents becomes important. Generally, the
landowner has significant power within agriculture because it is a sector that requires high
acreage of a specific quality (agriculture requires soil, good weather, and abundant water) as
withing mining (mining requires mineral deposits). Monopoly rents, however, bring the power
of the landowner into a new terrain: the city. In the city it is especially easy for landowners to
refuse to release the unused land under their control unless paid such a high rent that the
market prices of commodities produced on that land are forced above value. In this instance, the
rent charged creates the monopoly price. This form of monopoly rent can be important in all
urban sectors and affect the cost of food grains as well as the cost of working-class housing
(Harvey, 2007, p. 350).
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A small bakery requires only a very small footprint of land, and needs no particular
terrain or weather—hence, in a non-urban area a bakery generally would not be a high-rentpaying business, manipulable by landowners. However, in a city with limited commercial
storefronts, a landowner has significantly more power to raise rents on such an enterprise.

Withholding land from the market.
“He leases only when a lease-price can be paid.” (Marx, 2015, p. 745)
The power to withhold land from use is the greatest absolute power of landowners (see
Chapter 1 and 2). Where productive capitalists must keep high turnover rates, repay loans, and
realize profits before commodities lose value, landowners are characterized by a longer temporal
scope and the financial stability to keep their land vacant. If they own their land with no debt or
low debt, landowners increase their power to manipulate rents through withdrawal of land. This
distinguishes them also from finance capitalists, who must constantly put their loan capital in
motion to evade threat of inflation or other drains on hoarded money. While the price of land
may rise and fall, land itself remains.
This tendency reveals itself in widespread vacancy rates throughout every real estate
sector. Moreover, vacancy rates generally increase when housing markets go up. In the United
States, rents and vacancy rates both climb together from the 80s to 2009 (see Figure 4-11).
Likewise, rising vacancy rates have accompanied China’s property boom over the last 20 years
(Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5
Vacancy Rates for Chinese Cities, 2001-2012

Government policy.
Landowners have generally benefitted from favorable policies from the US federal
government. They have frequently pushed their agenda by holding up the small family farmer
as the imagined beneficiary of their proposals, and have often come into conflict with
industrialists.
Throughout most of the 19th century, debates raged about how to sell the so recently
stolen U.S. federal lands. On one side, Northern industrialists argued that land should be sold at

99

high prices and heavily taxed in order to subsidize industry and protect it against the labor
shortages it was soon to experience due to westward expansion. On the other side, politicians
argued the land should be sold cheaply, making it available to the “actual settler” and protecting
him from the “monopoly of speculation” (Gates, 1973, p. 9).
On the surface, the latter position triumphed, and land was made available cheaply for
sale across the country. However, the minimum amount of acreage required by each individual
to purchase was large enough to prevent most “small farmers” from being able to afford it, and
so tenancy swept across the country apace with western expansion. The Democratic party was
dominated by “Land- and currency-speculators who were undermining “subsistence” agriculture
in the west” (Post, 2012, p. 100). Even while President Jackson publicly deplored “that feature of
public land policy which permitted speculators to buy land in unlimited amounts” (Gates, 1942,
p. 324), his administration promoted enormous speculative land sales between 1835 and 1837,
in which at least 29,000,000 of the 38,000,000 acres of “public” land stolen from Native Tribes
and Peoples went to large landholders (Gates, 1942, p. 321). Almost all of these large land
disbursals went to cotton plantation owners using hyper-“efficient” and hyper-brutal
exploitation of slave labor; in Mississippi alone, 8.3 million acres (almost 1/3) went to
speculators of slave plantations (Baptist, 2016; Woods, 1998, p. 45).
Jackson clamped down on large land purchases in 1836, aiming to “save the new states
from a non-resident proprietorship, one of the greatest obstacles to the advancement of a new
country and the prosperity of an old one” (quoted in Gates, 1942, p. 324). However, large
landholders would continue to amass land by hook or by crook. Lands given to states for
internal use such as education and infrastructure—through the Military Bounty Acts (1847,
1855) The Graduation Act (1854) and the Homestead Act (1862)—created secondary land
markets (Passel, 1975, p. 84). Vouchers for land proffered by these Acts were bought and sold,
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and eventually amassed into large landholdings—often at cheaper rates than the government
had been charging for direct land sales.
Large public land grants themselves were not eliminated so much as redirected to
railway companies, who, as Marx put it, became the “greatest landlords” (Colean, 1950, p. 10;
Marx, 1879). Men who had been dry goods traders were able to amass over 175,000,000 acres of
land between the 1850s and 1870s (an amount of land larger than Texas), giving birth to a new
wing of the landowning class in the US. This is another example of how the US government
favored the emergence of major landowning factions at the expense of small scale settlers,
despite their rhetoric.
In the 20th century, Agriculture continued to receive special treatment from the
government, especially when compared to other sectors. Goldstein (1989) describes a strong
divergence between agricultural policy and industrial policy, summed up as “trade liberalization
for industrial products and trade protectionism to maintain farm incomes for agricultural
products.” While American industry was opened up to global competition, American agriculture
was sheltered and subsidized.
Goldstein (1989) notes that the protection of agriculture was in part due to the strength
of interest groups advocating for agriculture; she fails to mention that these lobby groups were
by and large wings of what Clyde Woods calls the Southern Plantation Bloc, closely allied with
Roosevelt. The inauguration of 20th Century agricultural policy was the Agricultural Adjustment
Act (AAA) of 1933, a “planter-dominated affair” (Woods, 1998, p. 123). The AAA enacted an
array of subsidies, primarily paying farmers to destroy crops and reduce acreage so as to raise
prices. These subsidies propped up troubled agricultural firms, and also ensured the continued
flow of ground rents to agricultural landowners. Moreover, these subsidies “allowed planters…
to end their responsibility for the survival and reproduction of African American labor” (Woods,
1998, p. 122). Not only did agricultural subsidies protect the income of planters, farmers, and
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agricultural landowners, but they enabled the Plantation owners of the south to sever some of
the last ties between Black farmers and the land of the south.
The structures set in place by the AAA have persisted throughout the 20th century. It is
widely acknowledged that support to the agricultural sector protects the rental income of
agricultural landowners—many have even argued that the primary beneficiaries of agricultural
subsidies are not the farmers, but the landowners (Alston, 2007; Kirwan, 2009). Figure 4-3
shows that the higher gross farm income during the 80s and 90s (as compared to the 50s and
early 60s) is primarily due to agricultural subsidy. Without this subsidy, rents would ostensibly
have had to decrease for farmers to be able to afford them.
The Anti-Trade nationalism pushed by President Trump panders to racist whites’ fantasy
of a lost America, and it conveniently also protects the rental income of the landlord class.
Suppressing imports in high-ground-rent sectors such as agriculture ensures continued income
which can be directed toward rents. A similar dynamic was present during the famed Corn Law
debates of the 19th century. The tension between landowners and capitalist producers over tariffs
was the crux of the conflict over whether to tax corn imports. Landowners were the primary
lobbyists for corn laws, as the movement of capital to other countries for corn production meant
the bottom falling out of their rental income. Further, keeping prices of corn high ensured they
could continue to charge high rents.
The genetic code of the US government is disposed toward the protection and
advancement of landowning class power—whether this is particular to all capitalist states, to
colonial settler states specifically, or to the US State in particular is an important question for
future research.
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Raising prices of High-Rent Commodities.
I call “High-Rent Commodities” those commodities whose production requires
proportionally high rental payments. It is in the interest of landowners that high-rent
commodities continue to be costly, and rise in price if possible. Every dollar increase in the sale
price of wheat above the production price is another dollar landowners can charge to wheat
producers in rent.
There is also an indirect struggle between landowners and capitalists over wages:
capitalists want to suppress wages, while landowners want wages as high as possible so that
workers can pay ever higher prices for High-Rent commodities. When commodities are
purchased by the working class, they purchase them out of their wages. Wages are paid
(generally) by capitalists. If high-rent commodities are necessities—such as, for instance,
housing—then as they rise in price, workers need higher wages to pay for them. If capitalist raise
workers’ wages, allowing them to pay higher rent, the worker watches the price of their labor
power rise while their quality of life does not. Capitalists, in the meantime, are footing the bill
for landlords’ hiking the price of high-rent commodities by paying their workers higher wages.
For example, while inflation has been negligible in recent decades even given all the
economic indicators that usually induce inflation15 —the cost of housing has spiked. This is
largely due to the fact that rental housing (or rather, the land beneath it) is a crop that can’t be
grown in China or Mexico. Urban and suburban housing, as well as prime rural housing, is
subject to the monopoly rents discussed above. The landowning class can raise urban residential
rents without any change in how apartments are produced or consumed.
This dynamic plays out in areas with extremely high and increasing ground rents and
rent gaps. In San Francisco, businesses ranging from small local joints to major multinationals,

15

See Saad-Filho (2019) for explanation for our contemporary lack of inflation.
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have closed or moved operations over the last decade due to their inability to find employees
who can work for the wages the company is able to pay, and/or because of the increased
overhead of commercial rental costs. Local establishment Mission Pie closed its doors in 2019,
citing their inability to pay a living wage in the face of soaring housing costs in San Francisco
(Eskenazi, 2019). Macy’s announced the firing of over 1000 employees in San Francisco in
February 2020 (Hanbury, 2020), citing the unaffordability of local office space and rising wage
demands due to housing. Macy’s gave some of their fired workers the option to reapply to
locations in New York and Atlanta, where the company owns commercial properties and is
headquartered. Employees hired in those places will receive a wage cut commensurate with the
lower cost of living (housing).
But as we venture into the territory of residential rents, we face a problem: while the
classic Landlord-Tenant relationship in ground rent theory is between a landowner and a
capitalist tenant, here we find working class tenants with an entirely different relationship to
the space they rent.

Capitalist-As-Tenant
If you ask a regular person (aka a non-capitalist, non-landowner) about “rent,” they will
probably talk about residential rents they have paid, couldn’t pay, or managed not to pay.
Ground rent theory has been unable to account for this type of residential rents because in
Marxian and classical ground rent theory, the tenant is the capitalist, and ground rent is paid
out of profits, while in urban residential rents, the “tenant” is generally a proletarian. Seminal
texts on ground rent from Marx, Ricardo, and Von Thunen discuss agricultural rents almost
exclusively. Marx mentions that his analysis of agricultural ground rent can be applied to the
rent of mines, and potentially for urban rents, but does not elaborate.
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In classical ground rent theory, the capitalist farmer rents farmland from the landlord,
and the rent is paid out of their profits made on the land. The “rent” paid by a proletarian
“tenant,” on the other hand, is drawn out of their wages. The value they produce happens
elsewhere. In the working class tenant’s relationship to their landlord, the capitalist appears to
be absent.
Consequently, ground rent theory has only been loosely applied to residential rents. Neil
Smith made an essential intervention in his theory of the rent gap, which applied the theory of
capitalist competition to an analysis of the rental market; David Harvey has correctly
emphasized the monopoly character of urban landownership (Harvey, 2007; Harvey et al.,
2009; Smith, 1987, 1996).16 However, it has remained impossible to apply ground rent theory
directly to residential rentals.
Here, Engels’ uneven text on The Housing Question has an important insight: the
relationship between a residential landlord and working-class tenant is described as a “quite
ordinary commodity transaction” (Engels, 1887).17 The working class tenant is a consumer of
the commodity home.
David Harvey also refers to residents of housing as consumers of that housing – “The
occupiers of housing consume the various facets of housing according to their desires and
needs… All occupiers of housing [be they owner-occupiers or renters] have a similar concern –
to procure use values though laying out exchange value” (Harvey et al., 2009, p. 163). This
clarifies the difference between the working-class residential tenant and the capitalist tenant:

16

Anna Haila wrote the promisingly titled Urban Land Rent, but the book does not actually offer any insight on how
to make sense of residential rents vis a vis land rent theory.
17

Engels falters as he continues, suggesting that the rent is decisively determined by the given relation between
supply and demand.
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the former pays rent in order to consume a use-value, the latter pays rent in order to produce
surplus value.
Interestingly enough, the Bureau of Economic Analysis treats rent in a similar fashion.
The housing stock provides a flow of housing services that are consumed by persons who rent
their housing, and by persons who own the housing they occupy (referred to as “owneroccupants”). In the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), owner-occupants are
treated as owning unincorporated enterprises that provide housing services to themselves in the
form of the rental value of their dwellings. Thus, Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) for
housing services includes both the monetary rents paid by tenants and an imputed rental value
for owner-occupied dwellings (measured as the income the homeowner could have received if
the house had been rented to a tenant). (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019)
But if working class tenants are consuming produced use-values, and landlords in
capitalism are defined by their disengagement from value production (see Chapters 1 and 2),
who is producing this commodity “home”?
Like all value production in capitalism, the production of the use value “home” involves
mixing living with dead labor. In apartment rentals, a capitalist must enlist living labor
(superintendents, plumbers, carpenters, administrative staff, security personnel, and so on) to
valorize the dead (the building, materials used for renovation and upkeep, mops and garbage
bags).
In many cases, the capitalist firm producing home and selling it to tenants is a distinct
legal entity from the landowner. Often today these firms are called “property management
companies.” They supposedly collect “rent” from “tenants” for the landowner, but in terms of
ground rent theory this is a mere appearance—in reality, the capitalist property management
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company sells the commodity “home” monthly to people “renting” apartments. After this sale,
the property management company pays ground rent to the landowner.
Long-standing landowning companies (those companies over 40 years old, say) often act
as both the capitalist and the landowner of residential property. For example, Trinity properties
is one of the biggest high-end luxury apartment rental companies in San Francisco, founded in
1949, and both owns and manages their properties.
It is common for high profile “financialized” residential landowners to employ a
subsidiary company to manage their properties; the companies remain legally distinct, but
profits are mostly kept in-house. For example, Veritas Investments—San Francisco’s biggest
residential landowner—purchases high value residential property which is managed by their
subsidiary Greentree Investment, while another subsidiary handles the leasing process.
In other cases, small landowners owning one or several multi-family buildings contract
with large national property management firms. All of these different configurations reveal
different balances of class interests between landowners, capitalists, and proletarians.
There are many forces and interests at work in the housing market. The existence of the
capitalist tenants in the residential rentals market challenges Engels’ (1887) comment that: “In
the housing question, we have two parties confronting each other: the tenant and the landlord or
house owner.” We actually have at least three: the landowner, the capitalist producer of the
commodity home, and the consumer of that commodity (either working class or bourgeois).
Sometimes a third party complicates the picture further: the lender, who can be either a
mortgage-lender, a credit issuer, or an investor. All of these parties have different interests,
strengths, and weaknesses.
Too often different kinds of rentals—agriculture, industrial, apartment rentals—are
analyzed in isolation from one another leading to an inconsistent theory of rent. But once we
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conceive of residential rents as involving capitalist production and working class consumption,
we are able to connect urban residential rent and rent of land for agriculture, mining, and
timber extraction. This framework allows us to consider absolute and differential rent of
industry and agriculture as also pertaining to apartment buildings. We are now able to
understand the conflict between capitalist and landowner imperatives in all of these sectors.
Just as a soybean farmer rents farmland, an automobile producer rents industrial
property, and a department store rents retail property, a property management company
functionally “rents” residential property. In the United States, multifamily rental housing is
considered one of four types of “commercial real estate.” In practice, residential real estate and
non-residential commercial real estate are analyzed separately (as advocated by the IMF – see
International Monetary Fund 2006). A developed ground rent theory should be applicable to all
instances of landownership and ground rent extraction, while opening up a more rigorous
analysis of the differences between these particulars.
In Chapter 1, I analyzed the relationship between rent per acre and levels of tenancy in
agricultural land in (Figure 1-3). The chart showed that higher rents correlated with higher
levels of tenancy. We can also analyze the same relationship for urban residential rents, and find
the same correlation (Figure 4-6).
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Median Rent vs % of Units in Tenancy
by Metropolitan Statistical Area, 2015
Source for tenancy: Census
Source for Median Rent: HUD
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Figure 4-6
Median Rent v. Percent of Units in Tenancy by Metropolitan Statistical Area,
2015
Today, many of the most recognizable names in residential rental markets are, in fact,
property management companies which do not own the majority of the properties they manage:
Blackstone Management; Starwood Capital; Alliance Residential. Greystar, the USA’s biggest
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property management company and self-proclaimed “Global Leader in Rental Housing,” only
owns about 1/3 of the 480,000 units under its management. Additionally, many proletarian
tenants erroneously believe their property management companies are their landlords– for
example, over the course of many doors knocked during a recent campaign against the big
speculative landowning company Veritas in San Francisco, I found that the majority of people
believed their landlord was “Greentree,” which in fact was the property management company
contracted by Veritas. And in a sense, these tenants are correct: their main interface is with
Greentree, and most of the pressure points they have are with Greentree, not Veritas. However,
for a full strategy for these tenants, they had to develop a clear understanding of the difference
between the two companies and how to effectively struggle against them both.
There is a clear distinction between the landowner properly speaking (the owner of the
title to the land) and the company that manages and runs a residential building The latter must
be understood as a capitalist company, one that pays rent to a landowner for the right to
produce and reproduce the commodity home on the rented land. The property management
buildings of residential properties are capitalist tenants.

Residential Property Management in 20th Century US
Property management companies were neither so common nor so professionalized
throughout the mid-20th century in the United States (Carucci Goss & Campbell, 2008). If they
were productive capitalist companies, they were equivalent to at-home weavers, not to industrial
linen factories. The property manager of the mid-century was closer to a superintendent than to
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today’s major residential management companies like Greystar or Alliance Residential. This
may be the reason that Property Management is often overlooked in the study of urban rentals.18
Carucci Goss and Campbell (2008) argue that the role of the property manager moves
from a pre-1930s “Owner Manager”, to a “Caretaker Manager” in the 30s, an “Emerging
Professional Manager” in the 60s, a “Sales and Marketing Manager” in the 80s, and “Income
Maximization Manager” in the 90s:
In the early days of property management, caretaker managers would never have
seen their property budgets. They would have been responsible for collecting the
rent, making necessary repairs, paying the bills, and turning over the profits to
the owner. Emerging professional managers would have been given a budget
from the corporate office and expected to manage the property within the budget.
The sales and marketing manager may have had some input into the budget, but
would be expected to adhere to the budget while emphasizing resident retention.
Today's income maximization managers prepare the budget for their properties
in consultation with the corporate office so as to maximize the profit for the
owner or stockholders. (Goss and Campbell, 2008, p. 17)
Carucci Goss and Campbell (2008) attribute the ascent of the property management to
the increasing complexity and difficulty of renting residential units. They argue that in the early
20th century rental housing demand was high, and landlords had a relatively easy time filling
vacancies and collecting adequate rents. Landlords could employ minimal management and still
expect decent returns. As renting became more onerous, and especially during the economic
downturn in the 80s, landowners turned to property management companies to ensure the

18

Property Managers, for instance, are absent from David Harvey’s taxonomy of actors in the urban housing
market—occupiers, Realtors, Landlords, Developers, Financial institutions, Government Institutions (1973).
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maintenance of profits. This timeline follows the narrative of financialization theory as well, in
which the pre-1970s period in the US was a more pastoral landscape for capitalism, marred by
increasing extraction at the onset of financialization/neoliberalism.
However, corporate property management reared its head way before. As early as the
late 19th century, realtors were already taking on full corporate property management roles
(Davies, 1958, p. 39; Doucet & Weaver, 1991, p. 368). This coincided with a rise in
financialization (see Chapter 5 on 19th century financialization). Where there were absentee
landlords—and they have been common throughout the history of the US—there were often
robust property management companies (Doucet & Weaver, 1991, p. 372).19 Absentee landlords
in agriculture also meant widespread tenancy, which we can see from the first eastern colonies
to the slave-holding south (Post, 2012; Woods, 1998). Large scale property management is not
new to the 20th century; the fact that it is notably absent in urban residential rents during the
mid-20th century indicates that

Rent Cost Index

something happened to reduce the
market for property management.
Rent prices went down every
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residential rental sector be sheltered

19

The correlation between property management and absentee landlords mirrors that between tenant farmers and
absentee landlords of farmland.
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from capitalist competition for profit rates during the postwar period? Why did landowners seek
so little in rent, even given low vacancy rates?
In fact, the mid-20th century was a backwards period for residential property
management in the US because tax policy had turned residential buildings into attractive tax
havens. If one purchases a building in order to shelter other income from taxes, one need not—
and cannot—squeeze too much revenue from that building in rents. Increased income from

Figure 4-8
Rental Vacany Rate for the U. S.
rents would defeat the purpose. There was little need for more income to be generated by
property management companies through increased rents.
The bulk of this tax evasion was enabled by increases in depreciation allowances
(Samwick, 1995). In 1954, Congress published the 1954 Revenue Code which increased
depreciation deductions for structures by enabling extra depreciation in early years of
ownership. The government further liberalized depreciation regulations three times over the
next 30 years, culminating in the early 80s when depreciation time dropped to 15 years with
rapid depreciation in the first years of ownership. This meant that on a building worth $1
million, not only could you write off almost $70,000 per year in depreciation (1/15 th of $1
million), you could claim accelerated depreciation for the first years of almost double that value.
113

Table III
History of Depreciation Deductions, Non-Residential and Residential Structures, 1950-1993
Rapid Depreciation Techniques: DDB= double declining balance; DB = declining balance;
SYD = sum-of-years-digits.

1950

1954-69

Non-residential

Residential

Structures

Buildings

40 Years, Linear

40 Years, Linear

40 Years, Rapid

40 Years, Rapid

Depreciation

Depreciation

Available (DDB,

Available (DDB,

1954 Internal Revenue Code

SYD)

SYD)

(Eisenhower)

Policy

40 Years, Rapid

1969-70

1971-80

1981

1982-3

1984-6

40 Years, Rapid

Depreciation

Depreciation
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Available (150%DB)

SYD)

36 Years, Rapid

31 Years, Rapid
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Available (SYD)

System (Nixon)

15 Years, Rapid
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Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
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Depreciation
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
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of 1993
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Reagan’s Tax Reform Act of 1986 closed several tax loopholes for landowners—in
particular, the TRA1986 barred landowners from claiming accelerated depreciation on their
properties and writing off “passive” losses.
In 1991, Donald Trump told Congress the 1986 tax act was an “absolute catastrophe.” As
a real estate investor at the time, it had deleterious effects on his industry (Eizenstat, 2017).
Here we can see the landlord and capitalist class competing for government favor: Reagan was
clearly interested in increasing the power of the capitalist class, and apparently willing to smite a
blow to the landowning class in order to advance the interests of capitalists. Conversely, Trump
as president has frequently made decisions that are unpopular for national and international
capitalist class, but advantageous for a landowning class.
For example, Trump has favored increased tariffs and nationalist economic policies,
inciting and emboldening various “trade wars” with countries from which the U.S. generally
imports. Landowners in the US, will find their ground rent streams secured and enhanced by
policies which enforce local production, because this means that capitalist companies are forced
to rent land domestically for production, assembly, and so on.
Before the TRA 1986, the internal rate of return (IRR) on real estate investment using all
the tax-sheltering techniques available was a handsome 21.88%. (This was for high income
investors, who were the most common users of the tax shelter.) The bulk of this profit was the
result of tax benefits on other investments, not from direct rental payments from the properties.
After the TRA, this IRR dropped to 13.15%. The new regulations resulted in negative after-tax
cash flows, requiring actual cash inputs during the years between purchase and sale (Samwick,
1995, pp. 8, 30). Now, for the first time in decades, rental properties had to turn higher profits.
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Sure enough, the 80s marked the reversal of rent’s long descent in real price (see Figure
4-7). Residential rents began a slow increase in the 80s, coinciding with the rise in property
management companies.
The growth of REITs in the mid-90s (20 years after the legal form of the REIT was
established in the US) can also be seen as a partial response to the TRA of 1986, since the reform
made private real estate ownership via limited partnerships less financially advantageous.
“Again, the role of the property manager was elevated in importance because as public entities,
REITs had to make public their financial information, and REIT stockholders expected a return
on their investments. All of this required good management” (Carucci Goss & Campbell, 2008,
p. 16).
The property manager played a minor role in the years between 1930-1980 because there
was less incentive to maximize profits in residential buildings. But in 1986 there was a rapid
introduction of major property management companies into residential rentals alongside a
growing imperative to extract higher ground rents. Residential landowners began to demand
higher rents from their capitalist tenants, and small-scale property management was not up to
the task.
In effect, ground rent extraction became a lesser priority in residential rentals
throughout the post-war period. The imperatives both of landowners to extract ground rent, and
of capitalist to produce and sell monthly doses of “home” for a profit, were tempered
substantially.
During this period, however, mortgage lending expanded. In the 1830s, when the
government tightened restrictions on large scale land purchases by big landowners, “only the
business of lending money to squatters remained” (Gates 1942, 324). Similarly, here, money
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flowed rapidly into mortgage lending, spurred by government policy. This time, however, the
government explicitly invited investment into the mortgage market.

Homeownership,
Mortgages, Ground Rent
During the post-war peak
of residential tax havens,
homeownership began to spike.
While rents were declining,
housing prices rose (Figure 410). Rented housing units
outnumbered owner-occupied
homes until the late 1940s. After
this, rentals continued to grow,
but owner-occupied homes grew

Figure 4-9
Occupied Housing Units by Tenure in U. S., 19002000
Source: Suchan et al., 2007, p. 234

faster (Figure 4-9).
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The government incited much of this boom in homeownership through expanding and
guaranteeing mortgage-lending for

Housing Price Index vs.
Rent Cost Index

homeownership. The specter of
communism made class
compromise a necessity—at least
between capitalists and the upper
half of the white working class—and
homeownership was central to this
compromise. The FHA began
backing mortgages in the 1930s, the
VA in the 1940s, and in the 60s
Johnson began a process resulting
in the production of the modern

Source: Shiller (home prices) and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(rent cost)
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mortgage-backed security. These securities widened the funding available for mortgages, while
still insuring all investments with a US Government guarantee of payment (Quinn, 2019).
Leftist scholarship generally marks the 1970s as a turning point. Both proponents and
critics of financialization theory view the 60s and 70s as the end of a ‘golden age’ of strong
working-class mobilizations and gains in the USA. Christophers writes that finance is “truly
shackled” for the first and only time during the postwar period. Quinn argues that only in the
1970s did the financial class “mobilize power… by taking advantage of political problems that
had existed since the start of the nation… [and] through adjustments to a set of partnerships and
credit supports that had long been active in the housing sector” (Quinn, 2019, p. 197). Wolfgang
Streek called this period “the revolt of capital against the postwar mixed economy.” John Weeks
points to the post-war moment as the achievement, by organized labor, of a kinder and gentler
capitalism (Weeks, 2011, p. 150).
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But why did capital only revolt against labor in the 70s? Why did finance’s shackles not
loosen in the 50s? It is wrong to assume that capitalists (and the finance sector in particular)
were unhappy about the compromise with labor, because they benefited from it as well.
However, by the 60s profitability had declined significantly, global competition was truly taking
off, so both productive and finance capital had to maneuver in new ways to ensure their profit
rates. Capital solicited, lobbied, and bullied the government for tax breaks (as it is wont to do) as
it sought other ways to counteract falling profit rates (Gilmore, 1999, p. 177). The government
proved willing to guarantee expanding amounts of mortgages, enabling ground rent extraction
by another name.

Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1949-2019
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Adjusted to 1984 dollars using CPI
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Mortgage Debt Outstanding, U. S., 1949-2019
Mortgage lending was shunned by the market after the property market crash of the
1920s. The US government guaranteed mortgage debt through the 50s and 60s, increasing
liquidity in the mortgage market in order to advance homeownership (Quinn, 2019). However
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arguments about the budget deficit forced the US to innovate techniques of unloading debt
while continuing to unload some of the mortgage debt it was accumulating. This gave birth to
the modern mortgage-backed security. First through Johnson’s failed Participation Certificate
program in the 60s, and then through Fannie Mae’s “pass-through certificates,” the form of the
mortgage-backed security took shape. In the latter, mortgage payments “passed through” Fannie
Mae directly to holders of the certificates, and titles to the mortgages were placed in a special
trust rather than continuing to be held by Fannie Mae. Both the return of the mortgage principal
and the interest payments were guaranteed by the U.S. government, even though the debt was
no longer on the books.
The form of the MBS was forged in the government at the demand of private investors,
but in 1983, First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Freddie Mac sorted the mortgages into
“tranches” and began selling the now familiar type of tiered MBS. The MBS market surged from
$20 Billion in 1982 to $265 billion in 1986 (Quinn, 2019, p. 206).
Mortgage lenders and holders of mortgage-backed securities became recipients of
enormous flows of ground rent from privileged sectors of the working class. Owner-occupiers
are the main buyers of 1-4 unit properties, and the main borrowers of mortgages by far (Figure
4-11). This changed slightly during the subprime crisis – at which point mortgage debt for 1-4
family homes drops significantly.
Major landholders tend to be the main purchasers of multifamily and commercial
property—and as we can see in Figure 4-11, they do not borrow so heavily from the mortgage
market. Their financing comes either from investors (both public and private), by non-mortgage
loans, and through saved liquidity.
Many high-profile companies entering the residential rental market over the last 10 or
20 years are highly leveraged—borrowing from banks at high interest rates—and/or raise cash

120

through investments to which they are beholden. As recently as 1990, rental housing was not
particularly highly leveraged, and showed a “typical” debt to asset ratio of about 35%--less than
the corporate sector’s 40%. (Gravelle, 2001, pp. 520–521). However, In 2000 (the last date for
which this data is available) the debt to asset ratio for rentals leaped to about 58% (Census,
Residential Finance Survey) while nonfinancial corporate debt dipped to about 30% (Federal
Reserve Data).

Residential Vacancies and Landownership
While the landowning class tends to be tolerant of vacancy and willing to remove land
from the market if they cannot receive their desired payments, property management
companies—as capitalist companies—have little such financial flexibility. Large-scale property
management companies tend to keep vacancies between 2 and 8 percent – a few percentage
points lower than the average 6 to 10% (Andrews & Sisson, 2018). While landowners are
beholden only to themselves, property management companies must pay rents to the landlord.
If they fail, they jeopardize their own profit margin as well as their contract with the landowner.
Once landowners have recouped their initial investment into land, they make little
additional outlay in their properties. Property management companies, on the other hand,
constantly advance capital in order to valorize it, and will always have to turn over a designated
amount of rent to the landowner. Some institutional landlords, such as REITs, have investors
who may sell stock if they are not profitable enough, leading to downturns in valuation and the
inability to raise more capital through selling stock. There are also highly leveraged landowners
who owe a large proportion of the prices of their properties to lenders. Such highly leveraged
landowners forfeit the ultimate power of landownership: withholding land from the market.
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The prevalence of residential vacancies, however, suggests that an ample amount of nonleveraged landowners still exist. Nearly 10% of residential units nationally stand vacant—far
more units than would be required to house all houseless people, as many homeless rights
organizations have pointed out. Office vacancies are even higher at around 12% while industrial
is somewhat lower, at around 6%.
In a further substantiation of the theses argued here, Figure 4-12 shows that a rise in
vacancies does not correspond with decline in rents. This deals a blow to mainstream analysts
who argue unflinchingly that high rents are due to low inventory—a position popularized by the
new “Yes in my back yard” (YIMBY) movement that claims that the solution to the homeless
crisis is an increase any kind of housing, regardless of whether it is affordable to those with low
incomes (California YIMBY, 2020; Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University,
2019).
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Rent Index vs. Vacancy Rate 1960-2018
Source for vacancy rate (left axis): US Census Housing Vacancies
and Homeownership (CPS/HVS)
Source for Rent Index (right axis): Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Even within Metropolitan
areas, higher vacancies persist
where rents are higher—San
Francisco has higher vacancy rates
than the greater Bay area while also
being home to the highest rents
(Figure4-13).

Figure 4-13
Vacancies by Year Built and Unit Size, U. S. 2015
Vacancy also pervades

Source: SF Housing Needs and Trends Report 2018

agricultural land—up to 40% of the
land grabbed in the “21st century land grabs” of the last two decades remains unused, often to
the despair of farmers pushed off that land (Peel, 2016).
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Private landownership in capitalism necessarily produces unused lands, often when and
where they are most needed. Thus, “in all civilized countries a relatively significant portion of
land always remains uncultivated” (Marx, 2015, p. 745).

Housing has Volume Cycle not a Price Cycle
A similar pattern exists in home sales: in housing slumps, rather than lowering prices to sell
properties, homeowners take properties off the market and wait. Leamer (2007) finds that it is
more accurate to analyze housing sales volume than housing sale prices, because when sales of
housing slows down, prices do not tend to decline substantially – rather, sales volume declines,
the amount of homes available on market declines, and with it, jobs in construction, real estate
brokerage, etc., decline.(Leamer, 2007, p. 25). This distinguishes land as an asset from stocks
and bonds; it can be dangerous to hold stocks during a downturn; they could lose value
completely. Land, on the other hand, does not fold in on itself and descend back into the earth;
it weathers its own price fluctuations stoically.
Leamer (2007) finds evidence for the fact that landowners are willing and able to hold
land if they are not being offered the price they want. This bears itself out in the fact that the
housing market has “a volume cycle, not a price cycle.” Interestingly, Leamer says that
compared to other landowners, banks do not sit on their assets, and that is why we saw a huge
price plummet of land in 2008:
Many homeowners exercised this attractive option [of getting rid of their negative
equity] and turned over ownership to their lenders. Unlike traditional owners, banks are
not reluctant sellers. On the contrary, they dumped properties on the market... What
kind of sales prices do you think those units experienced? But even with this contrary
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evidence, I stick with my view that housing experiences a volume cycle not a price cycle,
and that 2007–09 was a never-to-be repeated exception. (Leamer, 2015, p. 48)
The past decade has pushed more people into the position of holding titles to land that
they cannot or will not “sit” on, either because they never wanted the land in the first place
(banks getting properties through foreclosure) or because they are too highly leveraged. The
latter case includes dynamics of “predatory equity,” as criticized by numerous NYC nonprofit
housing organizations: buildings that are purchased with a high debt-to-income ratio such that
the current rental income from the building could not support the mortgage payments
(Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009). Such landlords do everything
imaginable, legal and illegal, to evict tenants so they can impose phenomenal rent increases.
Interestingly, it doesn’t always work, and tenants from Los Angeles to San Francisco to New
York have organized effectively to halt or slow evictions, lower rents or fees, sometimes forcing
the owner to sell because they cannot meet their promised debt payments.
Capitalist into Landowner
Is it better to be a capitalist or a landowner? This would seem likely to vary depending on the
balance of class forces in a given period. However, over the last half century it seems more frequent that
capitalists become landowners than vice versa.
Three examples.
The infamous start-up WeWork has attempted to insert itself in the process of renting
commercial office space, as well as providing extensive hardware, software and other accoutrements to
businesses. Effectively WeWork is a capitalist company selling office rental space, for it tends not to
own any property, but rent in bulk and sublease it to businesses. Nonetheless, Wework is known as the
biggest “commercial renter” in Manhattan, with 265,000 desks in 287 buildings (Wilhelm, 2018). They
operate in 111 cities across the globe. WeWork claims their lack of landownership is one of their
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defenses against a recession – WeWork can “stiff its landlords in an emergency” – implying an
inherent antagonism between the company and landowners from whom they rent (Evans, 2019;
Thompson, 2019). In this sense, WeWork functions as a capitalist company producing the commodity
office space, and in class conflict with their landowners over rent.
But the story continues: WeWork’s founder and CEO, Adam Neumann, has recently been
excoriated in the business media for having taken out loans from WeWork to purchase properties which
he then leased back to WeWork – sometimes on the same day he signed the purchase papers (Huet,
2019). In the wake of this minor scandal, along with the dwindling venture capital available to WeWork
as it continues to hemorrhage billions of dollars, Neumann has stated he is going to transfer some of
these properties at cost to ARK, a new real estate investment fund developed by Neumann and others at
WeWork with the purpose of investing in properties in which WeWork operates. ARK works with
WeWork, is partially owned by WeWork umbrella group We. Co, but is an independent company.
Landownership and capitalist enterprise each have different logics, necessities, and
vulnerabilities. WeWork follows a trend in start-ups of being “asset-lite,” and so holds no real estate.
This is a strategy for start-ups to grow quickly and outsource any large costs which would affect their
bookkeeping negatively. WeWork was lauded for raising large amounts of capital in early rounds of
funding, partially based on this model. However, WeWork’s valuation has plummeted from $47 billion
in early 2019, to a tentative $10 billion in September 2019. WeWork has yet to turn a profit, and
potential investors do not have confidence it will hold its value. They have delayed their IPO
indefinitely.
ARK and Neumann, on the other hand, benefited from the liquid capital available to WeWork,
using it to purchase property at negligible interest rates. If WeWork goes under, those properties
remain. The tacit suspicion in the business media is that Neumann could be using WeWork investment
funds as low-interest mortgage capital to build a real estate portfolio which will be insulated from the
failure of the subleasing company WeWork
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The McDonalds corporation is another example of profits from a capitalist company being
channeled into real estate. McDonalds began purchasing the properties on which it operated early in its
life as a successful fast food company. Over the years McDonalds has transitioned into being primarily
franchise-run, with now 85% of McDonalds establishments run by independent operators and only 15%
corporate-run. While most fast food companies profit from franchises through payments for special
recipes, ingredients, and materials, McDonalds also collects ground rent from their franchises, which
average about 22% of gross profits (Purdy, 2017). As we all know, McDonalds franchises are located
steps away from most major tourist destinations and landmarks across the world—from Times Square
to Big Ben—and so the ground rents in these locations are extremely high. McDonalds also charges a
“McDonalds rental premium” over and above the rent.
McDonalds shareholders have pressured the company to put its land into a publicly traded
REIT, particularly in times of slow or negative growth. This would “unlock” at least $20 billion in value
in US alone. However, the biggest argument against forming a REIT is that a REIT would not legally be
able to charge the rental premium, losing this extra monopoly income.
This rental premium is a savvy manipulation of rental contracts, which may best be understood
through Harvey’s concept of monopoly rent. This is a different logic than the production and sale of
food. McDonalds has gradually transitioned a significant portion of their company into the role of
landowner. As such, they are in conflict with their capitalist franchise owners over the rental price.
Collecting rent from franchises has allowed McDonalds to capture 9 to 15% of sales from their
franchises, compared to 6 to 10% of other companies like Burger King, Taco Bell, and KFC (K. Taylor,
2017). While it would be difficult to prove that McDonalds’ real estate holdings are a factor in its
consistent victory over other fast food chains, it seems likely.
This strategy has also been deployed successfully by more sympathetic business figures: Julian
Richer, founder of the UK Hi-Fi and TV Retail chain Richer Sounds, has been lauded in the media for
giving away 60% of his company in shares to his employees, and also for weathering the incursion of
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online purchasing platforms via strong business model and good employee benefits. His book Ethical
Capitalism promotes ethical corporate practices as a route to business success.
Richer rarely mentions that he began to purchase the properties in which he operated his
businesses early in the 1970s. His stores are both immune to rent inflation, and have assets to leverage.
Mr. Richer personally owns the freehold on 46 of his 52 shops, thus shielding the
business from the rent rises imposed by UK commercial property landlords in recent
years. “Our overheads are only 12 per cent of sales,” Mr Richer says. “We can’t find out
Amazon’s costs in detail but we think they are broadly 10 to 12 per cent. But because we
do such high volumes from such inexpensive stores and we are so efficient, it means that
I’ve got much deeper pockets than most of my competitors. (Moules, 2013)
Richer was apparently reticent to admit this in his own book, The Richer Way, in which he
writes:
When people ask how I can afford so many benefits for staff, I point out that
Richer Sounds spends less than 1.5 per cent of its turnover on rent and rates. This
compares with typically 10–20 per cent spent by the high-street multiples.
So we can afford good wages and holiday homes because we’re not wasting
money on property. …
Keeping our overheads down by saving on property suits us very well. We invest
in people, not buildings. It also conveys the right message to the customers. Our
reputation is for selling good hi-fi at cheap prices and when customers see our
shops in cheap locations, they are reassured that they are going to find a bargain.
(Richer, 1996)
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In any case, it may be easier to palate giving away your company to your employees if you still
collect rent on the store’s properties. Richer’s previous 100% ownership of Richer Sounds only
accounted for half of his £160 million fortune.
Many of the largest landowners today in the US made their fortunes first in capitalist enterprise.
For example, the two largest landholders in the US and the world are Ted Turner, who began his
ventures into real estate with a small fortune in an advertising company, and John Malone, whose
family fortune comes from the communications industry. Low-leveraged land ownership provides
insulation from fluctuations in sales and commodity prices, and requires relatively little investment
year-on-year while continuing to provide basis for rent extraction. As capitalists transition into
landownership, they offload the risk of the capitalist enterprise elsewhere (in the case of Neumann, to
WeWork; of McDonalds, to the franchise owners; of Richer, to his employees).
For a capitalist to become a landowner, or for a landowner to expand their holdings, they
require cheap capital. Once they own low-leveraged land, not even economic recessions are troubling.
Moreover, they need not be troubled in any way by engaging in the process of production. It is no
wonder that successful capitalists transition into landownership.

Why is the Rent so Damn High? Revisited: The Rent Gap and Beyond
Above, we discussed the recent attrition of businesses from San Francisco as a result of
high housing and commercial rents, indicating that rents may be reaching heights that become
higher than is possible for people to pay. Residential rents in San Francisco are so high (and
transportation to the city from lower-rent areas so costly) that few people who work for the
relatively high city minimum wage (currently 15.59 USD per hour) can even afford to even share
a room at prevailing rents. The average rental cost for a two bedroom apartment in San
Francisco in 2019 was $4,630, which means that working a 40 hour week at minimum wage,
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paying income tax, your total monthly income (roughly $2,195) would still be over a hundred
dollars short of the average room rental. If you work full time and share a room, you still will be
paying more than half your wages in rent. This is a generally untenable situation, leading to
overcrowding of existing apartments on the one hand, and widespread abandonment of the city
as workplace and living place by low income people on the other.
The catastrophic rent increases in San Francisco over recent decades have led to a
renewed surge of public argument about why rents are so high. There are two main camps in
this debate: On the one hand, the free-market thinkers who argue that rents are too high
because there is too much demand and not enough supply. These people, epitomized in the
recent “YIMBY” movement (Yes-in-my-backyard – by which they mean, Yes to market rate
housing in my backyard), passionately advocates for decreasing regulation on market-rate
housing construction, arguing that if the free market were given reign to build as much market
rate housing as they wanted, rents would level out. This camp pushed a bill in the California
senate, SB50, which would force all municipalities in California to approve high rise market rate
housing in the area of all major transit lines. The bill was opposed by many (including small
municipalities who argued that they didn’t even have fire trucks who could reach a 6 story
building, so they couldn’t approve the building of 6 story condominiums), and has failed
multiple times in the senate, but is only one of myriad movements for similar initiatives
throughout the state and country.
The second camp is made up of social justice non-profits and activist organizations who
fault improper regulation and enforcement of rent control law as the cause of the rising rents
and dwindling affordable housing stock in San Francisco. They cite, for example, the explosion
of “Ellis Act Evictions” that wreaked havoc on San Francisco’s rent controlled housing stock. The
Ellis Act allows rent-controlled tenants to be evicted if the landowning company declares
bankruptcy or that it is ceasing to be in the residential rental business—easy to do in the era of
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endless subsidiaries. This position argues that the construction of market rate housing only
makes the problem worse, and the solution to the housing crisis in San Francisco is tighter
regulation, better rent control and the construction of more low-income housing.
The debates raged with such heat between the two sides that in 2016 a San Franciscan
tech autodidact named Eric Fischer dedicated some weeks of his life to studying the possible
correlations between rent control, housing stock, and average rents in San Francisco. His work
was reviewed and adjusted by Matt Tyler, a trained econometrician, and on a scrappy looking
set of blogs we can find one of the only serious statistical attempts to understand the causes of
rising rents in San Francisco (Fischer, 2016; Tyler, 2016).
Fischer and Tyler found no support for either “side” of the housing debate: no significant
correlation between low housing stock and rising rents, nor between the curtailing of rent
control and rising rents. The only strong, significant correlation found was between average
rents and average income.
The relationship between average rents and average income has been surprisingly
understudied in the academy. The lone academic text analyzing similar data is “Household
expenditures, wages, rents” by Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011). The authors find that rising
housing costs are not substantively related to short housing supply or low vacancy. They find in
general that average rental costs and average household income are correlated, but not 1:1.
Income and rents increase together and decrease together, but not at the same rate. In fact, as
income grows, rent grows faster: they find that if the income growth in a specific Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) outpaces average income growth in MSA by 1 percentage point, the
average rental costs will outpace the average rental cost growth by 4.2 percentage points (Davis
& Ortalo-Magné, 2011, p. 249).
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This means that households of any income that reside in MSAs with high average
household wages spend a higher percentage of their income on housing than those in lowincome MSAs. They conclude, “wages – not housing supply – determine the relative price of
housing in San Francisco or any other high-priced area.” Further, “rental prices
disproportionately reflect income differentials” (2011, p. 261).
This leads them to suggest, from data drawn in 2009, that San Francisco is surprisingly
cheap compared to Pittsburgh—meaning that the amount which income rose in San Francisco
should have yielded higher average rents in San Francisco as compared to Pittsburgh. That was
in 2009, we can assume from the vantage point of 2020 that San Francisco landowners
proceeded to correct that error, raising average rents by about 25% since 2009.
And this, of course, is a story of rent gaps (Smith, 1996). These rent gaps are created by
rising average wages, rather than, for example, deteriorating housing stock. Rising average
wages in a city like San Francisco mean that there is a potential to charge increasingly more for
residential rentals.
And wages sure did rise. Over the four years between 2013 and 2017 in the census tract I
grew up in, median household income almost doubled from $64k to $113k. In San Francisco, the
increase in wages has outstripped all other cities in the US, followed closely by adjacent counties
such as Santa Clara.
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The rub, of course, is that while
some income is going up, other income
is stagnating, increasing at very slow
rates, declining, or evaporating
altogether. Only certain segments of the
population receive these high rising
wages – tech workers, business owners
and CEOs, etc. The rest experiences very
minor wage growth, or none at all. But
everyone has to deal with the same
rising rents.
This correlation between
Figure 4-14
Average Earnings Growth in U. S. Cities
Source: BBC

income and rents coincides with the
account we have given above of ground
rent theory. In agriculture, if the profit

of the capitalist farmers rises (relative to the average profit), the landowner raises rents. So,
here, in residential properties, the profits of selling the commodity “home” on a monthly basis
can rise steeply with rising household incomes.
But here is an upper limit to rent hikes. Landlords cannot raise rent above what their
tenants can pay. This gives us a slightly different picture of the housing crisis that is more
politically complicated than a simple story about rent control: rents are rising because some
people can pay them. That means that for some people, their income is rising to the extent that
they can afford increasing rents.
What becomes important here is the bifurcation of wage earners: while some people’s
income is increasing at a rate to keep pace with rising rents, a large group of people’s wages are
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stagnating, falling, or rising far too slow to keep
them housed (Figure 4-15). This is what Davis
and Ortalo-Magné attempt to highlight by
saying that households that live in high-income
MSAs, whether or not they are themselves high
income, end up paying a higher and higher
percentage of their wages in rents.
If your income is $120k (starting salary
for a software engineer at Twitter), you may be
annoyed but not devastated about your rent
rising from $3,000 (30% of your income) to
$4,000 (40% of your income). You are
technically debt burdened, but you still have
$6000/mo left after paying rent. However, if
your income is $34k (yearly salary working at

Figure 4-15
Widening Income Gap, Bay Area

SF minimum wage of $15.59) and you lose your rent-controlled room that you’ve been paying
$800/mo for (30% of your income), and the only rentals on the market start at 3,000 (105% of
your income), you better leave the city or buy a tent.
If you are one of many old or differently abled people on Social Security and you are
receiving the state maximum amount of $943.72, and you lose your $600/mo. rent-controlled
apartment you’ve had since the 80s, you are in even more dire straits.
For such renters who can afford a maximum of about $650 monthly rent—which
includes single parents working part time along with elderly and differently abled—there are
effectively zero options other than homelessness. The homelessness population in San Francisco
is made up of an enormous amount of people had stable housing in the city up until quite
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recently, but lost their low rent apartments. When they were displaced, there was simply
nowhere for them to rent in San Francisco, but they also cannot easily move because (a) they
receive all their services in SF, and (b) there is nowhere within 100 – maybe 200 – miles that
you can rent a room for $650.
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: Financialization

Critiques of “gentrification” in the 90s and 2000s have given way in recent years to
critiques of the “financialization of housing” (Aalbers, 2008, 2016; August & Walks, 2018; Brais,
2018; Fernandez & Aalbers, 2016; Fields, 2015; Fields & Uffer, 2016; Gotham, 2009; Marcuse &
Madden, 2016; Pereira, 2017; Rolnik, 2013; Romainville, 2017; Wijburg et al., 2018; Wijburg &
Aalbers, 2017). Scholarly opposition to “21st Century Land Grabs” in the early 2000s has
likewise given way to a critique of the “financialization of agricultural land” (Cotula, 2012;
Daniel, 2012; Fairbairn, 2014; Ferrando, 2017; Gunnoe, 2014; Magnan, 2015; Sippel et al.,
2017).
The concepts of the “financialization of housing” and the “financialization of land” are
intended to mark an epochal shift from previous land relations, resulting from deregulation in
financial markets as well as the withdrawal of the state from housing provision and subsidies to
small farmers. This literature of the financialization of land and housing (FLH) leans on the
general theory of financialization epitomized in the work of Krippner (2005), Lapavitsas (2013),
and Epstein (2001, 2005). Like the broader financialization literature, FLH literature
consistently describes financialized landownership as particularly pernicious in comparison to
non-financialized land-based accumulation (August & Walks, 2018; Fields & Uffer, 2016;
Gunnoe, 2014), and recommends stronger regulations on financial flows into landownership as
a solution to these ills.
There have been some important shifts in capital accumulation through land in the last
40 years that have been well documented and analyzed by FLH literature. As discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4, when ground rent or sale price of land is rising, it becomes possible to make
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“fast money” from the growing rent gaps. This can involve financing, debt-leveraging, and
securitizing—not because parasitic financialized imperatives have taken over the economy, but
because this is the way you make the most fast money from rising land values.
This fast land money contrasts with the common long-term orientation of landowners.
Speculative land buyers in a hot housing market may purchase rental property at an extremely
high debt-to-equity ratio, evict half the low-rent tenants, and triple rents. They often have to
increase rental income vin order to pay back investors and lenders.
Long-term landowners, on the other hand, might also buy property—though at a lower
debt to asset ratio—evict half the low-rent tenants, and triple rents. The difference is, they do not
have creditors to answer to. The obligations of the speculative land buyer to their lenders can
lead to increasingly egregious treatment of tenants, or it can lead to weaknesses (exploitable by
the tenants) that result in eventual sale of the property.
The ebb and flow of high-debt and low-debt land purchases is nothing new; Debtleveraged land purchases, securitized rent flows, and risk-assessing investors have been
prevalent since at least the 18th century (Frehen et al., 2014; Gates, 1942); displacement and
land-based violence have been the norm rather than exception throughout capitalism.
Many scholars have criticized the epochal theory of financialization on which FLH theory
is based. However, these criticisms have not been brought to FLH literature. Below, I summarize
the epochal theory of financialization as well as the most salient criticisms levied against it.
I advocate a longue-durée approach to analyzing financial cycles. I provide an overview
of the ways in which the epochal theory of financialization distorts the analysis of land and
housing dynamics. Literature critiquing the financialization of land and housing villainizes
“financial” landowners over more benevolent ones and displaces genuine inquiry into the deeper
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causes of rising rents, rising homelessness, widespread dispossession of indigenous land across
the world, and other forms of violent displacement.

The Epochal Theory of Financializaiton
“Financialization” in the current literature refers to a specific period of capitalism,
beginning roughly in the 1970s, during which “financial” motives, markets, actors and
institutions take up an increasingly large role in the economy; patterns of accumulation shift
away from production and towards the realization of financial profits, and finance often moves
outside the properly “financial” sector into other economic spheres (Aalbers, 2015, p. 217; G.
Epstein, 2001, p. 1; G. A. Epstein, 2005, p. 3; Krippner, 2005, pp. 174, 181; Lapavitsas, 2013, p.
3). On these accounts, financialization consists in a proportional increase of things financial
over things non-financial, and this quantitative shift leads to a “structural transformation of
contemporary capitalism” (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 3); a “novel pattern of accumulation” or
“structural shift” in the US economy (Krippner, 2005, pp. 189, 193); even an “epochal” or
“systemic” transformation of the global capitalist economy (Gunnoe, 2014; Lapavitsas, 2012, p.
484). This shift imposes heightened levels of competition upon capital, resulting in, amongst
other things, a heightened disciplining of labor globally (R. Martin et al., 2008). I will refer to
these as “epochal” theories of financialization.
Krippner (2005, 2012) and Lapavitsas (Lapavitsas, 2013) have provided some of the
most concrete empirical work proving the existence of a period of “financialization,” to which
many subsequent adherents refer. They “prove” financialization with data showing the growth of
total financial assets as percentage of GDP (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 205), growth in value added in
FIRE sector as percentage of total value added (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 211), or financial profits as
proportion of total profits (Krippner, 2005, p. 189; Lapavitsas, 2012, pp. 214–216). Lapavitsas
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and Krippner both also emphasize the increase in proportion of financial profits to non-financial
profits in non-financial corporations (e.g. Krippner, 2005, p. 185) and regularly remind us that
“Accumulation is now occurring increasingly through financial channels” (Krippner, 2005, p.
199). Krippner’s account is limited to the United States; Lapavitsas’ includes US, Western
Europe, and Japan.
These epochal theories of financialization have been criticized from several perspectives
and disciplines, finding three central issues: First, the epochal theory of financialization is
marred by a temporal and geographical myopia by focusing primarily on the US and UK (and
sometimes greater Western Europe, Japan, and Australia) from the 1940s to today
(Christophers, 2015; Poovey, 2015). Data from 5 or 6 countries cannot yield a global theory; data
beginning in the 1950s cannot accurately assess whether our current period is without
precedent.
Second, epochal financialization literature locates the cause of financialization in the
period of deregulation starting in the 70s, and epitomized in the 80s by Thatcherism and
Reaganomics. If deregulation is the proximate cause, then the prophylactic for financialization is
increased financial regulation, and/or popular control over financial institutions (Gotham,
2009; Lapavitsas, 2013; Norfield, 2014). However, the deregulation of financial markets itself
was a response to a problem of investors seeking returns that their post-war investments were
not providing; profits rates were declining substantially starting in the 1960s. If deregulation
had not occurred to widen investment opportunities domestically, investors would have found
somewhere else to go—overseas, if necessary, causing the recession in the USA to hit earlier than
it did (Kliman, 2011, pp. 191–193).
Third, theories of financialization conflate interest-bearing capital (IBC), fictitious
capital, and ground rent all as “finance.” These financial forms of accumulation are juxtaposed
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to productive forms. Financial violence is presented as worse than non-financial violence, and a
“productive” capitalism is treated as more benevolent and desirable than a financialized one.
Epochal financialization literature begins its analysis in the 1940s (or later). This is not a
result of reasoned assessment, but of limits imposed by the data; Poovery (2015) and
Christophers (2015) have pointed out this coincides with the beginning of comprehensive
national income accounts in the USA, developed after the depression in 1947. Only after this was
it possible to analyze, with government data, the percentage of national wealth that financial
activities represented. In the 1950s finance was disaggregated from adjacent sources of income
in the calculation of GDP, and not until the 60’s did “flow of funds” accounts become part of the
national accounting system, which makes it even easier to see the role of finance (Poovey, 2015,
pp. 220–221). Krippner and Lapavitsas both acknowledge the lack of data before 1940, but they
do not allow this lack to destabilize their conclusions about financializations’ epochal nature.
In recent years, researchers have attempted to project economic data about financial
indicators back beyond the birth of national accounts. Many have found that there is reason to
believe levels of financialization were spiking in the late 19th into the early 20th century. In
Figure 5-1 below from Philippon (2011), finance industry as share of US GDP experiences a huge
spike prior to WWII that reaches levels not seen again till 1990. In Figure 5-2, Jordà et al. (2014,
p. 115) have analyzed domestic bank lending data from 1870 to 2012, finding significant booms
in 1910s and 1930s, and hinting that numbers for the 1800s would be significantly higher if it
the data included mortgage debt held outside banks, which was common especially in the case of
farming (p. 116).
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Figure 5-1
GDP Share of U. S. Financial Industry, 1860-2010
Source: Philippon 2011

141

Figure 5-2
Bank Credit to the Domestic Economy, 1870-2013
Source: Jordà et al., 2014, p. 115
In both charts, he ascent of “finance” is just as rapid before the two world wars as it is
afterward The line becomes steeper in the 80s, right at the time financial indicators catch up
with where they were before the World Wars. Ostensibly what investable liquidity existed during
the wartime period was either wiped out or found profitable returns in wartime production.
During the world wars, the capitalist economy experienced extensive destruction of value, which
sets the stage for increased profit rates in productive industries at the war’s end (Kliman, 2011).
So began the “golden age” in the US economy, when wages rose. But it didn’t last long –
by most metrics, the affluent post war era wore itself out by the mid-60s. US began to lose its
global position of dominance in manufacture, labor productivity declined and the trade surplus
began to reverse itself. “While it was not entirely clear at the time, the mid- 1960s was the
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starting point of a painful and protracted transformation of the political economy” (Quinn, 2019,
p. 182).
The affluence of the post-war period was hard-won by working class movements, often
rooted in the radicalizing experience of the great depression. But the depths of the depression in
the 1930s brought value destruction that was far more severe than capitalist advocates at the
time anticipated. As a crisis loomed again in the 1970s, officials were willing to do what it took
to avoid a similar downturn and consequent
massive destruction of value. The weapons of
choice were then (as they are now during COVID19 epidemic) monetary and fiscal policy.
Profit rates declined in the US from 1947
to the mid 1970s, threatening a crisis. Declining
profitability was offset by “capital’s successful tax

Figure 5-3
U. S. Effective Corporate Tax Rate, 19472011

revolts, fought out in federal and state
legislatures” (Gilmore, 1999, p. 177) (see Figure 5-3).
All this accompanied the resumption of the steep acceleration in debt/GDP ratios and
GDP share of the financial industry that preceded the wars (Figures 5-1 and 5-2). We might
surmise that without the interventions of the great depression and the two world wars, the
acceleration of financialization would have continued along the path it outlined from 1880 to
1910.
All this to say—"financializaiton” is nothing new. In the mid 19th century Marx pointed to
an array of methods (we might say “financial technologies”) of lending and debt creation as well
as ”special credit instruments” (Marx, 2015, pp. 504, 508); Arrighi (1994) famously cited four
major waves of financial expansion over the last 600 years. Bordo (2008) writes that financial
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innovation is a “centuries old phenomenon,” and points out that the very purpose of new
financial instruments is to “avoid regulation” (pp. 6-7). Previous waves of financial frenzy, all
emerging from declining profit rates in the economy at large, have come to a close in a major
war inciting widespread destruction of value.
Christophers (2015) writes that “Only from the mid-1930s to the mid-1970s, in the
leading Western industrialized nations, was finance truly shackled.” But Capital is adept at
evading any shackles put upon it; the fact that it tolerated financial regulation was evidence that
profits were being made despite the regulations.
This period is also characterized by an unprecedented expansion of public housing to
which today’s dwindling public housing stock is often compared. From the perspective of 200
years, the 20th century postwar period appears more anomalous than the period of
“financialization” which follows it; financialization of the late 20th century appears as a reversion
to the norm of secular increase in finance. An even longer analysis suggests cyclical patterns of
peaks and troughs—and other moments of working class strength that become subverted as
profit rates decline.

Global Financialization in the Longue-Duree: Cycles of Finance, Financial
Imperialism, and Surplus Liquidity
A coherent theory of financialization – defined as the increase of profits made through
IBC and Fictitious capital relative to profits made in production, accompanied by an increase in
the power of financial and financializing firms and their associated governments – requires
three elements: (1) a long term perspective, in order to avoid imposing qualitative breaks where
there are cyclical patterns; (2) a global perspective, in order to avoid modeling a theory of
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“global” capitalism on the economies of the hegemon(s); (3) an understanding of compound
growth, surplus liquidity, and the effects of falling profit rates in spurring innovation in finance.
Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) analysis of capitalism in the “longue-durée” contrasts
dramatically with financialization theory. Arrighi outlines the rise and decline of capitalist
hegemons over almost a millennium. During this time, every major capitalist empire has
experienced a shift from production-based capital domination to finance-based or
“financialized” economic dominance. Declining “financialized” empires often lend money to
assist in the rise of what becomes their successor. The process of financialization – in Italian
City-States, the Netherlands, England, and now the US – is cyclical, and tied to a specific region
and national economy.
There is some evidence that housing also follows longue-durée cycles (Figures 5-4, 5-5,
5-6).
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Figure 5-4
Some Early-American Series on Land Values per Acre, 1642-1805
Source: Lindert 1988
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Figure 5-5
The Purchase-value and Rent on U. S. Farmland, 1805-1986
Source: Lindert 1988
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Figure 5-6
Real Home Price Indexes for the U. S. , Amsterdam, and Norway
Source: Shiller, 2006

Tony Norfield (2017) offers a different but complementary account of the financial
ascendance of the UK and US that he broadly names financial imperialism. On his account, the
increase in financial profits that is observable in the US and UK is not the result of a global shift
from production to finance; first world finance is, rather, a means of extracting value from
productive countries with less political, military, and financial power and resources. This
implies that while we can track metrics of financialization in dominant countries like the US,
Western Europe, and Japan, there is not a global decline in production.
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For example, in the early 2000s average growth rates in “developing countries” reached
over 7% per year, while “advanced economies” averaged about 2.7% (Ocampo et al, 2010). At the
same time, foreign investment in these countries from the global north ballooned from an
average of 200 billion in the 90s to an average of about 700 billion from 2003 to the present.
Such investment is both financial investment and direct investment, both of which skim profits
from ostensibly productive industry in the global south (Tyson & McKinley, n.d., pp. 18–20)
Financialization is cyclical, and ebbs and flows over the history of capitalism. One
country’s financial profits are often another country’s productive ones. Declining profit rates are
a siren’s song for financialization. These are the tenets of a non-epochal, longue-duree theory of
financialization.

Financialization of Land and Housing Literature
FLH literature emphasizes two key shifts: a shift of the agents of land-based
accumulation, and a shift in the imperatives and strategies of those agents. In the era of
financialized land and housing relations, “mom and pop” or “local, independent” landlords and
“family farms” are bought out by “financial” actors such as publicly traded national or
multinational investment firms, private equity firms, hedge funds, and Real Estate Investment
Trusts. While the mom and pop landlords and family farms were supposedly content to draw
regular (or gradually increasing) rents from the land they owned, the new financialized
landowners expect either large returns on their investments through the quick resale of land at
higher prices (“flipping”), or quickly increasing regular returns through constant rise in rents
and fees. Financialized landlords frequently evict or push out current residents (legally or
illegally) in order to achieve their expected returns. According to these studies, these
financialized imperatives result in increasingly violent forms of dispossession and displacement.
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Our goal must not be a return to “less-financialized” landownership. Landowners who
precede the supposed epoch of financialization were no angels: “local landowners” in NYC set
fire to the Bronx in the 1960s; racist FHA lending policy led to the explosion of white “mom and
pop” ownership of rental property; the massacre of Indigenous American peoples (often at the
hands of “small family farmers”) cleared land for “small family farms,” while African slavery and
the refusal to enact reparations was over and again the condition for increases in “local” white
landownership.
The emphasis on financialization of land and housing can too easily result in nostalgia
for productive or small-scale capitalism. But small scale capitalism, by its own logic, always
increases in scale; the success of local productive industry in a given economy generally gives
way, over time, to financialized economies. We cannot hope to arrest capitalism at any specific
stage.
At the same time as FLH scholarship poses the question of land and housing, it
simultaneously obscures any analysis of the specific social relations of land by subsuming them
into larger question of financialization; in this way, any understanding of the specificity of land
markets and land struggle is lost. For example, FLH theory emphasizes that the economics of
land relations are subsumed, through the financialization of land and housing, into a larger logic
of finance capital, and so the concept of “ground rent” is discarded in favor of “economic rent” or
rent-in-general, and any analysis of the “landowning class” is subsumed by a critique of the
parasitic “rentier.”
An acute example of this conflicted position on rents occurs in ““Value Grabbing”: A
Political Ecology of Rent” by Andreucci, García-Lamarca, Wedekind, and Swyngedouw (2017).In
this essay, the authors insist that the concept of “rent” should refer to all interest-bearing assets
(which would then include all credit, bonds and stocks), but every case study they use to
substantiate their arguments are struggles over land. Their rentier analysis prevents them from
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looking at struggles around land as struggles around land, and instead abstracts these as
struggles over “rents” in general. Their conceptual apparatus draws them away from land at the
same time as their concrete examples pull them back to the land. This pulling away from land
and ground rent theory while simultaneously pointing toward it is surprisingly common in
recent critical scholarship on the FLH (See also: Pereira 2017, p607; Ward and Aalbers, 2016,
p1780; Gunnoe 2014).
The Big Bad Wolf gobbles Mom and Pop?
The shape that finance takes in many generic and finance-themed land rush accounts
alike is that of a big bad wolf who is hungry for farmland. (Ouma, 2014, p. 163)

In the case of urban rental housing, we are told by FLH literature that a “new breed” of
landlord has come onto the scene in the last 30 years, which “treats” housing as a financial asset.
These new “financialized landlords” or “global corporate landlords” (Beswick et al., 2016) are
global investors which may take the form of a real estate investment trust (REIT), a private
equity fund, financial asset management firm, or other investment vehicle (Abood, 2017, p. 16;
August & Walks, 2018, p. 124; Wyly et al., 2009) These financialized landlords buy up rental
properties from the previous generation of landlords who are described as “local real estate
operators,” “local, independent landlords,” or, most sentimentally, “mom and pop” landlords
(Aalbers, 2016; Abood, 2017; August & Walks, 2018, p. 124; Fields & Uffer, 2016, pp. 1489,
1492–1493; Teresa, 2016, p. 2). Substantial media reporting also chronicles the rise of the new
“Wall Street Landlord” into both housing and farmland (Dezember, 2016; Doering, 2015; Gara,
2015; Philpott, 2014; Richter, 2017).
There are four different factors used by scholars to distinguish financialized landowners
from non-financialized landowners: size (how many units or properties are owned); legal status
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(a corporation or an individual); behavior (do they flip properties or hold them; do they raise
rents steeply or moderately); geography (are they local, national, global); and investment
structure (are they self-financed, do they hold mortgages and if so how big are they; do they
have investors and if so who are they).
But these different factors do not always line up the way we might expect. While it is
generally assumed that a small, individual or family landlord would be the most benevolent,
these were the types of people who engaged in some of the most vicious “flipping” during the
subprime crisis (Yelen, 2017); likewise, the “slumlord” of the mid-century inner-city was often a
locally based and locally-financed entrepreneur. On the other side of the coin, some enormous,
national, publicly traded LLCs in the US maintain properties in the long-term, raise rents only
modestly, and do not make a habit of eviction or harassment.
The mom-and-pop landowner is an important ideological tool in the US, alongside the
family farmer. In much publicly-produced information on who owns residential rental
properties in the United States, the data is constructed to emphasize the Individual Owner of
rental stock.20 We should be wary when they factor so prominently in critiques of the
financialization of housing and agriculture.
Most FLH literature focuses on a few case studies, and does not analyze shifts in
ownership in large data samples. However, there is not good data on who owns residential
rental properties in the US—a fact bemoaned by the Acting General Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Policy Development and Research at HUD (The US Department for Housing and Urban
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The 1991 Census Buerau’s Statistical Brief on “Who Owns the Nation’s Rental Properties?” States in the first
sentence that Individuals own 92% of rental properties. However, those properties could all have 1 or 2 units on them,
leaving Institutional investors actually owning the majority of units. Still in 2017, Harvard’s Housing Report
emphasizes that individuals own 74% of rental properties, while including but de-emphasizing the fact that they only
own 48% of rental units.

152

Development) who commented, for example, that “In an interesting data shortfall, researchers
don’t know the precise number of landlords in the United States” (Richardson, n.d.).
We know that business owned units have grown faster than individual owned rental
units over the last 25 years (Figure 5-7). We know the debt-equity ratio increased across the
board for residential rental units from the 60s to 2010, after which it began to fall (Figure 5-8).
We know that some units are purchased by highly-leveraged investment entities (Figure 5-9) but
that REITS own a small fraction of rentals.
What is missing is integral research into who owns residential properties in the US.

Who Owns Residential Rental Units in USA?
Source: US Census Bureau, Rental Housing Finance Survey and American Housing survey
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Figure 5-7
Who Owns Residential Units in the U.S.?
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Figure 5-8
Debt to Equity Ratio % for Rental Properties by Year Purchased
Source: Rental Housing Finance Survey, US Census
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Figure 5-9
Anatomy of a Deal: Private Equity Threatens Affordable Housing
Source: (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009)

The many death knells of the Family Farm.
A slew of papers have recently analyzed the “small but rapidly growing phenomenon” of
private sector financial investment in agricultural land (High Quest Partners, 2010). As these
texts have it, “the financial sector is taking an interest in farmland as never before” (Philpott,
2014). In a thorough analysis published by the Oakland Institute in 2009, Ross chronicles the
“speculative mania” that the financial sector has “recently” generated for California farmland (p.
3). Fairbairn (2014), heavily cited by Ross, marks 2007 as the year in which farmland shifted
from an “investment back-water” at the turn of the 21st Century, into a “desirable alternative
155

asset class” (p. 777-778). Gunnoe (2014) writes that “we are witnessing an unprecedented
integration between finance capital and landownership” (p. 478). The victims of this are the
“family farm” or supposedly small local businesses (Fairbairn, 2014; Gunnoe, 2014; High Quest
Partners, 2010).
Both Ross and Fairbairn caution against financialized investment into farmland, arguing
that it could “put upward pressure on land prices and make it even harder for young and
beginning farmers to become owners,” thereby creating “long-term trends threatening our
agricultural heritage” (Ross, 2009, p. 3). The Oakland Institute Report concludes by saying
If more is not done to protect family farmers and ensure they have reliable access to land,
then the recent spate of land grabs across the US could literally change who owns the
country in the decades ahead. The dangers of this trend, in both the short- and longterm, cannot be overstated. (p. 21)
This is not the first time the incursion of finance into agricultural land has raised fears.
In 1983, Colton (1983) warned of the impending “substitution of family farm corporations for
individual farmer/operators and the aggregation of farm ownership and operation into larger
corporate conglomerates.” Colton argued that this presented a threat to “The structure of midAmerican's rural ‘way of life’… predicated upon the family farm as a basic social and economic
unit.”
A decade earlier, in 1971, The Ralph Nader Task Force published an exhaustive report
entitled Power and Land in California which also claimed to chronicle a “recent” phenomenon:
“Entities now pouring vast new resources into California land speculation: professional groups,
conglomerates with vast political power, and the financial industry” (Fellmeth, 1971). They
emphasize the important “new” trend in which “The Financial industry (banks, savings and loan
associations and some insurance firms) is enormously involved in land development” (p. I-32).
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A century and a half before that, the financializaiton of agricultural land (by another
name) was denounced by President Jackson (see Chapter 4).
If the financialization of farmland is denounced in the 1830s, called “new” in 1971, “new”
in 1983, and “new” again in 2017, we should be wary of the notion.
Clyde Woods (1998) notes the common phenomenon of “absentee planters” in
antebellum Mississippi due to “high levels of capitalization and indebtedness” which means that
it was only the extremely capital-rich landowners, often living abroad, who could afford the land
(Woods, 1998, p. 47). Financing practices on slave plantations also transformed as land prices
rose, growing closer to the picture often painted of “financialized landownership”: “Now
planters were able to finance production by mortgaging the land instead of providing cotton
merchants with a crop lien” (Woods, 1998, p. 77).
In the year 1934, a date marking a halfway point between financialized land of slave
plantations and financialized agriculture today, Woods writes that an estimated 30% of all
southern cotton land was held by life insurance companies and banks (p. 122) – entities we
might today call “financialized landowners.”
The recent uproar about the “financialization” of farmland and timberland in the United
States emerged to amend and augment the ballooning literature describing “21 st century land
grabs” which were understood to occur generally in “underdeveloped” countries, often countries
in which agriculture occupied a prime position in the economy. The Financial Times chronicled,
for example, land grabs in Ethiopia and Myanmar in 2016 as part of a series entitled “The great
land rush,” the summary of which reads:
Across continents, big investors are pouring in billions into one of the world’s most
precious resources – land. They promise progress. But their arrival can upend livelihoods
and spark life-and-death struggles. (Burgis, 2016)
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The media reports on the global land grab exploded after the food crisis of 2007/8
sparked global attention to farmland.21 The studies on the financialization of agriculture and
timberland in the U.S. were intended to show that here too, in the “developed” United States,
financialized interests are setting their sights on agricultural land.
But U.S. land that is being “financialized” is land already used to produce goods for the
market; the bulk of land “grabbed” in the global south is land used primarily for subsistence
(farming, hunting, gathering, grazing, etc.).22 These are two categorically distinct moments: on
the one hand, the integration of new land into the global capitalist system, mirroring original
accumulation—on the other hand, the transfer of value-producing agricultural land from one set
of hands to another. These two moments are collapsed in the villainization of the
“financialization of agricultural land.”
In the US and Australia, most major land purchases involve the sale of land by one large
corporation to another larger corporation. (Fairbairn, 2014; Sippel et al., 2017). In the
developing world, it is more common for appropriated land to be without title (though not
unused) and uncultivated by capitalist standards (though not by local standards). In these cases,
land as yet unmortgaged becomes mortgaged; rent that’s never been securitized becomes
securitized; land not yet privatized and titled is become privatized and titled (or “enclosed”).
The critique absorbs the act of enclosure (the new incursion of capital into land) into the
act of upselling (the buying out of small capitalist farmers and landowners by larger ones). In
doing so, it emphasizes the conflict between landlord and capitalist farmer (however “Local” and
family-oriented) over the class conflict between landowner and proletarian (for lack of a better
word).

21

For an exhaustive review of both media and institutional reports of the “land grab” of last 20 years, see Cotula
(2012).
22

Or, land that is not “used” yet, at all, by humans, but for the lighter touch of nomadic peoples.
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Further, this critique shuts down an analysis of resistant and militant forms of land
relations which are attacked by new enclosures.
“Financialization of Land and Housing” and Racial Capitalism
FLH scholarship can be appreciated for acknowledging and analyzing the way that the
“financialization of land and housing” intensifies a global color line in which racialized and
indigenous groups are dispossessed and displaced. In the US, social relations of land in capital
are always racializing. The racist violence of, for example, the subprime crisis was but a new
iteration of racializing and particularly anti-Black federally-supported policy and practice
(Dymski, 2009, p. 152; Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, 2019). This means that even during the postwar period of relatively low financialized activity, the low ebb of “predatory finance” and the
supposed reign of “mom and pop” landlords and “family farming,” the beneficiaries were
disproportionately white people and communities.
Financialization is not the culprit of racial disparities in homeownership and
landownership. Recently the mainstream news issued a flurry of reports arguing that “Black
Homeownership Drops to an All-Time Low” (Kusisto, 2019) after recent data released from the
census showing that Black homeownership had dropped from a peak of 50% (in 2004) to less
than 41% (in 2019). However, this drop actually returns Black homeownership to its levels
before the Fair Housing legislation of 1968, meaning that both the gains and the losses in
homeownership occurred during the so-called period of the “financialization of housing.” In
terms of rural land, the amount of southern farmland owned by Black people declined by 80%
between 1900 and 1970—all prior to the so-called “financialization of farmland” (McDougall,
1984).
The lauded renter protections of rent stabilization and vacancy control currently
represents the most radical horizon of “progressive” housing activism [COVID19 EDIT: this no
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longer true, now “CANCEL RENT” is the call, which is an excellent change]. FLH literature
criticizes financialized landowners for subverting and steamrolling such regulations. However,
rent regulations have been far less effective in protecting long-term stable housing and
community continuity for Black and Brown people (Conley, 2018). This is true even though the
most militant tenant struggles have often been waged by Black and brown people, and women
and LGBTQ people within those groups.
FLH literature runs the risk of idealizing all things non-financialized. It is essential to
recognize that even in the quiet decades of financialization of land, racialized expropriation,
displacement, and destabilization were still the norm.
Gunnoe (2014), for example, criticizes the financialization of timberland while valorizing
a sector that has devastated Indigenous communities and their environs for centuries. He
describes how the US timber industry has historically dealt with the need for enormous amounts
of timber required in order to maintain this capital-intensive production The 19th Century found
companies “exhausting timber supplies” as they moved west “in search of virgin forest” (p. 490).
Gunnoe describes as a “hostile takeover” in the 1980s of the major timber firms by high
finance.23 The companies’ land was liquidated and sold to TIMOs (Timberland Investment
Management Organizations), which usually manage land for institutional investor clients, and
REITs specializing in timberland, which both own and manage the land.
Gunnoe suggests that the slide from “agrarian capitalist” landowners to “institutional
landowners” is a negative and deleterious one: “Where agrarian capitalists are actively involved
in the production of commodities, and view the land as a necessary condition of production that
must be sustained in order to facilitate expanded reproduction (M-C-M’), institutional
landowners view land primarily as a portfolio asset, and are therefore primarily concerned with
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Diamond International and Crown Zellerbach, Potlatch Corporation, Pacific Lumber Company, and Hammermill
paper.
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maximizing returns to investors, particularly in the form of asset prices appreciation (M-M’)”
(2014, p. 496). Financialized landowners are “rentiers” who “contribute little” to the local
economies in which they are situated; agrarian capitalists are, on the contrary, “actively
involved” in production and expanded reproduction.
In an effort to emphasize the evils of finance and elevate “productive” capitalism,
Gunnoe goes so far as to valorize big timber, an industry that is responsible for centuries of
attacks on Indigenous communities and profound destruction of environment through the
transformation of vast forests to fields of stumps. They are also responsible for the development
of dozens of hydroelectric dams, which further wreck the environment and disturb Indigenous
life in myriad ways.
Gunnoe elevates capitalist white settler ownership and control over timberland so long
as it’s not “financialized.” Here, “non-financialized” implies a limit on the size of a company, as
well as on geographical proximity. But capitalist firms necessarily grow and scale up, or they fail.
The financialization of timber farming does not indicate a shift in the nature of accumulation, it
is a necessary step in the path.
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Financializaton of Housing, or Housingification of Finance?
Real Estate, not finance “in general,” is leading much of the boom of “financial activity”
over recent decades. The increased ratio of bank lending to GDP since the 1970s (Figure 5-2) is
due almost entirely to increases in mortgage-lending. Studying 17 countries, Jorda et al. (2016)
go so far as to suggest that “To a large extent, the core business model of banks in advanced
economies today resembles that of real estate funds: banks are borrowing (short) from the
public and capital markets to invest (long) into assets linked to real estate” (Jordà et al, 2016: p.
115).
Similarly, Hudson and Gunnoe note that “Real estate accounts for approximately 70
percent of bank lending in Britain and the United States and some 80 percent of capital gains in
the U.S. economy are land price gains.” (Gunnoe, 2014, p. 485; Hudson, 2014, pp. 145–146).
Raquel Rolnik points out that “In the US, UK, Denmark, Australia and Japan, residential
mortgage markets today represent between 50% and 100% of gross domestic product (GDP)”
(Rolnik, 2013, p. 1059).
Rognlie (2015) shows that while net capital share of aggregate income has risen in the
last several decades, this increase comes “entirely from the housing sector: the contribution to
net capital income from all other sectors has been zero or slightly negative, as the fall and rise
have offset each other.” He argues that we must revise the story we tell of labor ceding ground to
capital since the 1970s; the increasing net share of capital “consists of a large long-term increase
in the net capital income from housing, and a more volatile contribution from the rest of the
economy” (2015, p. 50).
Lest we think that the rising housing share in national income accounts is a result of
speculative housing valuations, Albouy et al. (2009) find that “Rising rents appear to be the
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primary driver of the rising housing share in the national income accounts, and, to a lesser
degree, the affordability crisis in rental markets” (p. 28).
Many of these scholars suggest, based on this data, that housing is being taken over by
finance. However, what if we are experiencing the opposite: the housingification of finance?
But of course it is not just housing: Clapp et al. (2017) show that financial vehicles based
on agriculture and farming has spiked in the last two decades, making farmland one of the
hottest new investment opportunities worldwide. This is reflected in the literature chronicling
the financialization of global agricultural land (High Quest Partners, 2010; Holt-Giménez et al.,
2011; S. J. Martin & Clapp, 2015).
What we have on our hands is a steep rise in ground rent extraction relative to interest
and profits—at least within the United States, the EU, Australia, Japan, and China. In the US,
over the last fifteen years, the “Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing” sector has contributed almost
double to the GDP as “Finance and Insurance,” and represents nearly double the value added by
private industries as percentage of GDP (see figures 5-10 and 5-11). Real Estate, Rental, and
Leasing has been a more stable industry, and reliably contributed positively to GDP (even
during the subprime crisis is 2007-8) compared to the volatile Finance and Insurance sector
(Figure 5-12).
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Figure 5-10
Real GDP for Real Estate v. Finance and Insurance, U. S. 2005-2020l

Figure 5-11
Value Added as Percentage of GDP, Real Estate v. Finance and Insurance
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Figure 5-12
Contributions to Percent Change in REAL GDP: Real Estate v. Finance and
Insurance
Marginal and neoclassical economics have noticed the trend as well; Alex Tabarrok of the
blog Marginal Revolution argues that productivity gains in tech, bio-tech, and finance have
gone “not to producers but to non-productive landowners”(2018). He points to the geographic
concentration of these industries as proximate cause (for example: San Francisco and Silicon
Valley). He writes, “High returns to land have meant lower returns to other factors of
production.”
The mainstream marginalists explain these dynamics through supply, demand, and
overzealous housing and land regulation (Albouy, 2009; Rognlie, 2016, p. 51). These economists
only manage to call for the same old solutions: to deregulate and encourage growth in private
market.
In the void left by the dismissal of ground rent theory and the theory of a landowning
class, there has been no theoretical apparatus specific to the social relations of land, and so it is
conceptually difficult to articulate why and how land and housing play such a peculiar role in
“financialization.” Any account of the “financialization of housing,” then, remains a theory of the
absorption of yet another arena (housing) into the hungry belly of finance. This bolsters the
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ongoing villainization of a monolithic finance sector, blaming “financial actors” for recent waves
of land-based violence and displacement.
If, however, we revive a theory of the specificity of ground rent in the social relations of
land, we can consider a different interpretation. We see an increasing amount of what may have
been interest-bearing capital plunged into land markets of one kind and another. This suggests
an increase in breadth and power of the landowning class, as the recipients of ground rent, and
it reveals the urgency of analyzing the specific dynamics, limits, and tendencies of ground rent
extraction and landowning class interests.

166

Conclusion

Above, I have investigated the theoretical basis of landed class struggle in the capitalist
mode of production. I present this as a challenge to those who argue that landed class struggle is
in any way contingent, accidental, or unnecessary to the CMP.
I have drawn on, extended, and in some cases questioned theoretical categories
developed by Karl Marx. I have also drawn heavily on the work of social theorists who have
examined the role of land and of place in the dynamics of capitalism, and especially of the
production and reproduction of urban spaces in the context of frameworks rooted at least in part
in Marxian ideas. Here, I wish to point out several arguments that, as far as I know, are unique
to my investigation.
First, in Chapter 2, rather than treating Marx’s typology of ground rent as a method for
analyzing where rents come from, I show that the theories of absolute rent and differential rent
each reveal an essential aspect of the capitalist mode of production. The concept of absolute rent
illustrates the power of the landowner to withdraw land from the market – a power that
distinguishes landowners from other classes, and that leads to recurrent dynamics within
capitalism such as high vacancy rates during real estate booms. The concept of differential rent
reveals the fact that land (or we might say space, in order to include water rights and air rights)
is the only value-less, monopolizable resource. All other raw materials and potentially valueless resources either require labor to collect and process them (e. g. minerals, water), and so
gain a value, or they are not monopolizable (as in basic chemical processes such as the fact that
hot water evaporates, or that calcium helps strawberries grow). Being located on a specific plot
of land requires no labor, and is monopolizable through various means – from fences to SWAT
teams.
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In Chapter 3, I make two claims based on my analysis in Chapter 2 of ground rent as
social form: first, I argue that mortgage-lenders are actually landowners who collect ground rent
in the form of “interest” on mortgages. Second, I argue that land-based securities – from REIT
stock to mortgage backed securities – behave differently on the market than non-land-based
securities because they are based to a degree upon actual flows of ground rent.
In Chapter 4 I intervene in discussions of urban land rent, arguing that residential
tenants are not tenants in terms of ground rent theory; they are consumers of the commodity
home. “Home” is produced by a capitalist company (often today a “property management
company”), which valorizes labor in the usual ways. This capitalist producer is sometimes a
tenant paying rent to a landowner, and at other times the capitalist producer is also his own
landlord (mirroring the phenomena of agricultural landowners who are also farmers of the land
they own).
Also in Chapter 4, I suggest a new way of understanding why urban rents rise.
Explanations for the increasing unaffordability of rents usually range from the right wing
“there’s not enough housing, build more!” to the left wing “there’s not enough rent regulation;
pass more!” Applying the same methods Marx used in analyzing agricultural rents, I suggest
instead that residential rents rise as the income of tenants rise; that landlords will raise rents
whenever they can, and that the limit to their ability to raise rents is the income of their tenants.
The income of their tenants is, here, the income of the property management company, whose
income is based upon their monthly sale of the commodity home, and so is correlated with the
income of working-class renters.
In Chapter 5, I criticize what I call the epochal theory of the “financialization of land and
housing.” While this literature argues that finance is taking over land and housing, I argue the
opposite: a larger and larger portion of global “financial” revenue is taking the form of ground
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rent. This “housingification of finance” (or, more accurate but even less pronounceable, the
“ground-rentification of finance”) is an important avenue for future research.
Two ideas which I have touched upon in this dissertation demand the most elaboration
and future research. They are (1) my concept of “High-rent commodities,” and (2) the
relationship between the state and the landowning class. I describe “High-rent commodities” as
those commodities whose production process involves paying a large amount of rent
proportional to the whole capital outlay. The “High-rent sectors” producing “High-rent
commodities” are sectors in which landowners have the power to increase the price of the
commodities by threatening withdrawal of their land, thereby creating absolute rent. Future
research might ask, Which sectors are high rent sectors? How does the landowning class affect
these sectors? How does this play out in moments of class struggle?
As for the landowning class and the state, this relationship begs clarification both on the
highest level of abstract theory, and as an avenue of concrete historical study. Marxian state
theory has never moved out of its infancy, and I suspect that investigating the landowning class’
relationship to the state can take us to a new stage in understanding the particular role and
nature of the state in capitalism.
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, this work was motivated by my own
engagement with urban struggles in the United States, which led me to want to understand
more clearly the way in which land and landownership fit into the broader dynamics of
contemporary capitalism. I have said little about the implications of this largely conceptual
investigation – aimed at clarifying core concepts and their interrelationships – for people’s
struggles in urban and rural spaces over the right to land, and I will not resolve this here.
I will say only this, although many of my readers will already know it: Nothing will
permanently fix the housing crisis within capitalism, nor return agricultural and rural land to
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“the people” so long as the capitalist mode of production persists. Because the ownership of land
can yield massive riches, the rich will continue to own land. When necessary, landlords will
subvert regulation, overturn law, or defend their ground rent illegally.
This is no reason to give up pursuing housing and land reform, because control over
territory and mobility makes further organizing possible – every space carved out can be useful.
Control over land, territory, and mobility is essential for overturning the capitalist mode of
production. As we continue to fight for rent regulation, for municipal funding for community
land trusts, for reparations in the form of land grants, for full public housing, for the freedom to
cultivate the land for subsistence rather than profit, we can also have one eye on a horizon
beyond this world.
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